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FORCE

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THE PROBLEM OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
SUICIDE OR SANITY?

LETTERS TO JOHN BULL & OTHERS

"Robert the Peeler"



[Frontispiece

FORCE

BY
LORD DAVIES

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To my old friend and parliamentary colleague

GEORGE BARNES,

who has devoted his life to the
advancement of Justice
and Peace

“It is just that whatsoever is just should be pursued, it is necessary that whatsoever is strongest should be pursued.

“Justice without Force is impotent: Force without Justice is a tyranny.

“Justice without Force is a myth, because there are always the bad men; Force without Justice stands convicted of itself.

“We must therefore put together Justice and Force; and therefore so dispose things that whatsoever is just is mighty, and whatsoever is mighty is just.”

PASCAL.

PREFACE

THERE are certain elementary principles which I believe should be ingrained in the minds of all civilised persons—because they constitute the bedrock of human society. Amongst these principles is the right or moral use of force. Believing that there is still a vast confusion of thought concerning this subject, and that never was it more necessary to clarify our conceptions, I have endeavoured to treat of it in this book in the hope of stimulating discussion and thus arriving at the truth. It is clear that the reign of law will never be evolved out of the existing anarchy until we have solved the problem of the right use of force. It is also clear that this element in human affairs cannot be organised and directed for right purposes until we are agreed as to what those purposes should be, both in the domestic and international spheres.

In *The Problem of the Twentieth Century* I have tried to outline a plan for the organisation of force as an instrument of international justice. I realise, however, that without a moral foundation no plan is likely to succeed. Consequently, this book is an attempt to construct a foundation which I trust may be of assistance to all those who are engaged in building the New Commonwealth of Justice and Peace.

DAVIES.

March 1934.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

" Force and Right are the governors of this world, Force till Right is ready."—JOURBERT. •

THE eternal struggle between reason and passion still holds the world in its relentless grip. Recent events in every country and the proceedings at Geneva portray a sinister picture in which the forces of reason are pitted against the blind fury of the passions. In national affairs freedom and democracy are being submerged by the onslaught of tyranny and despotism. In the international sphere the growing association and co-operation of nations is frustrated and delayed by the lure of nationalism and the survival of the spirit of imperialism. Once more the protagonists of Policy are engaged in an assault upon the citadel of Justice. It is around this stronghold that all the struggles and conflicts of mankind have been fought. It is for this ideal that countless lives and boundless treasure have so unselfishly been expended. Has all this expenditure been in vain?

The concept of justice is immutable, but it is based upon a progressive morality. It strives to produce a system of human relationships, founded upon righteousness, in which reason and conscience are the sole arbiters of conduct. Policy, on the other hand, is based upon selfishness. It is the product of self-interest and intolerance; and ministers to arbitrary prejudices and mystic emotions which brook no restraint. It pursues its course regardless

of all considerations of right and wrong. Justice or righteousness is the goal of the human race. Policy, or self-interest, is the objective of the factions. It is because individuals, groups, and nations have taken the law into their own hands, and have imposed, or tried to impose, by force, their wills, theories, cultures, and desires—in short, their policies—upon others that the world now finds itself in such a deplorable and unhappy condition.¹ For the moment the factions, whether they are represented by dictatorships in the national communities or by sovereign States in the international sphere, have repudiated the reign of law and the principles of liberty, equality, toleration, and federalism.

In many countries the factions have destroyed the institutions which stood for democracy. Representative government has been suppressed. The elementary rights of the individual, the systems for dispensing justice, the hard-fought liberties of the peoples, have all been swept away by adventurers and opportunists as abysmally ignorant of the fundamental principles of government as they are blatantly ambitious and dangerously fanatical. It is almost incredible that, in the twentieth century, there should be so many instances of the cynical repudiation of those principles which were gradually and painfully developed during the preceding centuries. Well may we exclaim with the Psalmist :

¹ A most striking confirmation of this truth is found in the admission of the Sinn Féin P. S. O'Hegarty—"We derided the moral law and said there was no law but the law of force. And the moral law answered us. Every devilish thing we did against the British went its full circle and then boomeranged and smote us ten-fold : and the cumulative effect of the whole of it was a general moral weakening and a general degradation and a general cynicism and disbelief in either virtue or decency, in goodness or uprightness or honesty. The Irregulars drove patriotism and honesty and morality out of Ireland."—*The Victory of Sinn Féin*, p. 125.

“Thou hast made us to drink the wine of astonishment.” Why this failure to live up to the ideals of nineteenth-century reformers? Why, in so many parts of Europe, and indeed of the world, has there been a recrudescence of the mentality of the Middle Ages?

If we turn to the domain of international affairs, we find that the sovereign nations, dominated by imperialistic and nationalistic motives, have succeeded in undermining the moral authority of the League and in preventing it from becoming an instrument for the administration of justice. How is it that the League, born in the throes of the greatest and bloodiest of wars, has not developed into an international authority with the power to dispense justice and to inaugurate the peace of righteousness?

The answer to these questions is fairly simple. It is because individuals and nations have not yet, in spite of the lessons and experience of the past, recognised and acted upon the fundamental principle that the exercise of force should be limited to the police function. In the last resort it is the element of force which decides the issue. Either it is the servant of justice or the tool of policy. It cannot serve two masters. Organised and controlled by the factions, it is used to blast the liberties of the peoples, to destroy representative government, to prostitute the administration of justice and to serve the interests of one section or class of the community at the expense of all the others. In the hands of sovereign States force is employed to rob and to kill, to foster a war mentality, to breed the combative instinct, to thwart the development of international law and, in the end, to annihilate what is left of our civilisation.

Consequently, the crucial problem is the right use of force. For what purposes may it be morally and usefully employed in the domestic and international spheres? Unfortunately there is much confusion of thought upon this subject. But there can be no real security or progress until general agreement has been reached and has been expressed in terms of national and international organisation. There are some who desire to abolish force of every kind. That, however, is merely to revert to a state of anarchy. Then there are those who still believe in the duelling system or trial by battle. They belong to the factions who assert that force is still to be regarded as an instrument of policy. If they cannot attain their objectives by peaceful methods, then they resort to violence. Lastly, there are those who recognise that force is indispensable as the servant of justice and that its functions should be limited to protection against aggression and the enforcement of municipal and international law.

Here we have three distinct points of view. Which of them do we support? In a matter of such vital importance there can be no neutrality. We must be either abolitionists, duellists, or policemen. Obviously, before we can decide we must clarify our minds and satisfy ourselves that a moral basis for the employment of force can be found.

The problem is urgent for two reasons. First, because the potentialities of force have assumed gigantic proportions within the last twenty-five years. Since the scientific discoveries and inventions of the World War its powers of sheer annihilation and its destructive properties have been vastly increased. Secondly, because this is a matter which concerns everyone. It is not merely an academic question, for upon its solution depend the lives, happiness,

and prosperity of future generations. As Mr. Baldwin has said : " Who in Europe does not know that one more war in the west, and the civilisation of the ages will fall with as great a shock as that of Rome ? " Mr. Winston Churchill puts it thus : " Death stands at attention, obedient, expectant, ready to serve, ready to shear away the peoples *en masse* ; ready, if called on, to pulverise, without hope of repair, what is left of civilisation." ¹

At the moment those warnings fall upon deaf ears. The simple question which confronts us is, what is the right use of force ? How, in a world seething with violent passions and disorderly impulses, can it be employed to restrain the law-breaker and the aggressor ? How can it be used and organised in welding together the fabric of human society so as to secure justice, maintain peace, and provide a sure foundation for the continued progress and evolution of mankind ?

¹ W. S. Churchill, *The World Crisis : The Aftermath*, pp. 454-455.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF FORCE

"To solve this great problem will require the concentrated effort of all the great nations in concert, and if this is to be forthcoming it will be necessary for them to understand that the solution of this problem is the supreme need of civilised mankind."—VISCOUNT GREY.

I

*The Nature
of Force*

FORCE in its widest sense represents the instrument by which individuals and nations seek to impose their wills upon other persons and communities. In its highest form it is expressed in terms of ethics or morality and, as such, is the product of conscience and reason, manifesting itself in discussion and argument no less than in conduct and example. The character of one man may leave an indelible impression upon the lives of thousands of other men, which means that to this extent their actions have conformed to his will. The force of a great example equipped with a moral purpose has been reflected in the actions of individuals and nations, and the most striking instance is to be found in the life and death of Christ. On the other hand, even when intellect and reason are divorced from conscience and morality, the force of example may still be potent, and this fact is illustrated in the career and achievements of Napoleon.

Religious movements, intellectual crusades, political campaigns, and all forms of moral suasion are intended to exert pressure upon the ideas and actions of other people. The force of reason is displayed in debate and literature when, through the medium of

speech or the written word, a person or group endeavours to influence the ideas and actions of others. This species of force, however, is clearly distinguishable from other forms because it lacks the element of coercion or compulsion. Every variety of moral suasion implies that individuals or nations are perfectly free to accept or reject the ideas or courses of action suggested to them without incurring any direct risk or penalty.

Consequently, the application of force in its usual or narrower sense denotes a coercive act on the part of an individual, group or nation in an attempt to impose their respective wills upon other persons, groups or nations. This definition, recognised in the realm of municipal law, which relies upon a compelling agency in the form of sanctions to execute the decrees of justice, is the only one which has a bearing upon the enforcement of international law.

Coercive force may be applied in various ways. It is not confined to physical violence, the threat and exercise of which place a restraint upon the freedom and actions of individuals and nations. In the economic sphere it is expressed in passive or negative acts intended to exert pressure by producing a state of poverty and starvation. Such, for instance, are industrial strikes and lock-outs, when combinations of labour or capital endeavour to impose their wills upon each other or even upon the whole community.¹ Internationally, this form of coercion may

¹ There are four kinds of strikes: the common, the domestic, the sympathetic, and the general.

The first is the ordinary variety directed by employees against their employers with the object of securing higher wages, shorter hours or other improved conditions of employment. It is an instrument which is used by labour organisations to exert pressure upon capitalistic agencies.

The second is applied by Trade Unions as a means of compelling individuals to join their ranks, or to renew their membership. It

be applied to a nation through the instrumentality of an economic boycott or blockade.¹

Similarly, in the financial relationships between individuals or nations, the element of compulsion is in constant operation, and the power of the purse is a potent factor for good or evil, which enters into almost every department of human activity.

II

The Employment of Force

AT the bottom of the scale, force manifests itself in acts of physical violence culminating in the disablement, disarmament or death of one of the combatants. In the animal kingdom this species

may also be employed by one Trade Union as an instrument to attack a similar organisation which is alleged to have encroached upon its preserves. It may therefore be described as a kind of tyranny or civil war in which the majority exerts pressure upon the minority. Thus even in free and democratic communities, the individual may be coerced into abandoning his liberty of action, not only in the industrial but also in the political sphere.

The sympathetic strike is undertaken by a Union or group which is not directly involved in the dispute on the ground that its participation may assist a kindred organisation.

A general strike carries the idea underlying the sympathetic strike to its logical conclusion. It is aimed at the whole community, and seeks to bring the national machine to a standstill. Consequently it has a political object which it hopes to achieve by exerting pressure upon the Government.

All these varieties attempt to impose the will of groups of persons upon other individuals or groups through the exercise of force, irrespective of the rights or wrongs in any particular dispute.

¹ This was strikingly demonstrated in November 1921. Amidst negotiations concerning the delimitation of the frontier, Jugo-Slav troops were reported to be advancing on Albanian soil. The British Government immediately telegraphed to the Secretary-General asking him to summon a meeting of the Council to consider the application of the economic boycott of Article 16 to Serbia, unless the troops were at once withdrawn. The Council met in a week, but Serbia had already withdrawn, explaining that it had no alternative in view of the threat.—*Annual Register*, 1921, p. 155; League of Nations *Monthly Summary*, 1921, p. 174.

of coercion is the dominating factor of existence and constitutes the sanction of the jungle. It is governed by instinct and passion and is unrestrained by morality or reason.

In the circle of human relationships physical violence operates in divers ways. In sport and athletics it has been circumscribed by rules and customs which minutely regulate its application. Under these conditions it becomes a test of endurance, strength, skill, and character. The boxer or the wrestler must conform strictly to the regulations under which these contests are held : otherwise, he is precluded from participating in them altogether. Similarly in civilised communities the degree of violence to which individuals may resort, even in self-defence, is strictly prescribed by law.¹ If the amount of physical force exceeds the degree warranted by the circumstances in any given case, the individual is guilty of a crime and may be punished.

The same rule applies to the State in its relationship to individuals. It may only employ force under certain conditions and subject to certain restrictions. The arm of the law may only strike within the compass of carefully drafted regulations imposed by the community.

It follows that wherever justice is administered force is only allowed to operate within well-defined limits. If these limits are surpassed, either by private individuals or by the police, redress and compensation may be obtained by appealing to the courts of law.

¹ The limitation of physical force is effected by the civil and criminal law of assault, which make the unlawful application of force to the person of another an offence against the law of the land as well as a wrong actionable at his suit. The limitation of moral suasion is effected by the law of intimidation and conspiracy.

In the past, force has constituted the governing factor in international relationships, and the power of coercion has usually been the decisive argument in the settlement of disputes. The orthodox procedure was to destroy the forces of the opponent first and to enquire into the merits of the case afterwards. The claims of justice were thrust on one side. National interests alone dictated policy, which, in turn, was governed by the amount of force which could be employed. In the international jungle a condition of anarchy prevailed. Morality and reason were completely subjugated to the iron hand of force. Unbridled violence assumed the rôle of arbitrator and combined the functions of judge, jury, and police. Instead of being the servant of the law, it arrogated to itself the office of the law-giver. Masquerading in the garb of legality, it imposed its own rules and regulations under the ridiculous description of the "laws of war."

III

*The
Character
of Force*

IT will thus be seen that the character of force is determined by the purpose for which it is employed. Divorced from morality and justice and applied blindly and indiscriminately without restraint by nations and individuals, it becomes an instrument of tyranny and the scourge of human society. On the other hand, when force is the handmaid of justice, it becomes the executor of right and the custodian of peace. As such, it imposes impartially the will of the whole community, as expressed in its laws, upon all its members. In every civilised country morality and reason, upon which the laws are founded, have transformed

force into a coercive agency to deter the aggressor and to hold the criminal in awe. Like all other elements in human affairs, it is liable to abuse ; but held in the leash of the law, curbed by public opinion and circumscribed by legislative enactments, it provides the security indispensable to the progress of mankind.¹

Regarded from this standpoint, the application of force cannot be described as immoral. Some people condemn the use of physical force under any circumstances. They imagine that crime and aggression will disappear as soon as the coercive agency has been withdrawn. Unfortunately the history of mankind does not substantiate this view. It is a record of the ceaseless struggle between anarchy and order, between justice and force. The experience of centuries demonstrates conclusively that justice cannot become effective without the assistance of force, whilst force must always be subservient to the dictates of the law.² And yet the opponents of physical force are content to avail themselves of police protection and do not agitate for its withdrawal. They protest against the infamous use of force in the horrors of a sanguinary war, though they vehemently oppose the establishment of any international system which seeks to use it for the achievement of a moral purpose. The day may come when "the wolf and the lamb shall feed together," but so long as criminal instincts and disorderly impulses manifest them-

¹ "The only effective friend of peace in a big city is the man who makes the police force thoroughly efficient, who tries to remove the causes of crime, but who unhesitatingly insists upon the punishment of criminals."—Theodore Roosevelt, *Why America Should Join the Allies*, p. 42.

² "Wherever justice is established, there, in the resulting unity, peace will inevitably be found."—W. S. M. Knight, *Hugo Grotius*, p. 220.

selves in individuals and nations, force will remain an essential factor in the conduct of national and international affairs.¹ As the moral sense of every community develops, the need for its employment will diminish, and this dictum will equally apply to international relationships when nations are prepared to submit themselves to the reign of law.

IV

*The Right
Use of Force
expressed
in the
Police
Function*

WHAT, then, is to be regarded as the right use of force? On behalf of what moral purpose can its services be enlisted? For centuries it has showered its offerings upon the altar of self-defence. It has carried one brand of civilisation after another to the remotest corners of the globe. It has cast down mighty empires; it has trampled upon dynasties, religions, constitutions, and nationalities. It has blazed the trail of economic development, and rescued backward races from the bondage of barbarism. But only in the imperial and national spheres has force ministered to the necessities of justice. Municipal law has claimed it to provide an efficient sanction and, except in times of revolution, it has loyally maintained this rôle. During periods of anarchy and civil war it may temporarily have usurped the supreme authority,

¹ "The idea that a large new extension of the scale of human co-operation, the beginning of an effective social life among nations, can be conducted on a higher moral plane than the social life within the most civilised of nations, dispensing with that element of coercion in government which no State dare dispense with, cannot claim serious consideration. The evil which the use of force involves varies not with the amount of force, but with the mode of its employment and the end to which it is applied. Force employed as the only means of breaking down a forcible obstacle to justice is not an evil but a good, provided it is not excessive."—J. A. Hobson, *Towards International Government*, p. 88.

only to resume its former position when the crisis had passed.

And if nations become imbued with respect for the law ; if national legislation is able to reflect stages of moral advancement ; if the federal system is allowed to develop ; if the egotism of nationalism is superseded by a recognition of the unity of mankind ; and if the members of each democratic community respond to the claims of their civic responsibilities ; then the recurrence of civil no less than international strife will become less frequent and may gradually disappear.

It follows that in all civilised and democratic communities the right use of force within the confines of each State is strictly limited to the police function. Except, as we have seen, in times of national upheaval this character is recognised and endorsed by public opinion.

Immediately the international frontier is crossed, however, force divests itself of its police uniform. It appears in "shining armour," completely accoutred with the weapons of war. No longer is force the mainstay of justice. It assumes the rôle of the renegade law-giver and the relentless aggressor. It has completely changed its character, and henceforward rides rough-shod over every institution, human or divine. It may well be asked why a frontier line should possess this magic power of transformation.

Every rational being who witnessed the spectacle of the World War, every man and woman with a spark of imagination who reads its history, cannot help being amazed that even in the twentieth century the right use of force in international relationships has not yet been recognised. In the cold light of reason it is clear that between nations, as between

individuals, force should never be applied except to compel obedience to the law and to restrain the aggressor.

The establishment of the League, equipped with a deliberative assembly, a quasi-executive council, and a permanent secretariat, and the creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice have already exposed the absurdity of the duelling system. When the existing machinery has been supplemented by a tribunal empowered to settle all disputes upon grounds of equity and good conscience every vestige of excuse for the continued prostitution of force will have been removed.

It cannot be dispensed with: the problem is not how to abolish it, but how to use it.¹ Force can only be rightly employed when it has been scientifically organised as the sanction of international law in the form of an international police force.²

V

Conclusion

THE problem of the right use of force has still to be solved in the realm of international relationships. The framers of the Covenant evaded the issue. They refused to recognise that amongst all civilised and democratic communities

¹ "This treaty shall put force back of righteousness, shall provide a method of securing by the exercise of force the observance of solemn international obligations."—Theodore Roosevelt, *Why America Should Join the Allies*, p. 23.

² "All power to coerce should henceforth be put at the disposal of the community, and no longer be wielded by the unlimited sovereignty of the powerful nations. . . . Let it be said again and not for the last time, the only solution of the problem of disarmament lies in the organisation of the World-Community in such a way that power may be used only as a weapon of the World-Community against law-breakers."—Salvador de Madariaga, *Disarmament*, pp. 143, 195.

force can only be morally expressed in the performance of a police function. They failed to distinguish between this function and the right of self-defence. Consequently, their projected scheme of disarmament was still-born, and the right to make war remains.

At the conclusion of the World War force, bleeding and emaciated, might have become the willing slave of justice and the custodian of peace. Imperialism, however, willed otherwise. Exalting the mystic properties of the sovereign State, clinging to the ancient right of imposing its will unimpeded by the law of nations, it rescued force from the bondage of international law, and sought to prostitute it once more in the service of tyranny and oppression. It remains for the reformers of the future to give force its rightful place in the sphere of international relationships. They cannot afford to wait indefinitely. Shrunken in body, chastened in spirit, with feeble pulse and halting gait, force is slowly but surely recovering from the shock of Armageddon. The surgeons may perform minor operations and amputations, but so long as the patient is free to recuperate in the atmosphere of ultra-sovereignty, he will rapidly increase in weight and, assuming his old robust character, will once more wreak his vengeance on mankind. If, however, in the meantime the energies of force can be enlisted in the service of morality and reason, the progress and prosperity of humanity will be assured for centuries to come.

CHAPTER III

FORCE AND DEMOCRACY

"Government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth."—ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

I

*Denuncia-
tion of
Democracy*

IN these days it has become fashionable to rail at democracy. Why? Because democracy is alleged to be responsible, in some mysterious way, for all the troubles and disasters which afflict the world at this moment. Economic depression, financial stringency, failure to maintain law and order, warlike proclivities, rabid nationalism, intolerable injustices—they are all laid at the door of democracy. The democratic system is damned because it has not produced Utopia in the twinkling of an eye.¹ Its detractors are usually those people who, before the War, were conspicuous supporters of the international system which produced it. They have been reinforced by a multitude of youthful and ardent critics who had no experience of the War and whose ignorance is only equalled by their fanaticism. All these apostles of the new dictatorships, whether

¹ "Our democracy of yesterday had died: its testament had been read: it had bequeathed us naught but chaos."—Signor Mussolini, *My Autobiography*, p. 118.

"Liberalism and Democracy . . . exhausted their energies in the halls of Parliaments . . . Liberalism and Democracy, which had abdicated their duty at every turn, utterly failed to appraise and adjust the rights and duties of the various classes in Italian life."—*Id.*, p. 253.

"'Democracy' has almost succeeded in leading the world to destruction."—*The Fascist*, August 1933.

they are fascists or communists, are so hypnotised by their crude nationalistic or economic creeds that they refuse to recognise a fact which is obvious to most people. It is this, that our present calamities—economic, financial, and social—can be traced to the War and the mentality which the War produced.

II

WAR psychology did not disappear when the Armistice was signed. It has been rampant ever since. It has lowered the standard of morality in politics, business, and in almost every sphere of human activity.¹ The material results have been no less startling, and the economic collapse, involving financial stringency and unemployment, is directly attributable to the War.² During recent years it has become fashionable to produce other scapegoats.³ But it is a commonplace that every war has been followed by its after-

*Economic
Depression
due to War*

¹ "The entire world found itself in a crisis of disbelief. Disbelief in the established social order . . . disbelief in the economic order of individualistic capitalism . . . disbelief in 'middle-class' moral standards, especially in matters of sex: disbelief in older values such as thriftiness, diligence, respectability, even property-owning: disbelief in any absolute scale of values whatsoever . . . disbelief in real progress: and finally disbelief in the ability of the human reason to make anything coherent out of the muddle that is life. Such a wholesale collapse of established values produced an unbreathable atmosphere. A crisis of civilisation!"—Edgar Mowrer, *Germany Puts the Clock Back*, p. 34.

² "Armand Gatières, who was no economist, believed that the War was the direct cause of most of this misery. It had dislocated the mechanism of the international machine—so delicately poised in the industrial era. It had broken the rhythm of life, and all the War debts had put burdens on the human drudge beyond his strength."—Sir Philip Gibbs, *The Cross of Peace*, p. 223.

³ "Nor are we left in much doubt as to the nature of the causes that have been at work to produce these distresses. Some of these arise from conditions quite independent of the War, and which were

math of acute suffering and depression. The Napoleonic Wars plunged Europe into the direst poverty. From London to Moscow starvation and penury stalked in the rear of the returning armies. Half the population of Great Britain became the recipients of poor relief. Even in those days America did not escape, and the economic plight of Europe was reflected in the widespread depression of her trade and commerce.¹

Because the last war was unprecedented in its destruction of life and property, and because nations are now more interdependent, the economic upheaval has been on a far greater scale than any of those which preceded it. There are now millions of unemployed in every country. During the War there were no unemployed because the demands of the armies were inexhaustible. These demands called forth all the ingenuity and resources of the scientists. Feverishly they doubled and trebled the capacity of the machine in order to release more men for the battle-field. During the four years of intensive struggle scientific processes of production

spreading before that catastrophe began. The War only precipitated and aggravated evils in our economic system which were already becoming visible to observant eyes. No permanent remedy is attainable until these evils have been thoroughly diagnosed and skilfully and courageously eradicated."—D. Lloyd George, *The Truth about Reparations and War-Debts*, p. 4.

¹ Thus Henry Clay, speaking in the House of Representatives in March 1824, said that "the most prominent circumstance which fixes our attention and challenges our deepest regret is the general distress which pervades the whole country. . . . It is indicated by the diminished exports of native produce, by the repressed and reduced state of our foreign navigation, by our diminished commerce, by successive unthreshed crops of grain perishing in our barns and barnyards for the want of a market. . . . This distress pervades every part of the Union, every class of society, all feel it. It is like the atmosphere which surrounds us—all must inhale it and none can escape it."

and labour-saving devices were introduced at an accelerated rate. Before the War these changes had come about gradually. They did not generate an earthquake, and after a few tremors were absorbed in the economic system. When the Armistice came, however, these inventions were transferred *en bloc* to peaceful industry. Like a spate, they arrived with a rush, inundating one trade after another. In the confusion which followed there was no time to adapt the conditions of labour to the scientific processes which had been evolved.

The pre-War elasticity of the economic system failed to assert itself, because the War had dealt it a shattering blow. The battle-fields were deserted, and men thronged back to the avocations of peace. What did they find? In many instances that the mechanisation of industry imposed by the War had deprived them of their jobs. Their services had become superfluous, and the depleted resources of every country were insufficient to provide new capital and remunerative employment. Moreover, the delicate mechanism of the economic and financial machines had been completely thrown out of gear during the progress of the struggle. No steps were taken to repair the damage. On the contrary, instead of a complete overhaul, a deliberate policy of sabotage was cheerfully undertaken. More grit was thrown into the machinery. War debts, reparations, tariffs, subsidies and other nostrums have almost brought it to a complete standstill.

III

BUT what have all these things to do with the *Democracy and the War* system of democracy? Was democracy primarily or mainly responsible for the World War? It is true that Great Britain, France, and

America were units in the international system which caused the catastrophe and were, therefore, in a measure responsible for it. But did they deliberately plan the War? Did they, at the last moment, refuse to make an effort to prevent it? Were they all armed to the teeth on sea and on land? Did they exalt the cult of militarism as an end in itself? In short, did the democratic system breed the War, which is the *fons et origo* of our troubles? I imagine that the majority of fair-minded people who are not blinded by national prejudice will answer these questions in the negative. Then why blame democracy for our present plight?

It is also true that democracy won the War, but if professions mean anything they won it in order to destroy militarism.¹ That they have since been false to their professions does not invalidate the democratic system. It only means that, having been submerged by imperialism,² nationalism, fascism, communism, and a host of other "isms," democratic principles have been trampled under foot.

IV

*Basis of
Democracy*

HUMAN happiness and progress can only flourish in an atmosphere of justice. This atmosphere is more likely to be found in a democratic community than anywhere else. The reason is not far to seek. The essence of democracy—government by discussion and consent—is that

¹ "The militarism which for five years the Allied governments never ceased to curse in their solemn proclamations."—Gustave Le Bon, *The World in Revolt*, p. 240.

² For the repugnance of imperialism to the principles of democracy see *post*, chap. VI, p. 50.

force shall only be employed for policing purposes. The democratic system is based upon two great principles both of which operate to restrict the purposes for which the element of force may be utilised. First it implies equality in the eyes of the law. Justice is meted out impartially between man and man. Whatever the social position of the parties to a dispute, the same law will be applied: there is no distinction between rich and poor, peer and peasant, all are treated alike. The judge and jury are not concerned with any inequalities of rank or station. Religious, political, cultural, and racial differences are of no account.¹ Nor are convictions sought on grounds of policy or for reasons of State. If they have been wrongfully treated, individuals may seek redress even against the departments of the Government.² Each case is treated on its merits and according to law. Extraneous influence, irrelevant evidence, and pernicious prejudices are

¹ Contrast the situation in Germany under Nazi rule. "Against the Brown Shirts there is no defence, and for the torture they inflict there is no redress. . . . At Bochum two men belonging to the 'Iron Front' (the working-class organisation which made the last and strongest stand against the Nazis before the Republican collapse and is therefore particularly exposed to Hitlerite vengeance) were assaulted by Brown Shirts. They were arrested, but the judge dismissed the case, for they had obviously acted in self-defence. Soon afterwards the judge was himself arrested and beaten by Brown Shirts, and instead of receiving redress he was temporarily suspended. *The independence of the German judiciary has, for the time being, ceased to exist.*"—*Manchester Guardian Weekly*, April 21st, 1933.

Cf. the French Revolutionary Tribunal established March 10th, 1793, an extraordinary court designed to try all offences against the Revolution without appeal. The jury received wages and voted openly, so that condemnation was almost certain.

² There have been many cases where convictions have been quashed on appeal and the Government has been compelled by public opinion to grant compensation to the aggrieved party. The case of Oscar Slater is a well-known example.

banished from the purview of the courts. The supreme objective is, in the words of Justinian, "to render everyone his due." This, of course, does not mean that miscarriages of justice never take place. These are, however, exceptions which do not invalidate the system.

Therefore, we may with confidence assert that equality in the eyes of the law is one of the hallmarks of democratic government. If it is absent it means that the spirit of democracy is dead even though its form continues to survive.¹

Such a system obviously deprives individuals or groups of any right to take the law into their own hands to impose their ideas or inflict injury upon others. If a man or a group has a grievance, if they are injured or defrauded, the courts are open for redress. The case will be pleaded and adjudicated upon in a judicial atmosphere. Moreover, it is certain that the verdict will be executed, because organised and armed force is the monopoly of the Government, and the Government is directly responsible to the representatives of the people. Under this regime the sole use of force is to protect the law-abiding citizen and to execute the decisions of the courts.

¹ Thus equality before the law was non-existent in Germany even before the counter-revolution of 1933. *Vide* E. A. Mowrer, *Germany Puts the Clock Back*, chap. xvii, for a survey of "the astonishing pronouncements of the German Supreme Tribunal." "Of all professions, the judges seemed the most resolute and effective opponents of the Republican regime, and in studying their activity under the democratic Republic the word *sabotage* involuntarily arises to the inquiring mind." "Their own class, the upper levels of society, nobility, University-corps brothers, officers, fellow-officials, Nationalists, must be judged differently from the common herd in the street. . . . They and the rich and the patriotic are right because they are conservative."

V

THE second principle underlying democracy proclaims the right of citizens to participate in the government of their country and, if they think fit, to change the Government by peaceful methods. During the nineteenth century the democratic system was developed so as to confer upon the majority of citizens, not only legal equality, but also political equality in the making of the laws. With each extension of the franchise, this right has been asserted until to-day, in democratic States, adult suffrage is the rule and not the exception. Through the system of parliamentary representation—the Anglo-Saxon contribution to the development of democratic government—every person is able by registering his vote to exert his influence upon the affairs of the nation. He is thus able to assume an indirect share in the government of his country and in the framing of its laws. It follows that once he has assumed this responsibility he is morally debarred from trying to alter the laws or to change the form of government by a resort to force. If he is dissatisfied with the laws and wishes to change them, he possesses a constitutional remedy. He must use his vote and persuade his fellow-voters to use theirs, to effect the desired reforms. In other words, he must have recourse to reason and discussion. Trial by battle is ruled out. He is precluded from employing forcible means.

Participation in Government and Legislation

In these circumstances he has forfeited the "sacred right of rebellion."¹ This ancient doctrine, cherished by revolutionaries in every age, cannot be

¹ "When the government violates the people's rights insurrection is, for the people and for each section of the people, the most sacred

recognised. It is treason to the community. Such a right finds no place in a society which is governed by reason and discussion, and in which every member is entitled to play a part in framing the laws and determining the policy of his country. No longer does the citizen possess the moral right to invoke the aid of force or physical violence to attain his objectives. The national legislature is the forum where all his grievances can be discussed and redressed. It is the battle-ground where the factions may have their fling. It is the court of revision, where the laws can be adapted to meet the changing needs of the community. It is the safety-valve for superfluous steam which prevents the boiler from exploding.

But, above all, this system limits the exercise of force to the police function—the protection of the individual and the enforcement of the law. In a democratic State organised force becomes the monopoly of the government. It is wielded by a group of persons directly responsible for their actions to the representatives of the electors. The outstanding merit of democracy is that it provides a moral basis for the elementary responsibility of maintaining law and order, thus creating the conditions essential for the peaceful development of the community and the security of its individual members. Force must be the servant of the people and the guardian of the law. Its employment for any other purpose cannot be morally justified, nor can its existence be tolerated in any other quarter.

of rights and the most indispensable of duties.”—Article 35 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man of June 24th, 1793.

Cf. “Insurrection is the holiest of duties.”—General Lafayette, to the Constituent Assembly, February 20th, 1790.

VI

IN a recently published book there occurs the *Property and Force* amazing assertion that "there is not the slightest doubt that the British capitalists, just so soon as they are thoroughly alarmed, will organise all their forces—their physical forces—in order to attack by violence and terror everything which threatens their position. To suppose anything else is to fall a victim to the most pitiful illusions."¹ To this the reply is that "British capitalists"—which term, we presume, embraces all owners of property—recognise that a minority of property-owners has no more right to flout the law and resort to force in defence of its property than a Communist minority, for instance, has of trampling upon the democratic system, ignoring the legislature and raising or seducing armed forces with the object of seizing private property by forcible means. Let us suppose, for example, that a bill is introduced and passed by a Socialist or Communist majority confiscating property and handing it over to the State. Have property-owners a moral right to resist such an enactment by a resort to force? Certainly not. Laws may be just or unjust. In a democracy it is for the electorate to decide. The remedy of those who are dispossessed is not to appeal to force, but to the common sense and fair play of the voters, with the object of winning their support in modifying or rescinding the confiscatory Act. If they fail, we can only conclude that the majority of the people of the country consider the law to be just and reasonable, and that therefore it must be obeyed and executed.

¹ John Strachey, *The Menace of Fascism*, p. 178.

VII

*Force and
Passive
Resistance*

THE application of force is, therefore, morally justified only in the performance of the police function. And it is important to note that when it is thus applied in a democratic community force may contribute towards securing the amendment or repeal of law. It may be argued that there is no intrinsic virtue in the rule of a majority which may at any time tyrannise over a minority. Let us suppose, for instance, that a majority of the electors has returned to power a party which proceeds to pass a law violating the moral sense of a minority. Further, that this minority, on grounds of conscience, refuses to carry out the provisions of such a law, offering, however, a purely passive resistance, without resort to forcible means. For their disobedience the law-breakers and defaulters will be haled before the courts and will probably be punished. But in suffering the penalties inflicted, the resisters will direct public attention in a striking manner to what they consider to be the iniquity and injustice of the law. Public opinion may thus be convinced that an injustice has been perpetrated, and that a revision of the law should be obtained through constitutional means.

Such passive resistance, therefore, though, like active resistance or resort to force, it can never be recognised as legal or constitutional or be allowed to pass unchallenged in a democratic State, may nevertheless serve a useful purpose. The mere fact that in practice it may be invoked acts as a brake upon the activities of tyrannical legislators. It is also a reminder to the electorate of its responsibilities as the ultimate determining authority. History affords many instances of the reaction of public

opinion in support of such protestations. The old precept that "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church" is not confined to ecclesiastical manifestations of resistance. Bigotry and intolerance obtrude themselves in many spheres. They are not unknown even in democratic communities. New forms of tyranny and oppression may appear which require acts of passive heroism, moral courage, and self-sacrifice to awaken a democracy from its apathy and torpor.

But without force exercised as the sanction of the law passive resistance would have no significance. The proof of the existence of conscientious objection and the test of its sincerity would alike be lacking. If force was not organised to enforce the law, no opportunity would be afforded the objector of impressing public opinion by immolating himself on the altar of conscience and thus endeavouring to secure the peaceful revision of the law through the parliamentary institutions of the country. It is the element of force that winnows the wheat from the chaff. It discloses to the electorate the honest and conscientious resister and enables it to discriminate between him and the dishonest politician.

Moreover, it is only in the democratic community that the element of force can, as the sanction of law, hold the balance evenly as between passive resisters on the one hand and the community on the other. It is, therefore, in the democratic community alone that such resistance can secure the modification or rescission of the law without resort to civil strife and bloodshed, because no other system possesses the machinery for the peaceful alteration of the law if the majority of the electorate can be convinced that such revision is just and necessary.

VIII

*Force and
Democracy*

THE conception of the right use of force—the police function—is, therefore, the basic principle underlying the structure of all democratic communities. Once this is repudiated the democratic system has been undermined. If the factions are allowed to arm themselves—in other words, to organise physical violence—then the democratic State ceases to exist. Why? Because the resort to force will have been substituted for the appeal to reason. Policy will have usurped the place of justice. The liberty of the individual and his freedom of conscience will be destroyed, and he will be forced to acquiesce in an unlawful and unconstitutional policy which he may abhor. The impartiality of the courts¹ and the freedom of the press² will also disappear, no less than all the

¹ In the *Deutsche Juristenzeitung* Dr. Dietrich-Hechingen, a presiding State judge, wrote as follows in defence of his Nazi comrades: "In order to achieve the national objective all sorts of activities may be necessary. No one has ever supposed that a soldier in the field who as part of his military duty commits acts of physical violence, homicide, damage to property, and other acts that are normally criminal, is liable to punishment. What applies in the case of war against a foreign enemy must also be made to apply to the enemy within our frontiers. A judge who has the courage to interpret the law freely can find a way, on these lines, to get over any difficulty."—*Manchester Guardian Weekly*, July 7th, 1933.

² Thus on March 10th, 1933, the *Berliner Tageblatt*, which had criticised the action of the German Government in Bavaria, was suspended for three days. On its reissue it was announced that important changes had taken place in the editorial staff. By the middle of March the Nazis had suppressed almost all the Socialist press, only five out of 192 Socialist papers still appearing. The *Manchester Guardian* Special Correspondent wrote on March 27th that "There is no press in Germany, and no news that is not all obsequiousness to the will of the dictatorship can be told; no truth can be told by the defeated Opposition, and no falsehood told by the Government can be publicly denied." German readers could

guarantees against the blind and indiscriminate use of force.¹ In the long run tyranny, oppression, and injustice will reappear in their worst forms.

This is the alternative to the democratic system even in the twentieth century. If anyone doubts it, let him scrutinise the events which have taken place in Russia, Italy, and Germany within the last twenty years.

With all its drawbacks and imperfections, democracy offers the most stable and just form of government that the world has yet known. Despite its cumbrous procedure, its appeal to mass psychology, its tendency to lower the standards of conduct and culture, and its pandering to ignorant voters, it is the only political system which can ensure the peaceful evolution of mankind. But it can only be maintained and improved at the price of eternal vigilance. A people no longer jealous of its hard-won liberties or a new generation which has never had to struggle for these liberties may, in a moment of depression or fanaticism, throw away its heritage. Instead of bending their energies to the task of making good still find in foreign newspapers the information prohibited in their own ; in April, however, a number of foreign newspapers, including the *Manchester Guardian*, were forbidden in Germany until further notice.

¹ It is the practice in modern constitutions to proclaim certain fundamental rights possessed by the subject. Article 114, for instance, of the German Constitution of 1919, asserts that " Personal liberty is inviolable. An interference with or abridgment of personal liberty through official action is permissible only by authority of law." Other articles assert the inviolability of the house of every German, and of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communication, the right of all Germans freely to express their views, the illegality of a censorship, the right of meeting in public without notice or special permission, and the right of association for purposes not contrary to the criminal law.

President Hindenburg's decree of February 28th, 1933, which placed Germany under an absolute dictatorship, suspends the articles of the 1919 Constitution which guarantee these rights.

the defects of the system, they may consign it to the scrap-heap.

But a return to despotism or oligarchy cannot easily be accomplished if the democratic community insists that the rôle of force is limited to the police function. Only thus can the factions be held in awe. They must be deterred from attempting to brow-beat and terrorise their fellow-citizens, and a democratic government which allows them to do so is guilty of treason to the whole community. So long as force is the monopoly of the Government and is exclusively controlled by the representatives of the nation, so long will the fabric of the democratic State hold together. But this principle must be strictly and impartially enforced. Let it be betrayed and force will again become the weapon of policy.

On the other hand, if the political parties or factions are allowed to organise and control their own storm troops or shock battalions, then the security and well-being of the whole community will be compromised. The nation will become the prey of a mentality which is obsessed by the idea that all disorders can be cured by the application of force.¹ For a time the iron grip of a dictator may produce the semblance of order and prosperity. But, under the surface, the fires of discontent and faction will burn all the more fiercely. We are reminded of the man in the parable to whom the evil spirit returned,

¹ Compare the admission of the Sinn Féin O'Hegarty: "With the vanishing of reason and principle and morality we became a mob, and a mob we remained. And for the mob there is only one law—gun law. So the gunman became supreme: and the only thing which counted in Ireland, in anything, was force, for the spirit of the gunman invaded everything, not politics alone. Thenceforward there was no consideration and no reason and no argument—nothing but blind obedience to something above."—*The Victory of Sinn Féin*, pp. 55-56.

finding him as a house swept and garnished, and then "taketh with himself seven other spirits more wicked than himself, and they enter in and dwell there: and the last state of that man is worse than the first."

In these days there is no lack of evil spirits. They are to be found everywhere. But when despots and oligarchies have done their worst the desire for the restoration of liberties, long repressed, will spring to life again, and the struggle for the "rights of man" will be resumed once more.

IX

THAT is the teaching of history and experience. *Democracy and the Future*
The democratic State is part of the process of evolution. In the long run it is bound to triumph. It may assume varying forms but, in essence, it is the only solid foundation upon which may be erected the federation of mankind, because it is the only system which has solved the problem of the right use of force. For its success it depends upon the development of a progressive morality in the relationship of all sections and classes of the community. This morality, displayed in the characters of individuals, will be reflected, not only in the service of the State, but also in its educational and cultural institutions.¹ Through these channels

¹ The existing educational system is defective: the fundamental ideas of national and international morality find no place in the curriculum of educational institutions. "At a juncture when the maintenance of civilisation depends upon a relatively simple and logical development in the organisation of society, education has not equipped the public mind even to the extent of enabling it to grasp the elements of the argument, the simplest of the issues involved. The implications are unfamiliar to the mass of ordinary men, to the scholars turned out by our schools. . . . The mass of

it will permeate the mass and pave the way for a higher and nobler form of civilisation.

Democracy, therefore, is not an end in itself. It is the dynamic and peaceful instrument for securing the liberty, happiness, and advancement of humanity. It represents a system which harmonises the rights of the individual with the sovereignty and authority of the nation. It is designed to give expression to the inherent and potential qualities of every individual on the basis of a common citizenship.

On the other hand, it is not blind to their passions and vices. Hence the need for the exercise of restraint and the organisation of force, not as the tool of policy, but as the instrument of law. Democracy has solved the problem of the right use of force within the confines of the State. Does it possess the faith, courage, and determination to champion this principle in the wider arena of the world ?

ordinary men who form our voters have not been led to think about the necessary mechanism of society, or to think of society as having a necessary mechanism at all : or to think about the nature of society ; or to be conscious that there is such a thing as a definitely organised society. . . . You will find the modern European asserting such principles as an absolute nationalism because his education simply has not related that thing to the needs of organised societies at all."—Sir Norman Angell, *The Unseen Assassins*, pp. 113-115.

CHAPTER IV
FORCE AND THE
NON-DEMOCRATIC STATE

“ Then none were for a Party,
Then all were for the State.”

MACAULAY.

I

HAVING discussed the moral basis for the *Depend-*
use of force in the democratic community, *cies*
we have now to consider the case of a non-democratic State where the principle of “ government of the people, by the people, for the people ” is non-existent. We have further to distinguish between those countries which are considered to be civilised and those which are regarded as unfitted to assume the full responsibilities of self-government. Such communities are to be found in Asia and Africa. They are described as “ backward.”¹ One of the tests of their backwardness is inability to maintain law and order in their territories. For this, amongst other reasons, they have become appendages of European States, and are still controlled and policed by the latter. The most conspicuous example is the case of India.²

¹ Compare the description in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League : “ Territories . . . which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.”

² For the treatment of these communities see chap. v, p. 57.

II

Non-
democratic
States

LET us first turn, however, to those so-called civilised nations which are either renegade democracies or have never yet been able to attempt the art of self-government. Italy and Germany are two instances of the former, whilst Russia is an example of the latter. The question is whether in non-democratic States the use of force can be limited to the exercise of the police function. If not, what are the other purposes for which it can be justifiably employed?

In the long struggle waged for political freedom in Europe there have been many set-backs and reactions. It is the ebb and flow of the tide which has not yet reached its high-water mark. But throughout the struggle, from the time of John Hampden to our own day, the use of force as the last resort against despotism has received the moral approval of liberal rulers, statesmen, and reformers.¹ This attitude was subsequently endorsed by public opinion. It is true that the brutal excesses perpetrated in these national upheavals—the French Revolution, for example—shocked many foreign

¹ See, for instance, the reference made by Lord Palmerston in his *Civis Romanus sum* speech of June 25th, 1850, to the Greek insurrection of 1843. "The patience of the Greeks was exhausted. They rose in Athens and extorted by force that which had been refused to reason."

In the same speech Lord Palmerston referred to the assistance rendered by the British Government in 1834 to the revolutionary party in Portugal. "Thinking, as we did, that right was on the side of that party with whom waved the constitutional banner, we espoused that cause: and we concluded a treaty between England, France, Spain and Portugal by means of which, through the exertion of force, Donna Maria was seated upon the throne of Portugal." Lord Palmerston referred to this as an "act of forcible interference, for the purpose of giving to Portugal the blessings of representative government."

observers who sympathised with the general aims of the revolutionaries. The account of those sinister and evil doings will always remain a dark blot upon the scroll of history. But apart from these cruel and unnecessary proceedings, which formed no part of the programme of those thinkers and publicists who had sown the seeds of civil liberty in the minds of the people, the idea of attaining by force what could not be secured in any other way was recognised as an article of the reforming creeds.¹ As a moral principle it was expressed in the "sacred right of rebellion."

This meant that, in the absence of any machinery for settling political disputes between the factions and expressing the considered opinion of the majority of citizens, there existed the moral right to appeal to force. And, indeed, when the government of a country was concentrated in the hands of one man and his advisers; when it was the monopoly of an oligarchy, creed or faction; when the courts dispensed justice under the direction of a despot; when all organised force was legally at his command; it is difficult to understand how anything short of forcible measures, a *coup d'état*, a revolution, however bloodless, could avail to bring about the change. For this change involved not merely the substitution of one faction for another in the seat of power. It was the introduction of an entirely new system, which necessitated a new organisation. Fundamentally, it meant that the affairs of the nation would be conducted by an appeal not to force but to reason,

¹ "In revolutions to obtain some great and positive good, reason and discussion, persuasion and conviction, become the weapons in the contest, and it is only when those are attempted to be suppressed that recourse is had to violence."—T. Paine, *The Rights of Man*.

Cf. Article 35 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man of June 24th, 1793, cited *ante*, p. 23,

through the medium of a national legislature. Henceforth the factions, deprived of the means of coercion, would be compelled to rely on moral suasion. Only the weapons of intellect, debate, and propaganda would be found in their armouries. Their victory or defeat would be registered at the polls, not by an Octobrist *coup d'état*, a march on Rome or a drill in the Reichstag.¹

III

Revolution

A REVOLUTION is primarily a duel between two factions. Its success or failure depends upon the forces—moral, intellectual, economic, financial, and physical—which each side is able to mobilise. In this process the determining factor is

¹ The Russian revolution of March 1917 was followed by a contest for power between various conflicting interests. On October 26th the leaders of the Petrograd Soviet constituted a military revolutionary committee which declared itself to be the highest military authority in the capital and province of Petrograd. This step, which was ostensibly for the defence of the capital against German invasion, was actually directed to the purpose of giving the Bolsheviks control of the forces.

On the outbreak of a general strike on August 1st, 1922, the Fascist Directorate gave the Government 48 hours to prove its authority over those who were attempting to destroy the nation: "on the expiry of this delay Fascism will assume full freedom to supplant the State." Mussolini declared that "either the Government will be given to us, or we shall seize it by marching on Rome." The general mobilisation of Fascists was ordered and the march on Rome commenced late in October.

The first session of the Reichstag elected in March 1933 was marked by remarkable scenes. "Business formerly tedious was instantaneously settled by orders from the Speaker (Captain Göring) to the Deputies to signify assent or dissent by rising or remaining seated. This is compared in the Press with an exercise in drilling, with Captain Göring as drill-sergeant. The 288 uniformed Nazi deputies actually marched to the House in military formation. The Nationalist Press says that the 'drill exercise' was magnificent, though it was not Parliament."—*The Times*, March 23rd, 1933.

public opinion, a shadowy, fickle, and doubtful partner at all times. But however intensive and widespread the propaganda for democratic reform, however solid public opinion may be in its favour, there comes a moment when the reformers must exert forcible means to attain and consolidate their objectives.¹

The exception, a very rare one, is the absolute monarch or dictator who abdicates his authority and deliberately confers self-government upon his people.² In this event the employment of force is obviously superfluous. This particular brand of autocrat is, however, a *rara avis*, and, even should he desire to embark upon a liberal experiment, he is usually restrained by his court or the faction which supports him.³

¹ The demand for reform had been insistent in China for many years before 1911, but the beginning of the revolution which overthrew the Manchus was a mutiny among the troops at Muchang on October 10th. Many Chinese cities immediately ranged themselves with the mutineers: by the close of the year fourteen provinces had taken this course, and on February 12th, 1912, the Emperor abdicated and a Republic was proclaimed.

In the spring of 1931 public opinion in Spain was intensely Republican, and in the municipal elections of April 11th the party gains were overwhelming. The decisive event, however, was the securing of popular control in Madrid on April 13th. The following day the Civil Guard was handed over to the Revolutionary Committee, and the Provisional Government was formed. "The Revolution had been made in the street with the help of the masses." —*Annual Register*, 1931, p. 244.

² Thus the Emperor of Japan, after the successful contest with the Shogunate in the early months of 1868, promised, in an oath before an assembly of the Court and the territorial nobles, that a deliberative assembly should be summoned and all measures determined by public opinion. The Parliament thus promised met a year later.

³ Alexander I of Russia commenced his reign by declaring his desire to terminate arbitrary government and establish a reign of law, but the friends surrounding him, whom he wished to help him in drafting schemes of reform—Novosiltev, Stroganov, Prince Adam

It may be contended, however, that passive resistance, non-compliance with the decrees of the dictator and voluntary martyrdom for the cause will, in the end, suffice to shake off the shackles of despotism. It is true that these efforts and sacrifices will exert a profound influence upon public opinion. They will prepare the ground, and the seed will be sown, but it is doubtful whether the harvest can be reaped until the element of force has also been enlisted on the side of the new system. For, at this stage, force is the weapon of the factions, and until the democratic faction has triumphed and initiated the new system of democracy it will still be regarded as a faction. When, however, the new constitution has been firmly established, this faction gradually loses its power and control, which henceforth becomes vested in the electorate and, through it, in the national legislature. The armed and organised force upon which the democratic faction has relied is either disbanded or is incorporated in the policing forces of the country. In the latter event its character has completely changed. No longer is it the weapon of the reforming party. It has now become the servant of the people and of all parties. Its duty is to execute the decisions of the courts, to guard the national constitution, to protect the legislature and its members against any assault by force upon the authority which they have derived from the people.

Moreover it is clear that reason and morality

Czartorisky, Prince Kochucey—considered the limitation of autocratic power too dangerous an experiment. In 1818 Alexander again ordered the preparation of a draft Constitution for Russia. The draft was prepared by Novosiltev and was considered by Alexander in the following year. The Russian historian Karamzin, however, being consulted by the Tsar, strongly advised the abandonment of the project.

cannot be the sole arbiters in the affairs of a nation until force occupies this position of complete neutrality in its relation to the factions. Under the new regime it is wielded exclusively on behalf of the community as a whole. All the factions are disarmed and must remain in this condition.

Consequently we are driven to the conclusion that until force has become the policing agency of the whole nation and is controlled by its duly elected representatives, the right or moral use of force cannot be limited to the police function.

IV

WHAT, then, are the other purposes for which *Legal Equality* it may be morally employed? They are twofold. First, to secure equality in the eyes of the law; that is to say, the impartial administration of justice between all the individuals, groups, and factions of the community. Equality of legal status also implies the right of action against the Government and its departments.¹ Clearly this is impossible where the courts are compelled by the executive to frame their decisions and verdicts on grounds of policy. If a conviction is considered necessary in the interests of the State, which in this case simply means the interests of the faction or dictator at that moment controlling the State, then the prisoner will be condemned whether he is innocent or guilty of the crimes alleged against him. This doctrine ignores the facts and the merits of the case. It does not even pretend to hold the scales

¹ Even in English law, though an "action" does not lie against the Crown, a petition of right will lie. The subject who has a cause of action is therefore in practice able to secure redress. Against Government departments an action will generally lie.

evenly between the accuser and the accused. It is the negation of justice, and under this system the courts of law become the tool of policy. This is part of the stock-in-trade of every dictator. Unhappily, confirmation of this statement is not far to seek. Search the records of the Ogpu, interrogate Italian deportees and refugees, investigate the procedure of the Nazi courts! Is it to this travesty of human justice that all the struggles and toils of humanity have led? We may well wonder whether we are the victims of an illusion which, by some mad freak, has transported us back into the Middle Ages.

V

*Exercise of
Franchise*

THE second purpose for which the use of force may morally be justified in any country not endowed with a representative assembly is to assert the right of the citizen to participate in the government of his country and in the making of its laws. This means the free and unfettered use of the vote. In order to prevent various forms of pressure and coercion, democratic communities have resorted to the ballot-box. Thus the voter is able to register his convictions without running the risk of being victimised or coerced. Henceforth the duels between the factions will have to be fought out on the platform and the hustings. This means the peaceful method of settling internal and domestic disputes in substitution of trial by battle.

If the primary and elementary duty of every government is to maintain law and order, to prevent civil strife, and confer upon its citizens the benefits of security and peace, then it is clear that, in the long run, the responsible or parliamentary system,

with all its imperfections, offers the best chance, in fact the only chance, of discharging these obligations.¹

VI

FURTHER, even though the possession of *Theory of Contract* power by a faction is justified on the theory of contract advanced by political thinkers such as Bodin and Hobbes as being an alternative to anarchy, it is obvious that the activities of the faction in power must be kept in bounds, otherwise the lives of individuals will be as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" as were those of the men living in a state of nature before the institution of any government, whose condition the "contract" was designed to mitigate. The sorry plight of Irish loyalists and of Italian liberals, the sufferings of the Russian intelligentsia, the martyrdom of the Jews, democrats, pacifists, and communists in Germany, are as intense and horrible as the disabilities, outrages, and misery inflicted by the religious factions in the seventeenth century which called forth the remonstrances of Hobbes. To demonstrate the way of escape from the conflict of factions Hobbes elaborated his theory of an original contract whereby the warring individuals constituted a sovereign with absolute power. Similarly, sixty years earlier, Bodin had advanced a theory which, though different from that of Hobbes in many respects, was, like it, directed against the factions. To-day these authors would have directed their efforts against Sinn Feiners,

¹ In Great Britain, since the Revolution of 1688 and the establishment of parliamentary control, insurrections against the Government have been unknown and even rioting of serious proportions has been of infrequent occurrence. Amongst the great countries of the world Great Britain stands unique in its freedom from civil war for a period of over two hundred years.

Orangemen, Nazis, Communists, Fascists, imperialist clans and bandits, *et omnia sui generis*.

The remedy proposed by both was the establishment of a monarch, but that monarch must exercise the power with which he is endowed for the proper purpose. Even Hobbes conceded that in rare circumstances the subjects might oppose the monarch. Such conduct was permissible when the state of nature, bad as it was, was better than that which would result from obedience to the monarch. The subject's obligation of obedience is limited to the objects to gain which his submission to the monarch was made, "namely the peace of the subjects within themselves, and their defence against a common enemy." When, therefore, refusal to obey does not frustrate the end for which sovereignty was ordained there is admitted liberty to refuse to obey.¹ That is to say, the power conceded to a faction is to be exercised solely for the maintenance of peace and the enforcement of justice: the "contract" does not justify the sovereign faction in tyrannising over the others.

It is interesting to note that though Hobbes proposed the constitution of the sovereign as the remedy against anarchy his theory does not solve the problem of the right use of force in the non-democratic community. Hobbes' system limits the use of force to the police function, but he draws no distinction between the community which is democratic and that which is not. The "Leviathan" makes no provision for changes in the character of the sovereign to meet the changing needs of the community. Once constituted, the sovereign, whether monarch or sovereign assembly, is sovereign for all time. In this respect Hobbes' necessary

¹ *Leviathan*, chap. xxi.

fixidity is inferior to Rousseau's theory of the contract as one between the monarch on the one hand and the people on the other, a theory which made the people the repository of power and justified their revolution if the monarch failed to abide by the contract. Hobbes' system is therefore inadequate in that it makes no provision for the vesting of the sovereignty in a body representative of the democracy. It is only when this has been effected that the exercise of force, for the reasons already set forth, can properly be limited to the police function.

VII

IT therefore follows that in the non-democratic community the use of force is morally justified *Abdication of Power* to secure the right of the people to participate in their own government.

This conclusion may be challenged on two grounds. First, it will be maintained that a free people or a democracy is exercising its sovereign rights in abdicating its power and delegating it permanently to a particular person or faction. It may do so in the belief that its security, prosperity, and achievements will be greater if these are confided to the keeping of an autocrat or a junta. The nation is prepared to sacrifice its liberties in return for greater efficiency of administration and enhanced security against attacks from its neighbours. Consequently the sovereign people proceed to destroy the democratic system and to install in its place a dictator or faction.

This proceeding, judged on grounds of expediency or policy, may be right or wrong. But it does not invalidate our thesis that the right use of force is limited to the police function, and that this function can only be exercised exclusively under a demo-

cratic system. If a majority of the citizens decide to hand over permanently to a particular faction the powers hitherto confided to their national legislature, it only means that they have repudiated this principle. The flood-gates have once more been opened. Force has been liberated and is again at large. The implications are serious. It means that in the domestic sphere a policy either of reaction or progress will be punctuated by a series of explosions. In place of ordered government, peaceful development, and smooth working will be substituted the spasmodic revolutions of the wheel of State, with its accompaniments of bloodshed, misery, and retaliation. Demi-gods are fragile: even Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler cannot last for ever.

A further and more serious implication of this repudiation is its repercussion upon international relationships. Clearly, if a nation rejects this conception of the right use of force within its own frontiers it is unlikely to acquiesce in its wider application to the international arena where sovereign States, clad in shining armour, are as vociferous and warlike as the factions, adorned in multi-coloured shirts, in their national circuses. To this point we shall return later.

VIII

Terrorism

BUT before leaving the particular case of the voluntary abdication of its rights by a democracy it is pertinent to enquire whether, when this decision was reached, the armed and organised forces of the country were, in effect, the monopoly of the Government and were exclusively controlled by an executive responsible to the national legislature. Were the factions unarmed or were they organised on a military or semi-military footing?

It is obvious that if the custodians of democracy betrayed their trust by tolerating the existence of factional forces, a free and unfettered decision on the part of the electors—ballot-box or no ballot-box—would become an impossibility. Terrorism would lurk at every corner.¹ The existence of red shirts, black shirts, brown shirts and, in fact, a shirt of any colour which has become synonymous with a military or semi-military organisation, would suffice to undermine the whole system. If the element of force has already been re-cast in a number of factional moulds—in Germany, for instance, the Nazi “Brown Army,” Reichsbanner and Stalhelm organisations—the national parliaments will be stripped of their authority. They become attenuated rumps whose only function is to register the decisions of the dictator.

Consequently, the abdication by a people of its liberties and powers cannot be considered to be real or genuine if the factions are in possession of armed forces. In these circumstances, the verdict of the community is secured under a procedure of duress and coercion, which is the negation of the democratic system and its underlying principle that force can only be employed in the performance of the police function.

¹ This was the state of affairs in the German elections of March 1933 in which the Nazis and Nationalists polled a majority of the votes cast. “The election campaign was one continuous outrage. Every resource at the disposal of the Government was used in favour of the Right and against the Left. The Right controlled the radio and had every freedom, while the Left could hardly publish a pamphlet or a poster or hold a meeting without bullying and paralysing interference. The wildest denunciation and calumnies, the most outrageous propagandist legends, were allowed in the Nazi and Nationalist press, while the Labour press was reduced to insipidity or absolute silence.”—*Manchester Guardian Weekly*, July 14th, 1933.

IX

*Tempera-
ment*

THERE is the further objection that the democratic system suits some nations but not others. Nations, like individuals, it is often said, are temperamental. Some prefer to be governed by a strong, masterful personality ; others desire to assert their liberties. We are told that the former do not want to think for themselves. They believe that the affairs of the country and the making of its laws are best left to experts and administrators who understand its requirements and how these can be satisfied in the most efficient manner. The duty of the ordinary citizen is simply to obey and ask no questions. In return for this accommodating and patriotic attitude he expects protection for himself and his family, the improvement of his economic conditions, and the maintenance of the prestige of his country. Probably this represents the normal attitude of most people in all countries, democratic and non-democratic alike. Certainly it is not the monopoly of any particular race or nation. There is nothing temperamental or characteristic about it.

On the other hand, there is in every country an energetic minority who do not share these views. They are the people who recruit the factions, and with the spread of education, their numbers are increasing. They are not prepared to be blindfolded. They are also prone to become fanatical. Consequently, unless they are willing to practise the principles of democracy, especially in their attitude towards the use of force, they become a danger to the liberties of their neighbours and a menace to the whole community. But these factions are not confined to any particular environment or temperament.

They are to be found everywhere. If it were simply a question of psychology and mentality, why should a Frenchman support democracy whilst for the moment an Italian is wedded to dictatorship? Are Germans and Italians so essentially similar in type and in character that only a Fascist regime can minister to their wants? If the peoples of the East are temperamentally unfitted for self-government, why does an influential section of the community in India agitate for a national legislature? Why, also, has Japan reformed her political institutions during the last seventy years, giving them at least the semblance of a democratic constitution?

It is a truism that, broadly speaking, human nature is the same all the world over. A political system cannot therefore be ruled out merely on grounds of temperament or of race.

X

DEMOCRACY, like everything else, is a growth. *Progress of Democracy*
 Sometimes its development is exceedingly slow. There are certain obstacles which retard it. Amongst these is the international system, which breeds a sense of insecurity. It is assumed in many quarters that a democratic government is incapable of defending its people against attacks from without; hence the need for a strong government, concentrated in the hands of a few, entirely free from any parliamentary restraint or democratic control. Even the result of the World War has not succeeded in dispelling this illusion. National history, tradition, and training also play a conspicuous part in determining the attitude of every community. There are also the vested interests which oppose any change

which they imagine will injure their authority and prestige.

Consequently, confronted with these antagonistic forces, reinforced by the innate conservatism of the ordinary individual, is it surprising that the progress of democracy in every country has been slow? Even in Great Britain, which boasts the Mother of Parliaments, it is still in process of evolution.¹ It has taken a century to accustom and reconcile France to the democratic system.² Barely seventy years have elapsed since Abraham Lincoln disciplined the democracy of America and vindicated the supremacy of the federal system against the disintegrating factions.

We need, therefore, not be surprised or dismayed if there are temporary reactions and set-backs. Experience will prove in the future, as in the past, that nature has not decreed that the human race shall be deprived for ever of the rights of self-government. National temperaments and idiosyncrasies are not insuperable barriers to the cause of democracy.

It follows that the day may not be far distant when mankind will be able to allocate to force its rightful place within the confines of the national State. We are also confronted with the same problem in the realm of the community of States. In both these spheres the democratic principles we have insisted upon—equality in the eyes of the law

¹ In the last twenty-five years there have been two extensions in the electorate; the powers of the House of Lords have been curtailed and its reform has been constantly discussed; and the Party system, which has been a feature of English politics since the close of the seventeenth century, has twice been abandoned.

² "A political history of France since the revolution of 1789 would be a record of eleven regimes in less than a century, including republics, kingdoms and empires."—C. E. Martin and W. H. George, *Representative Modern Constitutions*, p. 11. Cf. A. V. Dicey, *Law of the Constitution*, 8th ed., p. 469.

and the right to participate in the framing of the laws—will be recognised and incorporated in their constitutions. But until these truths sink into the consciousness of the peoples and, through the processes of education and experience, nations are constrained to realise the moral significance of force in the governance of the world, the right of rebellion remains, and the factions, whether they are represented by national dictators or sovereign States, will continue to wage their ceaseless warfare.

Well may we exclaim with Dante : “ O ! Race of mankind, what storms must toss thee, what losses must thou endure, what shipwrecks must buffet thee, as long as thou, a beast of many heads, strivest after contrary things.”

CHAPTER V

FORCE AND IMPERIALISM

"Our task is to fortify Justice, not to justify Force."

SIGNOR GRANDI.

I

*Imperial
Expansion*

THE growth of the British Empire was due to three main causes—economic expansion, the competition of rivals,¹ and the necessity for the maintenance of law and order.² The Empire was not planned, it was an afterthought. It was a gradual and unconscious development,³ often forced upon an unwilling and disgruntled people by fortuitous circumstances entirely outside their control.

Economic expansion was undertaken by chartered companies, traders, and adventurers, with or without the authorisation of the Government. Having staked their claims in different parts of the world, the commercial fraternity looked to the Government for protection against their trade rivals—Spaniards, Portuguese, French, and Dutch—with whom they waged an intermittent warfare, culminating in prolonged campaigns when, as the result of their

¹ "Inseparable from the commercial stimulus was the stimulus of international rivalry."—Sir John Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, Lecture VI.

² "By extending our Empire the reign of robbery and murder might be brought to an end in a moment, and that of law commence."—*Id.*, Lecture VIII (Course II).

³ "We seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind."—Lecture I.

"The simple idea of expansion has seldom been conceived or realised clearly."—Lecture IV.

quarrels in Europe, the support of the home governments could be enlisted in the struggle.¹

Having acquired control over territories and strategic points, no nation was anxious to surrender them, lest they should fall into the hands of their competitors. It was for this reason that they did not relinquish the conquests of their intrepid fellow-citizens. They bore the cost of administering these territories grudgingly, and were often tempted to abandon them altogether.

The third cause—the maintenance of law and order—operated as a result of those we have mentioned. The demands of trade, no less than the protection of the pioneers, required the pacification of these far-flung territories. This responsibility ultimately proved to be too great for the traders themselves. Even the rule of the powerful chartered companies had to be superseded, and the obligations for the maintenance of peace were taken over by their respective governments. The latter have continued to control and police the subject races ever since, often to the mutual advantage of both.

II

SIDE by side with this process of subjugation, *Colonisation* there arose the colonial systems, the result of emigration to countries sparsely populated where climatic conditions were tolerable to Europeans. The Americas, North and South, and Australia are notable examples. In these countries democratic communities sprang into existence, where,

¹ "The hidden cause which made ministers rise and fall, which convulsed Europe and led it into war and revolution, was, far more than might be supposed, the standing rivalry of interests in the New World."—Lecture VI.

in theory if not always in practice, force has been assigned the exclusive rôle of the police function. It is true that in many of these countries the factions have succeeded from time to time in violating this principle. The States of South America, for example, have been the prey of lawless juntas and the happy hunting-grounds of ambitious dictators. Many causes have no doubt contributed to make the working of the democratic system more difficult in these turbulent communities. Constant warfare between the individual States, the intermixture of races, the size and natural features of the country, lack of tradition and education, and a number of other reasons may be cited. It is nevertheless true that, although the factions are often in the ascendancy, and the right use of force is neither understood nor practised, democratic systems have made headway, even in South America. And it is conceivable that when the economic depression has lifted, when these vast territories have been developed, when their peoples become more educated and enlightened, when inter-state wars, through the intervention of an international authority, become less frequent, democracy will at last come into its own and the reign of law will be firmly established.

III

U.S.A.

IN North America the people of the United States appealed to the "sacred right of rebellion" when they found themselves precluded from any share in the passing of the laws imposed upon them by the British Parliament. At the outset of their career as a free and independent people federalism won the day. Had there been thirteen independent States, the factional fights and inter-

state wars of South America might have been reproduced on an even larger scale.¹ Force, however, was enlisted on the side of order and justice. For more than a century the energies of Americans were absorbed in a march across a continent. It is true that during this period the merits of the American democratic system were so exaggerated as almost to become its defects. In the long run, nevertheless, the principles of democracy and federalism have triumphed. Handicapped, however, by the traditional right of rebellion, the jealousies between the individual States, the Puritan insistence upon the unrestrained liberties of the citizen, which often degenerated into licence, and the extreme Quaker attitude denying the use of all force, the American nation became possessed of a "lawless heritage"² which still exercises its baneful influence in the politics of the Republic. As a result, the onward march to the Pacific and the conquest of the West is crowded with incidents and events—the treatment of the Indian and the rule of the gunman for instance—which display force in the garb of the usurper and the tyrant.³

But the main cause of all these prostitutions of

¹ Cf. Sir Norman Angell, *The Unseen Assassins*, pp. 93–94.

² Cf. J. Truslow Adams, *A Searchlight on America*, chap. v. "Lawlessness has been and is one of the most distinctive American traits. . . . We in America to-day are without the pale of this respect for law which is one of the fundamentals of civilisation."—*op. cit.*, pp. 81, 83. "Americans . . . have one of the most sinister inheritances in this matter of law from which any civilised nation could suffer."—*Id.* 98.

³ "The American heritage of independence, which degenerated very quickly into sheer denial of law and order, marched with the pioneers into the wilderness. . . . The extermination of the Indian, according to the Western creed, was legitimate by any and every means. . . . The gunman appeared very early in American history and has never taken his departure."—Frederick Watson, *A Century of Gunmen*, pp. 8, 14, 23.

force was the extreme reluctance of the American people to endow the central or federal government with a superiority of force which would enable it to control the westward movement and to assert its authority over the State members of the Union. The legacy of the "lawless heritage" produced this mentality. It played into the hands of the factions and eventually culminated in the Civil War, lasting for four years, which cost the Republic a million lives and retarded its economic development for more than a generation.¹

This breakdown of the democratic and federal system was no doubt partly due to defects in the judicial and legislative machinery,² but its main cause was the repudiation of the principle that the exercise of force should be limited to the police function, not only in the relationships of individuals, but also within the circle of the federal community.

In this crisis the courage and determination of Lincoln vindicated the authority of the federal government. In his hands what at the outset was a weak sanction became transformed and organised

¹ "There was but the nucleus of an army: the navy was moribund."—Admiral F. E. Chadwick, *Causes of the Civil War*, p. 164.

"Had the army and navy of the United States been adequate, the South could not have made war."—Oscar Newfang, *The United States of the World*, p. 150.

² The American Constitution, as adopted in 1787, did not deal with the question whether a State had the right to secede from the Union. It was therefore open for the Southern States to assert that the right existed. The Northern States, on the other hand, denied the existence of the right. "No State," said Lincoln, "can in any way lawfully get out of the Union without the consent of the others." The immediate cause of the Civil War was the ordinance of secession adopted by the South Carolina legislature in December 1860, and the similar action of six other Southern States in February 1861. The question of slavery had thus brought to the front the question of secession, and it was on this latter issue that the Civil War was nominally waged.

into an overwhelming one which has never since been challenged.¹ The factions were suppressed and the element of force, strengthened and centralised, became the monopoly of the American Union for the sole purposes of maintaining law and order within its own frontiers and protection against aggression from without. It is now recognised not only as the agency for enforcing the law against individuals but, in the last resort, as the sanction of the Supreme Court in the settlement of disputes between the individual States of the Union.² Thus its exclusive function as a policing instrument has been acknowledged in the federal no less than in the democratic system.

IV

THE same principle holds good in the British self-governing dominions, where federalism has also taken root. Warned by the secession of the American colonies and acting upon the advice of Lord Durham and other far-sighted administrators, the British Parliament conceded the rights of self-government to its dominions. This step deprived them at one stroke of the right of rebellion. But in the absence of an imperial federation with a constitution establishing and defining the powers of a legislature, judiciary and executive, no mutual obligations were imposed upon the constituent members of this curious association of independent and self-governing communities.

*The British
Common-
wealth*

The right of rebellion, if it exists at all, can now only be exercised as the right of secession, and it is probable that, except possibly in the case of Ireland,

¹ Cf. *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, pp. 214 *et seq.*

² *Id.* Appendix A.

force would never be used to challenge the exercise of this right. Consequently, as no organic law exists defining and governing this right, and as no imperial tribunal with obligatory jurisdiction has been established to adjudicate on grounds of equity upon disputes which may arise between the members of the British Empire,¹ the position to be assigned to force has been completely ignored in these arrangements. It is obvious that it cannot exercise the police function. Consequently, if force is employed, as it is at this moment between Great Britain and the Irish Free State by means of the economic weapon,² it can only be as the instrument of policy. This, as we have seen, means the repudiation of democratic and federal principles. The absence of any clear or logical conception of the right use of force and the conditions under which its application may be legally

¹ Neither of the existing tribunals which may adjudicate upon certain disputes arising between members of the British Commonwealth is capable of performing the function here indicated. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is clearly essentially a court of law and is not appropriate to try political issues. The Commonwealth Tribunal established by the Imperial Conference of 1930 is designed for the determination of "justiciable" issues only, and the decision by it of political issues on the basis of equity is not contemplated. Nor is the jurisdiction of this tribunal obligatory: the 1930 Conference, in the absence of general consent, recommended the adoption of the voluntary system. Hence it was possible for the Irish Free State in 1932 to reject the proposal of the British Government that the dispute regarding the Land Annuities be referred to a Commonwealth Tribunal. See, generally, Cmd. 3717, pp. 22 *et seq.*

² In consequence of the failure of the Irish Free State Government on July 1st, 1932, to pay the sum due on account of the land annuities, and of Mr. De Valera's threat to withhold further sums, the British Government, to make good the loss, obtained a resolution giving the Treasury power to impose duties on any imports from the Irish Free State. Duties were imposed on July 12th, and the Irish Free State Government at once imposed retaliatory duties. Great Britain and the Irish Free State thus became involved in an open and prolonged tariff war.

and morally justified may yet prove to be one of the causes of disintegration of the British Empire.

But in its self-governing dominions the control of force is vested exclusively in their democratic governments. Its sole purposes are to provide protection and to execute the law. Never have the political parties or factions been allowed to arm themselves. On the whole, justice has been impartially administered, and even the march of the pioneers has been conducted in an orderly fashion. In a great measure this is due to the existence and efficient control of such forces as the Canadian Mounted Police, whose splendid record could never have been achieved in the atmosphere prevailing across the frontier, where the spell of the "lawless heritage" has never been entirely broken.

From this cursory examination of the history and experiences of those countries now described as "new," which were originally uncivilised but are now colonised by alien peoples, we find two phenomena: first, that the right use of force—the police function—has been recognised, if not consciously, at least tacitly and subconsciously; and, secondly, that all these communities have been founded, in theory if not always in practice, upon democratic and federal principles. It is when these principles have been violated and the factions have been allowed to appeal to violence that misfortune and impoverishment have descended upon the peoples.

V

NOW let us turn to the category of subjugated races where force is controlled and organised by an alien community to maintain law and order amongst semi-civilised or "backward" peoples.

*Force and
the Subject
Races*

We have noted that these dependencies or appendages are confined to Asia and Africa. We have also seen that in its origin this system was the result of economic expansion. It was impossible to carry on or develop trade in any country where the factions or groups were in a perpetual state of war either amongst themselves or against the foreigners who insisted upon trading with them. Consequently peace was essential. But it was impossible to secure a durable peace unless it was based upon justice. Hence the need for courts and tribunals, backed by force, to dispense justice and to establish equality in the eyes of the law, which, as we have already seen, is one of the hall-marks of democratic government.

By introducing and controlling the administrative, legal, and policing machinery, law and order were gradually established in these communities and contributed to the mutual prosperity of the governors and the governed. Pride in the discharge of these self-imposed tasks prompted the idea that they were undertaken as a service to these semi-civilised peoples. This was popularly described as the "white man's burden," of which he is now being asked to divest himself.

The white man was no doubt right in assuming that by providing efficient judicial and policing machinery he was laying the foundations of ordered government. Perhaps he has been surprised to find that his services were not always appreciated by the recipients. He must also have realised, as Lord Hastings did,¹ that this regime could not last

¹ "A time not very remote will arrive, when England will, on sound principles of policy, wish to relinquish the domination which she has gradually and unintentionally assumed over this country, and from which she cannot at present recede. In that hour it would be the proudest boast and most delightful reflection that she had used her sovereignty towards enlightening her temporary subjects,

for ever, because it was frankly based upon force. The consent of the governed was tacit or implied. They were deprived of the rights of governing themselves and of framing their own laws—rights which the white men jealously guarded in their own countries.

For various reasons the second fundamental principle of democracy was denied to the subject races, who, indeed, had never exercised these rights and were incapable of doing so as long as their political and civic education remained stationary. But more than a century of intercourse with the nations which govern them has stimulated the process of education, with the result that in some cases, India for example, movements have been set on foot to throw off the foreign yoke. The white man may claim that in these countries the element of force which he controls is employed solely in the exercise of the police function, to secure equality in the eyes of the law. But, as we have seen, from a moral standpoint it cannot be limited to this function until the community over which it is exercised has become a self-governing democracy in which the citizen, through his possession of the vote, forfeits the right to resort to force. Consequently, until this consummation has also been effected in the subjugated territories, the right of rebellion remains. So long as the laws and administration, of these peoples are under the jurisdiction and control of external parliaments, there will always be a moral justification for the use of force to obtain the liberties of self-government and parliamentary representation which are now denied them.

so as to enable the native communities to walk alone in the paths of justice, and to maintain with probity towards their benefactors that commercial intercourse in which we should then find a solid interest.”
—Lord Hastings, quoted in A. P. Nicholson, *Scraps of Paper*, p. 13.

It follows that every imperial system—where force and not voting power is the foundation of authority—is undemocratic and violates the fundamental principles of the democratic creed.

VI

Dilemma

THE alternative is either complete autonomy or federalism. The latter is initiated by and rests upon the free assent of the co-operating peoples. It is the only system which harmonises the claims of democracy and nationality with the advantages of a centralised government.

On the other hand, it is equally clear that the political education of the "backward" communities has not yet reached the point when they can be safely entrusted with all the rights and machinery of self-government. There is every reason to believe that if such a wholesale concession was made outright, without safeguards of any kind, force would immediately become the tool of the factions. Instead of being controlled by the representatives of the people or, as it is now, by an outside imperial authority, as the means of upholding law and enforcing order, it would be ruthlessly employed by dictators and juntas to usurp power and impose their wills and policies upon the whole community. This means a return to anarchy. The conditions which have prevailed in China since the disappearance of her emperors¹ are a warning of what may

¹ After the Revolution of 1911, which abolished the Imperial office and the ancient administrative machinery, China passed through a prolonged series of political changes which resulted in the collapse of progressive government and of national unity. Rival military leaders struggled for power, the country split up into a number of warring fragments, and civil war was almost continuous. More settled conditions have supervened in the last few years, but

happen elsewhere if the white man divests himself of his burden in a hurry.

We are thus confronted with a dilemma. How is it possible to assert our belief in the democratic system and to practise it if, at the same moment, we entirely deny its application to the "backward" races? How can we insist upon the principle of limiting force to the policing function at home, if we persist in employing it for other purposes in distant territories? Can we discover a way out of this impasse which is morally justifiable? How, at the same time, can we avoid those convulsions and upheavals which are bound to follow any sudden and precipitate removal of all extraneous control and authority, ending in confusion and disaster?

Before attempting to answer these questions it is necessary to point out two things: first, that there are degrees of "backwardness." There are uncivilised and semi-civilised countries. There are communities on the border-line—Iraq, for example, has just been accorded self-government¹—and there are others who have scarcely emerged from barbarism. Consequently, it is impossible to apply the same remedies simultaneously to all the backward races. Each must be treated on its merits. Stages on the road to self-government should be carefully marked out. The march should be gradual and progressive, the entry upon a new stage being dependent

the political situation is still complicated, and the legacy of militarism resulting from the civil wars increases the difficulty of reconstruction. Moreover, China found herself so weakened by the long internal disorders that she was unable to offer effective resistance to the Japanese activities in Manchuria, which resulted in the loss to China of the provinces constituted in February 1932 into the new State of Manchukuo.

¹ Being thus in a position to satisfy Article 1, para. 2 of the Covenant as a "fully self-governing State," Iraq was admitted to membership of the League at the Thirteenth Assembly, on October 3rd, 1932.

upon the progress already achieved. Broadly, this is the policy of British democracy in its attitude towards the problem of India.¹

VII

Trusteeship

SECONDLY, a great advance in this direction was registered when the principle of trusteeship for the native races was declared, agreed to, and incorporated in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Apart from the cynicism and insincerity with which this doctrine was received, however much it has since been violated, however shadowy and nebulous the control of the League, and whatever the real reasons for its adoption may have been, nevertheless, the principle of trusteeship represents a new conception of the relationships which should exist between the imperialist and the backward nations. It is another landmark in the march of progress.

The representatives of the democracies at Versailles must have felt the need for a moral basis and formula which would help to reconcile their treatment of the subject races with the democratic principles which they were so vociferously proclaiming at that moment. Consequently, General Smuts introduced the ingenious system of Mandates² which, in his opinion, was admirably suited for the imperialist governments of Europe. When, however, he dis-

¹ Cf. *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, pp. 644 *et seq.*

² The system of Mandates was suggested in *The League of Nations—A Practical Suggestion*, published by General Smuts in December 1918. Vide D. H. Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, Vol. II, pp. 30-31. A resolution drafted by General Smuts, which became the basis of Article 22 of the Covenant, was discussed at a meeting of the British delegation on January 29th, 1919, and was introduced in the Council of Ten the following day. Cf. Miller, Vol. I, p. 109.

covered that it was to be applied everywhere and that not even South Africa was to be exempt, his ardour cooled considerably and the affection he had entertained towards his offspring was sensibly diminished.¹ In spite, however, of protests from various quarters, the principle of trusteeship and the mandate system were included in the Articles of the Covenant.

The implications of this system are threefold. In the first place, all those nations which signed the Covenant expressly endorsed the principle of trusteeship for the welfare and development of those native races and territories which had formerly been administered by Germany and her allies. In assuming these obligations the trustees—notably Great Britain and her Dominions as well as France and Japan—openly supported a doctrine which, if it meant anything at all, must necessarily be applied to all subject races over which they exercised control. Obviously the new system could not be confined to the conquered territories. If it was morally right that the inhabitants of Palestine should become the subjects of a mandatory State, then why not the peoples of India? If France was to become the repository for the welfare and development of Syria, then why not also for Morocco? Apart from the question of

¹ "The mandatory principle . . . owed its birth to General Smuts. Its application has now to be extended to limits the General had not contemplated. . . . The General had only intended it to apply to ex-Russian, ex-Turkish, or ex-Austro-Hungarian territory. He had never thought it suited to the regions conquered in the course of the War by the various British Dominions. Least of all had he expected it to be applied to the case of German South-West Africa, which the Union Government had occupied and intended to annex. This was carrying a sound principle too far. The self-governing Dominions all took the view that the mandatory principle should not be applied to the places they had taken."—W. S. Churchill, *The World Crisis : The Aftermath*, p. 150.

legal status, there is no difference between those dependencies held before the War and those which have been acquired by mandate. In both cases trusteeship is the essence of the arrangement, and having been formally recognised in the latter, it cannot be repudiated in the former. It may be true that no Great Power has openly declared its willingness to apply the mandate system in its entirety to all its dependencies. Nevertheless, they cannot escape from the logic and implications of their contractual obligations to the League. In the case of India, for example, that country has already been launched upon the voyage of self-government. Great Britain proposes that this reform shall be undertaken in instalments, and that the new constitution shall embody democratic and federal principles. Let us hope that other imperialist nations may follow this example.

The second implication is that the final goal is complete self-government and admission into the membership of the League. Trustees are appointed to provide for the education and to administer the affairs of children and adolescents. When the latter attain manhood and reach the age of discretion, the direct control of the trustees comes to an end.¹ Thereafter the ward or subject of the trusteeship becomes entitled to assume all the rights and obligations of the citizen.

It is clear that the same principles should be applied to all subject races. The latter have not been classified or grouped in accordance with their

¹ It should be noted that while as regards the Class "A" mandates the cessation of control by the mandatory is envisaged—cf. Article 22, para. 4: "Until such time as they are able to stand alone"—no such termination of control is contemplated in the case of either the Class "B" or Class "C" mandates.

ages or attainments.¹ No periods have been fixed or curricula prepared for their courses of education and instruction in the school of self-government. These are matters which will have to be discussed and decided after a searching and scientific enquiry such as is now being undertaken by the Joint Select Committee on Indian Reform of the British Parliament.² But whatever preparations are needed, and however long or short the probationary period may be, the final objective is clear and unmistakable. When that is achieved, the trusteeship will come to an end.

Thirdly, the mandatory system recognises the overriding authority of the League. The League is the ultimate repository of the interests of the "backward" races. It is responsible for ensuring that the terms of the mandate are complied with.³ It is the court of appeal which guarantees that the trustees shall perform their duties honourably and efficiently.

¹ Article 22 recognises that "The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances." The only attempt, however, to apply these factors is in the division of all mandated areas into the three general groups of "A," "B," and "C" mandates. The principle, therefore, though recognised, has been applied only in a tentative manner.

² As a result of the investigations made by the Statutory (Simon) Commission and the deliberations of three Round Table Conferences the British Government's proposals for Indian constitutional reform were made in a White Paper issued in March 1933. In April 1933 a Joint Select Committee was constituted to examine the proposals of the White Paper.

³ Article 22, paragraph 9, of the Covenant provides that "A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates."

VIII

The Bridge
—an I.P.F.

IT is clear, however, that although the majority of the members of the League may be willing and anxious to honour their obligations they will be unable to do so as long as the League remains a sanctionless body. Without force behind it, exercising the police function, it cannot assert its authority over the trustees, with the result that in all probability the mandate will become a dead letter.

Japan, having been branded as the aggressor by the unanimous vote of the Assembly in her dispute with China, has seceded from the League. In 1919 she was given the mandate for the administration of a number of islands in the North Pacific. Will these territories now be restored to the League, and if not, what control can the League exert over a non-member State to ensure that the terms of the mandate are being fulfilled? There appears to be no disposition on the part of Japan to relinquish these territories. She has already flouted the League and waged war upon China in open defiance of the Assembly. Consequently, unless the League is able to assert its authority the mandate system also goes by the board.

But if we could postulate that the League was equipped with an adequate and superior force, that the implications of the mandatory system had been worked out to the point of complete self-government, and that the stages for periodical revision had been fixed, then it would be possible to discover a way out of the impasse and to eliminate the contradiction and inconsistency between democracy and imperialism.

We should then be able to build a bridge linking

the democratic system and the right use of force on the one hand with an ordered and progressive evolution of the semi-civilised races on the other. Such an arrangement is clearly the nearest approach to the elimination of force as the barrier to self-government. If it does not entirely nullify the right of rebellion, it at any rate reduces it to the most slender proportions. It recognises the claims of the native races and holds out to them the certainty that, with their co-operation and goodwill, their aspirations will ultimately be realised.

But the success of this new dispensation will depend upon the rôle which is assigned to force. If it becomes the servant of the League as the protector of its covenants and the sanction of international law, it will play its part in the introduction and development of the new regime. Indirectly it will assist in the emancipation of the "backward" nations. It will become the guarantee for this reform. And as the mandatory system develops force will automatically divest itself of its imperialistic proclivities, until eventually, with the advent of complete self-government, its employment will be limited exclusively to the police function.

Before, however, this consummation takes place the right use of force in the domain of international relationships must be recognised and organised. Hitherto, we have considered its moral purpose in the municipal, federal, and imperial spheres. We shall now endeavour to apply the same principles and tests to the wider arena of the world. At this moment the peoples are in imminent danger of using force to destroy themselves and to wreck completely the whole fabric of our civilisation. "Whom the Gods wish to destroy, they first make mad." Let us employ the interval of sanity in clarifying our

minds as to the moral purposes for which force may be employed, and embody our conclusions as the foundation of a practical scheme. Then force, instead of being the destroying angel, will become the guardian of justice and the custodian of peace.

CHAPTER VI

FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE

"The laws are good only when the legislator has so ordered it that equity and force are never separated from each other."—**SOLON.**

"The use of force is justifiable when it is ordered in accordance with law by a neutral authority in the general interest."—**BERTRAND RUSSELL.**

I

MANY years ago Tennyson conjured up the *The Vision* vision of "the Parliament of Man—the Federation of the World." The realisation of that dream may still be far distant. It appears to be more remote now than it did fifteen years ago, but that is no reason why we should not apply our minds to the right use of force in international relationships.

In the preceding chapters we have endeavoured to find a moral basis for the employment of force. We have concluded that in the democratic and federal systems its right use is limited to the police function. Can this limitation also be imposed in the realm of international affairs and, if so, under what conditions?

For it is becoming more apparent year by year that unless man is able to harness force to the chariot of justice, unless he can control this element in human affairs, it will assuredly destroy him and "pulverise without hope of repair all that is left of civilisation." Consequently, the problem we are discussing is not merely one of academic interest.

It is a practical proposition which directly affects the happiness and welfare of every member of the community.¹

This, above all others, is the crucial problem of the twentieth century, and unless man is capable of solving it he runs the risk of losing everything. For centuries he has striven to emancipate himself from those crude passions and impulses inherited from his ancestors of the cave and the jungle. He has struggled to develop a higher morality, expressed not only in the lives of individuals, but also in the affairs of social and national communities. He has, with infinite pains, wrested the secrets of nature and endeavoured to utilise them for his own benefit and material advantage. He has, through the processes of the mind, sought to extend his dominion in the realms of culture, knowledge, art, and science. He has been inspired by the vision of a regenerated race, purged of its dross and materialism, marching steadily forward to some viewless goal. And in this adventure he has pictured everyone, irrespective of his occupation, position or status, sharing in the common responsibility for its success and being given an opportunity of employing whatever talents Providence has endowed him with in the attainment of the higher purpose.

But this vision will assuredly fade, the march will become a disorderly rout, the achievements of our ancestors and the heritage of the ages will be abandoned and the reign of tooth and claw will once more assert itself, unless mankind is prepared to grapple with the giant of force. Who are to be his masters : policy, prejudice, and passion, or justice, morality, and reason ?

In a world seething with inflamed passions and

¹ Cf. chap. 1, *ante*.

disorderly impulses it is obvious that we cannot dispense with the giant. We cannot, even at a Disarmament Conference, immediately order his execution. The real problem is how and for what purpose his services are to be employed. Is he to be allowed to hold up the onward march, to scatter and destroy the marchers, or can he be requisitioned to maintain order in their ranks, to prevent pillage and incendiarism, to succour the weak and urge on the laggards?

At the moment there are, of course, many giants. Each is fed and housed by its own national community. Like pugilists, they are put into strict training. Their diet is varied. Its ingredients are extreme nationalism, spiced with racial hatred, territorial aggrandisement, economic expansion, and, above all, the desire for mastery. With this stimulating diet the giants are carefully prepared for the next duel, which is always initiated on the plea that they are defending themselves.

II

CONSEQUENTLY, we are faced with the task *The Reign of Law* of abolishing the duelling system in the relationship of States and substituting a policing system in its place. Clearly this transformation cannot take place until the new system has been expressed in terms of organisation. A policeman cannot function without a court. It is equally true that a judge cannot dispense justice without the aid of the policeman. Therefore, if force is to be limited to the police function in international affairs, there must at least be a court to administer the law, for in any dispute or breach of the peace the duties of the policeman are confined to the protection of law-

abiding citizens, compelling appearance before the court and executing its verdicts. He is not concerned with the merits of any dispute or of the decision of the judge.

But the existence of a judge presupposes a law-maker, and at the moment, as between States, force is the only law-maker. The public law is mainly embodied in treaties, and treaties are the result of duels. Further, no peaceful method exists for the revision of treaties, which are bound sooner or later to become out of date and must consequently be revised and adapted to meet new conditions which have arisen since they were signed. If the procedure of negotiation—which is the old method of diplomacy—and conciliation—the method employed by the League—break down, what is left? Nothing but a resort to force. The giants once more proceed to contest the issue by recourse to the ancient and time-worn test of trial by battle.

III

*Sanctions
indis-
pensable*

WE are therefore driven to the conclusion that what is described as international law is really only a compilation of principles, rules, bargains, and settlements which may or may not be observed. It is not law, but the appearance of law—a mirage—which only deludes people by inculcating a belief in something which is unreal and inoperative.¹ The reason is obvious: it is that this so-called law possesses no sanction. It cannot be

¹ Cf. *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, p. 169. "The so-called law of nations consists of opinions or sentiments current amongst nations generally. It therefore is not law properly so called."—John Austin, *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined*, Lecture V.

enforced, and in every society, whether it is composed of individuals or nations, there are, unfortunately, depraved and evil-minded persons who will not voluntarily conform to any law unless they are compelled to do so. Hobbes' dictum, written three centuries ago, still holds the field : " Covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all."

It follows that our first duty is to make provision for " the sword " without which the enforcement of covenants and treaties cannot be guaranteed.

IV

BUT, as we have seen, this cannot be done unless simultaneously a court of justice and an arbitral tribunal have also been established, the former to adjudicate, on the basis of law, upon disputes which are capable of determination by judicial settlement ; the latter to determine, on the basis of equity and good conscience, political disputes, including those which have to do with the revision of treaties. Such a court already exists. It is the Permanent Court of International Justice which sits at The Hague. The jurisdiction of the court, however, is in effect limited to disputes described as justiciable. It has no authority, except at the request of both parties, to pronounce a verdict on grounds of equity and good conscience. The tribunal in equity has not yet made its appearance as an integral and permanent part of the machinery of the League.¹ Therefore, disputes which are non-

*The Court
and
Tribunal*

¹ As a temporary expedient, however, the Lytton Commission, appointed in December 1931, exemplifies the working of the permanent tribunal proposed, and demonstrates its practicability. In consequence of the Japanese coup of 18th-19th September,

justiciable in character, those to which no law or treaty apply, or which are concerned to alter existing treaties, cannot be dealt with effectively or satisfactorily by the League as it is at present constituted. These disputes usually arise out of political issues, which have always been the main causes of war.

V

*The Council
and
Assembly*

UNDER existing conditions political disputes are referred to the Council and Assembly of the League, whose members are the representatives of the governments of its states-members. These bodies are composed exclusively of political personages who take their orders from their governments. In this condition of things they cannot, nor are they expected to, reach decisions on grounds of right and equity. The interests and policies of their respective countries are the paramount consideration.¹

1931, and of the appeal of the Chinese Government to the League Council under Art. 11, the Council on December 10th, 1931, by unanimous vote, constituted "a Commission of five members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstance which, affecting international relations, threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends." The members of the Commission were selected by the President of the Council, with the approval of the parties to the dispute: five representatives of the Great Powers, including America, being appointed. The Chinese and Japanese Governments, in accordance with the Resolution of December 10th, each appointed an assessor. Lord Lytton, the British member of the Commission, was appointed Chairman. The Commission pursued investigations in the Far East in February-July 1932, and completed its Report in September. This Report, and the general principles of settlement contained therein, were the basis of the Assembly Report, unanimously adopted under Article 15, para. 4, on February 24th, 1933.

¹ "When disputes are under consideration by the Council the press of different countries has a habit of indicating that their representative's sympathies lie in one or other direction, without

The absence of an arbitral tribunal designed for the settlement of disputes which are not justiciable in nature, that is political disputes, is a serious defect in the structure of the League. They cannot be satisfactorily dealt with by a Court of Justice acting on the basis of law ; and the only alternative under the existing system is a reference to a political body, which offers no guarantee of impartiality.

Further, if the Council or Assembly fail to reach an unanimous decision, the parties to the dispute may resort to war. This they will probably do, despite the provisions of the Kellogg Pact. And even when the decision is unanimous, as in the recent case of the Sino-Japanese dispute, there is no certainty that sanctions will be applied, even those specified in Article XVI of the Covenant. On the contrary, it is certain that the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of these obligations will depend, not upon the dictates of justice, but upon the exigencies of policy. Although the most flagrant act of aggression has been committed, the sword will remain in its scabbard. Not even the blunt edges of its diplomatic, financial, and economic sanctions will be employed.

The reason for this impotence is not so much the unwillingness of states-members to vindicate the authority of the League as the lack of any plan or organisation to ensure common and united action.¹

any consideration of the merits of the case. This fact tends to rob the Council of that measure of complete confidence which it might otherwise enjoy."—M. Henri Rolin, *The Peaceful Settlement of All Disputes*. Problems of Peace, Fourth Series, p. 28.

¹ On February 24th, 1933, the Extraordinary Assembly of the League found it necessary, in undertaking not to recognise the State of Manchukuo, to appoint an Advisory Committee to perform *inter alia* the function of aiding the members of the League in concerting their action and their attitude among themselves and with non-members. The Advisory Committee met on March 15th and

Each state-member distrusts its neighbours. They fear that if they take any individual action to compel compliance with the decisions of the League they will be left in the lurch to bear single-handed the results of their intervention. Could they rely upon common action planned in advance against the aggressor or defaulter, they might be willing to co-operate. What is everybody's business is nobody's.

VI

*Centralised
Force*

EXPERIENCE has shown conclusively that there is no way of circumventing this difficulty, except by the centralisation of force under the direct control of an international authority. This is the system which has been evolved in every civilised community, where the obligation of individual citizens under the common law to assist in its execution has, in practice, been organised and undertaken by the national executives and transferred by them to the policing authorities.¹

This devolution of responsibility does not mean that the members of the community have been relieved of their obligation to assist in the maintenance of order. It does mean, however, that the primary responsibility now falls upon the police and, in the last resort, upon the military forces, and that the

constituted a sub-committee to consider what measures it might be necessary for governments to take. This sub-committee met on May 10th and adjourned until June 2nd. On June 7th the Advisory Committee requested the Secretary-General to send a circular letter to states-members and others drawing their attention to the desirability of certain indicated measures being taken. Three and a half months had thus elapsed before any suggestion for common and united action had been made.

¹ Cf. *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, p. 166.

personnel of both these organisations are engaged to act on behalf of the whole community.

This system of centralising force and devolving its execution has superseded the old methods of hue and cry and outlawry. It has also resulted in the disarmament of individuals, because when the latter were guaranteed police protection and were assured that the arm of the law could safeguard their lives and property, weapons became superfluous and were consequently discarded.¹

The same principle is exemplified in the fusion of kingdoms, the development of federalism, and all those unifying political processes which have tended to centralise force and to promote the security of the co-operating communities. As Mr. Oscar Crosby has said: "Centralised force tends to eliminate all force, including itself."²

VII

IN the international sphere, however, this principle has been entirely ignored. Instead of *Function of the League* bending their energies to discovering how force can be reduced to the exclusive purpose of the police function, nations and governments have been wasting their time in trying to achieve disarmament, always forgetting that when they have solved the problems of justice and security disarmament is logically bound to follow. It is clear, therefore, that under existing conditions the relationships of States are only one or two stages removed from the law of the jungle, with the supremacy of force and the resort to trial by battle as its ultimate sanctions.

To remedy this state of affairs, the League was

¹ Cf. *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, p. 209.

² *International War*, p. 11.

called into existence.¹ Its primary duty was to prevent breaches of the peace and to provide machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes. This machinery, however, has not yet been developed, though the League is asked to undertake the task of administering justice, without which no durable peace is possible. It is expected to perform this duty without being equipped with the elementary organisation which has been found indispensable in every civilised State. There is no law-giver and no sanction. There exist an Assembly—a deliberative body whose proceedings are governed by the rule of unanimity ; a Permanent Court with powers of definition and interpretation ; a Council—a quasi-executive body whose composition does not inspire confidence, and a Secretariat—an embryonic international civil service.²

Here are the rudiments of a political structure corresponding to the institutions existing in European communities centuries ago when they were beginning to emerge from a condition of barbarism.³ Obviously they are inappropriate to the needs even of the international community in the twentieth century. Outlawry and hue and cry may suffice for nations armed with bows and arrows or even

¹ " Our task at Paris is to organise the friendship of the world—to see to it that all the moral forces that make for right and justice and liberty are united and are given a vital organisation to which the peoples of the world will readily and gladly respond."—President Wilson, in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, January 3rd, 1919.

² Cf. *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, p. 134.

³ " We cannot afford to rest and be thankful. There is very much to be done. We have got the barest outline of an international organisation, a sketch of an international parliament, an international executive, an international judiciary, and an international civil service, but not more. We have scarcely even laid the foundations of an international police force. We are still slaves to the conception that each nation must arm itself against all the others."—Viscount Cecil, *The Way of Peace*, p. 8.

thundering culverins. But they are inadequate, to say the least, where aeroplanes, poison gas, submarines, and "Big Berthas" are involved and when the fate of civilisation hangs by a thread.

No, these rudiments will not suffice. In an age when international contacts and mutual interdependence are more widespread and intensive than they were in the national communities a century ago,¹ an international authority armed with powers of restraint becomes an urgent and imperious necessity.

VIII

WHAT, therefore, are its minimum requirements which will suffice to safeguard civilisation from the impending disaster and which will conform to the moral principles we have laid down governing the right use of force?

*Minimum
Require-
ments*

First of all, there is the principle of equality in the eyes of the law. Nations, like individuals, must be treated on a basis of equality. Whether they are strong or weak, great or small, rich or poor, they should appear as equals at the bar of justice. But real equality, however much it may be invoked in theory, will be unattainable in practice until the international authority possesses a reliable and adequate sanction. The events of the last ten years have proved this. Corfu, Vilna, Manchuria,

¹ "The world of to-day constitutes a single economic organisation. No longer are countries self-contained or self-supporting. . . . There is more of common interest and interdependence between the United States and China, or between England and Ceylon, than existed a hundred years ago between the States of our (American) Union."—R. B. Fosdick, *The Old Savage in the New Civilisation*, pp. 135, 202.

Shanghai, and Jehol all bear witness.¹ Law-abiding nations—Norway and Denmark, for example²—may accept the verdict of the Permanent Court. In their case sanctions may be superfluous. It is in order to deter the aggressor, to bring the bully to heel, and to coerce the defaulter that they become indis-

¹ In consequence of the murder on Greek soil of an Italian General engaged on League duties, the Italian Government in August 1923 occupied the Greek island of Corfu. Greece appealed to the League, but expressed willingness to accept any decision of the Conference of Ambassadors. The League Council made detailed suggestions which were forwarded to the Ambassadors and accepted, but with an important modification in the matter of reparations. With regard to this the Ambassadors appointed an Allied committee of enquiry, but, withholding its report from publication, they awarded Italy the full compensation demanded. The Italian Government had held Corfu until the award was made.

On October 7th, 1920, Poland had recognised the Lithuanian occupation of Vilna, the historic Lithuanian capital. On October 9th, however, General Zeligovski seized the city, which has remained in Polish hands ever since. In 1921 the League of Nations made two suggestions for a settlement, neither of which proved acceptable to the conflicting governments.

The action of the Japanese Government in Manchuria was condemned in the Report of the Lytton Commission (see *ante*, p. 73, n.) and in the Report unanimously adopted by the League Assembly on February 24th, 1933. While the Assembly was reaching its decision the Japanese armies had been threatening the province of Jehol, which was claimed by Manchukuo as part of its territory. On February 22nd a Japanese invasion of Jehol commenced, and the whole of the province was soon in the hands of Japan.

² On July 10th, 1931, the Norwegian Government issued a declaration of occupation of certain territories in Eastern Greenland. Denmark claimed these territories as subject to its sovereignty, and on July 12th instituted proceedings in the Permanent Court asking for judgment that the Norwegian proclamation was a violation of existing legal status and was consequently null and void. Both countries had acceded to the Optional Clause. On April 5th, 1933, the Court, by 12 votes to 2, gave judgment in accordance with the submissions of the Danish Government. The Norwegian Government immediately revoked its declaration of July 10th, 1931, and also a declaration of occupation of July 12th, 1932, relating to certain territories in South-Eastern Greenland.

pensable. Therefore, it is clear that until force has been placed at the disposal of the League it will be unable to assert the principle of legal equality.

IX

SECONDLY, force cannot be limited to police *The Law-giver* action in the international sphere until provision has been made for the peaceful settlement of international disputes which may involve political issues and the revision of treaties. Clearly this is equivalent to the establishment of an indirect method of legislation in the affairs of nations through the tribunal system.

We have concluded that in the national States the right of rebellion remains so long as its citizens are deprived of the right, exercised indirectly, of sharing in the government of their country and the framing of its laws. Similarly, each member of the international authority is entitled to participate in these responsibilities. How far and to what extent can this participation be arranged on a basis of equity and equality? The principle of voting equality is debatable even when applied to the citizens of national States. There is much to be said for an assessment of voting qualifications which takes into account the intellectual attainments and cultural standards of the voters, if such a method is practicable. But in the international domain, the issue is still further complicated. There are countries whose inhabitants are numbered in millions; in others they do not exceed a few hundred thousand.¹ It would be morally indefensible and contrary to the

¹ The 1931 Assembly elected China and Panama to seats on the Council. The former State had a population of 440,000,000, the latter of 442,000.

elementary principles of democracy itself to confer the same legislative powers upon a population of one hundred thousand people as upon one of fifty or one hundred millions. There are also nations whose standards of civilisation are much higher or lower than those of others. It would be absurd to suggest, for instance, that the moral authority of Costa Rica or Abyssinia is equal to that of France or the United States.

Consequently, it is clear that equality between states, in the sense of equal voting power, is unattainable. It is not, however, beyond the bounds of human ingenuity to devise a system which will fairly and equitably assess the relative voting power which should be accorded to each state-member. Federalists, confronted with the same problem in the past, have been able to overcome it.¹ But we contend that in the existing conditions of the world it is premature to attempt this solution and thus to complicate still further the issues involved. The time has not yet arrived when the Parliament of Man can be ushered on the stage, equipped with all the paraphernalia of modern government. World consciousness, its sense of unity, and insistence upon common interests have not yet reached the point when they demand a full-fledged legislature. Deliberative equality, the right to speak and to be

¹ Thus the problem is overcome in the constitution of the United States by granting each State equal representation in the Senate, while in the House of Representatives the more populous States are conceded a representation proportionate to their population. A similar solution is adopted in the Canadian, Australian, and South African constitutions.

In the Lykian League of the second century B.C. the problem was met on different lines. The greater cities were given three votes apiece, the intermediate ones two, and the smaller members one each.

For a further discussion of this question see *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, chap. XIII and Appendix J.

heard, has already been recognised in the proceedings of the Assembly. That is a great advance, because it provides a forum for the free and open discussion of international grievances. But the Assembly is not the law-giver, nor, in its present form and constitution, will it ever become one. Many acute controversies and debatable points will have to be settled before it is able to initiate and enforce statutory reforms.

X

THESE constitutional changes are, however, *The Solution* not vital at this stage in the evolution of international law and order, however insistent they may hereafter become. The principle of equal and equitable participation in the settlement of political disputes and the revision of the public law can be achieved by a more practical, direct, and appropriate procedure, namely, the submission of all these questions to an impartial tribunal empowered to settle them upon grounds of equity. This body would be composed of persons chosen, in the words of the 1924 Protocol, "from among persons who by their nationality, their personal character, and their experience, appear to furnish the highest guarantees of competence and impartiality." They would be appointed, not by their national governments, but by the international authority. Consequently, they would not represent the policies and interests of the governments of the countries to which they happened to belong. They would bring to bear upon the issues in dispute a free and unfettered judgment, with the sole object of securing a fair and equitable settlement. During their tenure of office these elder statesmen, versed in the conduct of public affairs,

would become exclusively the servants of the League. They would retire from any participation in the internal politics of their respective countries and they would become the repository of a world conscience seeking to make straight the paths of justice and thus to ensure peace. They could not initiate international legislation. Their services would only be requisitioned at the request of the Council or Assembly of the League or when one or other of the parties to a dispute invoked their jurisdiction.

XI

*Develop-
ment of
Arbitral or
Tribunal
System*

THE inclusion of such a tribunal as a permanent institution in the organisation of the League would mark a further stage in the development of the arbitral system. In the history of civilised nations this system has always been the precursor of legislative assemblies and the forerunner of parliamentary representation. If, in consonance with human nature, the international organism develops on similar lines, clearly this is the next stage in its evolution. Then why should this reform not be undertaken? The Lytton Commission has already exemplified the working of the tribunal system.¹ It has demonstrated its practic-

¹ The Commission appointed by the Council of the League of Nations on December 10th, 1931 (see *ante*, p. 73, n.) was composed of persons whose competency, impartiality, and integrity were assured; it made an examination on the spot of the circumstances of the dispute; it afforded an opportunity to both the disputing parties to state their case: it formulated general principles to which any settlement, to be satisfactory, must conform. It was not, technically, within the province of the Commission to frame Recommendations for the settlement of the dispute; in practice, however, the Recommendations of the Assembly Report of February 24th, 1933, are merely the application of the general principles of the Lytton Report.

ability. The rejection of the report by Japan does not invalidate the system. It only proves the necessity for an organised sanction which could be enforced by the international authority.

Fifty years ago Sir John Seeley wrote as follows : " There has been found hitherto but one substitute for war. It has succeeded over and over again : it succeeds regularly in the long run wherever it can be introduced. This is to take the disputed question out of the hands of the disputants, to refer it to a third party whose intelligence, impartiality, and diligence have been secured, and to impose his decision upon the parties with overwhelming force. The last step in this process, the power of enforcing the decisions by the federal union only, is just as essential as the earlier ones, and if you omit it you may just as well omit them too." ¹

Does the tribunal system in the international circle conform to the principles of self-government which we have already laid down as one of the essential conditions for the right use of force in the national State? It is clear that if all the members composing the international authority combine to deal with certain matters by putting their international legislative powers into commission in the way we have described, they will all enjoy a status of equality. In seeking redress at the hands of the tribunal, they will all be equal. Whatever precedents are created, whatever legislative processes are exercised by that body, they will be formed or applied without discrimination in the interests of all. Secondly, the states-members will have entered freely and without coercion into this arrangement, in order to be rid of the duelling system and to

¹ In a lecture delivered February 28th, 1871, reproduced in W. Evans Darby, *International Tribunals*, p. 184.

substitute in its place the reign of law. Thirdly, they will be able to exercise the right of secession should they become the victims of some flagrant injustice. Fourthly, through the medium of the Assembly, they will have preserved their rights of deliberation and criticism. They may even insist that the decisions of the tribunal may be rejected by a unanimous vote of this body.

Thus the democratic principle will have been applied to the community of States, and in joining the ranks of the international authority they will have deprived themselves of the right to resort to violence. The right of rebellion will no longer exist, and the moral justification of force will be exclusively limited to the police function.

XII

Alternatives

THERE are only two alternatives to this system. One is to remain in a condition of anarchy, a condition in which the law-abiding nations are always at the mercy of the lawless and criminal members of the international community.¹ In the present stage of development negotiation, conciliation, and conference are the hall-marks of this system. They are inadequate. Alone, they are incapable of curbing passion or restraining crime.

The other alternative is a World Federation, modelled upon the American Republic, with legislative, executive, and judicial machinery all complete. Such an institution would rest, not upon

¹ "In all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independence, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another, that is, their forts, garrisons and guns, upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours, which is a posture of war."—*Leviathan*, chap. xiii.

State or government representation, but directly upon a democratic franchise. The individual citizens of all states-members would elect their representatives to the Parliament of Man. Its officials and tax-gatherers would function in every country. Equipped with an executive, judicature, and treasury of its own, its enactments would directly affect the citizen, and its writ would run in the territories of every state-member. It would be completely independent of all national parliaments. The powers assigned to the international authority on the one hand and to the states-members on the other would be embodied in a written constitution.

The time may come when such a federation is practicable. At the moment, it appears to be premature and impossible. The tribunal system with an International Police Force as its sanction stands, however, midway between these two extremes. Mankind, driven by necessity and the instinct of self-preservation, will be compelled to accept it, and, in doing so, will have recognised the right use of force in the governance of the world.

CHAPTER VII

FORCE AND THE FACTIONS

"Having the protection of the Commonwealth, he needeth not the defence of private force."—HOBBS.

I

Repercussions

THE world we live in to-day is the prey of anarchy. Despite its vaunted progress mankind—that beast of many heads—is still the victim of its passions and emotions. The good in human nature has not yet overcome the bad, either because it is a minus quantity or because it lacks the power to translate its benevolent intentions into terms of rational organisation. In the international arena anarchy is rampant, and its repercussions—the strife and turmoil of the factions—reverberate within the frontiers of the national State. The sovereign nations are free to fight without restraint. Why, therefore, should the factions not emulate their example? Why should Fascists, Communists, and Nationalists be debarred from resorting to force? In both cases human nature is essentially the same. If the police function is repudiated in the relationships of nations, why should it be insisted upon in the relationships of individuals and groups within the State?

It is clear that a lawless international mentality breeds a similar mentality in the conduct of national affairs. To this cause amongst others may be ascribed the civil and industrial strife, the innumerable revolutions and *coups d'état* which have

ravaged almost every country since the termination of the War, paralysing the development of democracy and retarding the economic recovery of the world. War mentality has been reproduced in the conflicts of the national factions. This is bound to happen, so long as two systems—the duelling and the policing—operate side by side in two different spheres of human relationships. There is a constant reaction between the two, which is always more pronounced after every war.

Moreover, as a result the right use of force is not understood or practised in either sphere. Even in democratic communities where, as we have seen,¹ it is morally possible to limit its exercise to the police function, it may still be employed by the factions to thwart the decisions of the electorate or be so abused by the Government as to defeat the ends of justice.

II

AS an illustration of this thesis, let us consider the relationships between Great Britain and Ireland during the last quarter of a century. *Force and Home Rule* These are referred to at length because they exemplify how the principles expounded in previous chapters may be trampled under foot, while they vividly display the confusion of thought which surrounds the subject. They also point out the pitfalls, and teach certain lessons which may help us to avoid a repetition of these tragic experiences.

It will be generally agreed that there is no more democratic constitution in the world than that of Great Britain. Stripped of its trappings, it has been evolved to express the will of the people through their parliamentary representatives. In parliament

¹ See chap. III, pp. 16 *et. seq.*

resides the sovereignty of the people. Yet even in this community, which has developed the democratic system to its highest degree, the principle of the right use of force is not recognised or, if it is, it has been betrayed by the political leaders of the country.

What are the facts? In 1914 a Bill was passed through Parliament devolving a measure of self-government upon Ireland. For many years, such a measure had been demanded by the people of Southern Ireland. After many disappointments and rebuffs, and after many of its champions—Gladstone, Parnell, and others—had fallen in the fray, the Home Rule Bill, canvassed and debated from one end of the British Isles to the other, was placed upon the Statute Book.¹ It is clear that at the end of this long-drawn-out controversy the electorate had declared itself on the side of devolution. Through the process of reasoning and discussion, public opinion had become convinced of the justice of the demand for Home Rule. What had been refused to the terrorist pressure of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the “Hibernians” and others,² bent upon

¹ The Home Rule Bill had originally passed the House of Commons in January 1913, being rejected by the Lords. If passed in three successive sessions by the House of Commons the Bill would become law without the assent of the Lords, under the provisions of the Parliament Act, 1911. The Bill passed the Commons a second time in May 1914; the Lords, however, excluded Ulster from its operation. War supervening, the Bill passed the Commons a third time without resistance, and became law for all Ireland in September 1914. A contemporaneous Act provided that it should not come into effect until after the War, and the Government undertook to bring in a Bill dealing with Ulster. The 1914 Act never came into actual operation in any part of Ireland.

² The Irish Republican Brotherhood, founded in 1858, had been the power behind all separatist movements. “It had members everywhere, its tentacles went into everything, it maintained a footing in every organisation and movement in Ireland Everywhere it pushed separatist principles.”—P. S. O’Hegarty, *The Victory of Sinn Féin*, p. 13. In 1904 the Ancient Order of

intimidation, was at length conceded to moral suasion. This was achieved in a deliberative and legislative assembly, in which the peoples of England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland were all represented.

III

BUT the factions had still to be reckoned with *Factions*
 even in a democratic community. In Nor- *versus*
 thern Ireland the Orangemen immediately *Democracy*
 announced their intention of resisting the measure by force of arms.¹ Despite the fact that the House of Commons, representing the electors of Great Britain, Southern Ireland, and Ulster, had after half a century of debate decided to confer a measure of self-government upon Ireland, Ulster began to organise armed resistance. Obviously such action was indefensible. It undermined the constitution and destroyed the democratic system because it repudiated the right use of force. However mistaken a policy of non-participation or passive resistance² might have been against a measure which evoked such keen resentment, we could have understood and might even have sympathised with such a protest. The threat of armed rebellion, however, was a chal-

Hibernians, a secret society of Catholics to promote the material interest of Catholics, had been formed. "The society spread its invisible network round Ireland. It was mischievous in origin, in tendency, and in result."—Sir James O'Connor, *History of Ireland*, Vol. II, p. 185.

¹ Demonstrations against the Bill commenced in Ulster in the summer of 1912. In September 200,000 men signed a "Solemn League and Covenant" pledging the signatories to use "all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule Parliament." In the same month the Ulster Provisional Government was set up, and Ulster boasted of 85,000 well-armed men, with General Sir George Richardson as Commander-in-Chief. On the night of April 24th–25th, 1914, gun-running operations resulted in the landing of 35,000 rifles in Ulster.

² See chap. III, p. 26.

lence to all political parties which professed a belief in constitutional and peaceful methods of government.

In a democratic community, no worse crime can be committed, no more insulting challenge can be offered to the sovereignty of the people, than an attempt to arm on the part of the factions or to organise themselves on a military or semi-military footing. It was, moreover, a flagrant breach of the law,¹ and was admitted to be so.² Therefore, the custodians of power, acting on behalf of the people, should have taken immediate measures to repress the incipient outbreak, even at the cost of breaking a few heads, including those of the leaders of the rebellion. An inflexible Abraham Lincoln would have asserted the sovereignty of the people and the majesty of the law. The importation of arms should have been ruthlessly suppressed. This action, coupled with a blockade of the North of Ireland ports and the trial of the leading conspirators, would probably have sufficed to vindicate the authority and impartiality of the British people

¹ "What is to be said about Carson's treasonable action in the North? That it was treasonable is, of course, beyond question. All of those highly placed men who were engaged in the Ulster campaign were guilty of the grave offence known to British Law as treason-felony, punishable with penal servitude for life."—Sir James O'Connor (Lord Justice of Appeal 1918-1924), *History of Ireland*, Vol. II, p. 180.

"The gist of the offence is this: no man can by force, or show of force, compel Parliament to do or abstain from doing anything whatsoever. If it were otherwise, mob law would be substituted for the will of the people expressed through Parliament."—*Id.*, p. 181.

² "The Attorney-General says that the doctrine and the course I am taking lead to anarchy. Does he not think I know that?"—Sir Edward Carson, October 1st, 1912.

"I do not care twopence whether it is treason or not."—September 21st, 1912.

"The Volunteers are illegal: don't be afraid of illegalities."—September 7th, 1913.

in its exercise of the police function. Had these measures been taken, there can be little doubt that "The Terror" which visited Ireland in both North and South a few years later would have been avoided.

IV

BUT what happened? The Conservative Party *The Betrayal* in Great Britain ranged itself on the side of the Orangemen. Mr. Bonar Law, the Leader of the Party in the House of Commons, echoing a famous declaration that "Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right," declared that he could imagine no lengths of resistance to which Ulster could go in which he would not be prepared to support her. "We shall not be guided by the considerations, we shall not be restrained by the bonds, which would influence us in an ordinary political struggle. We shall use any means—whatever means seem to us likely to be the most effective."¹ One wonders in what school of political philosophy Mr. Bonar Law had graduated that he should thus deny the basic principles of democracy and proclaim himself openly on the side of rebellion. His lieutenant "Galloper" Smith, afterwards Lord Birkenhead, was even more emphatic. "There was no length," he said, "to which Ulster would not be entitled to go, however desperate or unconstitutional, in carrying the quarrel."² It seems that even Oxford fails to inculcate the elementary principles of the right use of force in the minds of its scholars!

What a spectacle! In the Mother of Parliaments democracy was betrayed by a party which at election times is loud in its praises. We were suddenly pitchforked back into the days of the Civil War and the

¹ Blenheim, July 27th, 1912. ² Liverpool, January 22nd, 1912.

mentality of the Restoration.¹ Why? Because it was apparently not realised that the right use of force in a democratic community is limited to the police function, and that once this fundamental principle was thrown to the winds, anything might happen.

And what is to be said of the Conservative Party? Upholder of the constitution, protagonist of law and order, in betraying democracy and allying itself with a faction which proposed to defy the law, it degenerated into a faction itself. Defeated at the bar of reason it consented privily to the employment of force. Afterwards, unblushingly, it encouraged the Ulster faction in public and gave it its moral, or immoral, support. By so doing it abrogated the rules of the parliamentary game. It ceased to play cricket. This was an act of sabotage directed against the democratic system, which rendered the task of the Government—the peaceful settlement of the Irish dispute—almost impossible. From that moment, the seeds of disintegration were sown. The attitude of the Conservative Party, dictated by Lord Carson, Leader of the Ulster faction, and endorsed by Mr. Bonar Law and his lieutenants, dominated the situation. Eventually it plunged Ireland into what was virtually a state of civil war,

¹ Even in the conflict of the factions in 1659 there was one man who proclaimed the principle of the right use of force. General Monk, commander of the Army in Scotland, intervened in the contest of the Army leaders and the Rump Parliament by declaring his intention "to assert the liberty and authority of Parliament." The question was not one between monarchy and a republic, but whether England was to be governed by law or by the sword. "I am engaged," he wrote, "in conscience and honour to see my country freed from the intolerable slavery of a sword government." In January 1660 Monk commenced his invasion of England, on February 3rd he entered London. On February 11th he declared to the Rump that his motive was the vindication of the liberties of the people, and that a representative assembly must be constituted.

and prepared for Great Britain one of the blackest pages in her history.

V

AT that moment, however, the World War *The Force of Example* intervened, and the final decision of these issues was postponed. But unfortunately the mischief had already been done. If the Orangemen, backed by the Tory Party, could make good their claims at the point of the bayonet, then why not the Nationalists of the South? At first the latter were divided. The Constitutionalists, the men who had won Home Rule by an appeal to the reason and conscience of the British people, supported Great Britain by speech and action in this new crisis. Many of them enlisted in the British forces, whilst others helped to recruit their fellow-countrymen in the cause of liberty and democracy. The extreme Nationalist section, however, remembered that England's necessity was Ireland's opportunity, and, with the example of Ulster before them, hoisted the flag of rebellion.¹

VI

DURING the War it was no doubt difficult to *Abuse of Policing Instrument* deal effectively with the problem of maintaining law and order in Ireland. But once peace in Europe had been restored there was no excuse for the dilatory, pernicious, criminal, and

¹ The initial revolt, Easter 1916, was easily crushed, the rebels failing to enlist the sympathies of the Irish people. The events of the next two years, however, proved disastrous to British rule. In the elections of December 1919 the Sinn Fein Party won 73 seats out of 106. In January 1919 the Sinn Fein members constituted themselves into the Dail and drew up a Declaration of Independence. In the same month the "Anglo-Irish War" was commenced by Dan Breen and his gunmen.—See O'Connor, *op. cit.*, chaps. xxii, xxiii.

immoral proceedings which the Government instituted in Southern Ireland.¹

It is bad enough when force is prostituted in the service of the duelling system. But it is a thousand times worse when, under the cloak of the law, it becomes the tool of unscrupulous politicians for the purposes of murder and incendiarism. The crimes and cruelties of the Nationalist gunmen were blatant, revolting, and inhuman, but they were no worse than the brutalities and banditry of the Black and Tans, a collection of irregulars who were neither policemen nor soldiers.² The gunmen were rebels, they carried on a guerrilla warfare. They were guilty of the vilest atrocities. They did not, however, commit them under the ægis of the law. But the men employed by Mr. Lloyd George and his Ministry were sent to wreak their vengeance on the population of Southern Ireland with the King's writ in their pockets. In the name of the law they were permitted and later ordered to roam the country, looting, burning, and killing not only the Nationalist gunmen, but innocent people who were now being terrorised by both sides.³

¹ "I doubt if the history of any civilised community in modern times can show anything which for cowardice, wickedness, stupidity, and meanness can equal the handling by the British Government of the situation created for them by a couple of thousand Irish peasants and shop-boys."—O'Connor, *op. cit.*, II, p. 315.

² The Black and Tans were introduced in June 1920 to supplement the Royal Irish Constabulary. "It is said of the Black and Tans that some of them were taken from English jails One can well imagine that the nature of the occupation would attract a somewhat objectionable type and that little care was taken to ensure that none but men of thoroughly good character were accepted. Physical fitness and brute courage were the essentials. The Irish Rapparee was to be beaten by the British Rapparee."—O'Connor, *op. cit.*, II, 317–318.

³ "A campaign by the Black and Tans was initiated of counter-murder, counter-arson, and counter-looting. The Cabinet took no

Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, though himself an Irishman of the "Black North" who hated the Nationalists with all the zeal of an Orangeman, loathed and abominated this utter prostitution of force in the service of the State. He viewed these proceedings at close quarters. He was a partisan, a supporter of the Ulster faction, but he could not stomach these wicked and brutal proceedings, which brought dishonour upon the King's service and debased the police force to the level of the thief and the murderer. "These reprisals," he wrote in his Diary in the period of "unauthorised reprisals," "were carried on without anyone being responsible: men were murdered, houses burnt, villages wrecked this was due to want of discipline It was the business of the Government to govern. If these men ought to be murdered, then the Government ought to murder them I have protested for months against this method of out-terrorising the terrorists by irresponsible persons."¹ To what depth of ignominy can democracy sink when it is led by men devoid of every principle and moral

real steps to prevent it. That is not all. It is now clear that this 'competition in crime' had the support of certain persons in high places."—O'Connor, *op. cit.*, II, p. 316.

"Burning of houses went on. The creameries especially suffered. The guilty gunmen, who had no property, were neither scotched nor killed nor dismayed by the destruction of other people's property. There were stories of cruelty to prisoners. Several were shot 'attempting to escape,' an obvious euphemism for murder of a prisoner in custody. Other episodes have been related to me, upon testimony that I cannot discredit, of threats of death to prisoners and of shocking personal violence."—*Id.*, p. 318.

¹ Callwell's *Life*, Vol. II, pp. 263–264. "He (Mr. Lloyd George) reverted to his amazing theory that someone was murdering two Sinn Feiners to every loyalist the Sinn Feiners murdered . . . He seemed to be satisfied that a counter-murder association was the best answer to the Sinn Fein murders. A crude idea of statesmanship."—*Id.*, p. 251.

scruple ! To what heights of self-indulgence may a faction aspire when its cause is involuntarily supported by the chicanery, opportunism, and wanton brutality of a dishonest Government !¹

The arm of the law must strike down the aggressor and coerce the defaulter. But in the exercise of its authority, even under the greatest provocation, it must hold the scales impartially and judicially. The policing system is the adjunct of the law. Its function is to compel appearance before a court or tribunal, to prohibit illegal assemblies, and generally to prevent breaches of the peace. It is not its function to indulge in reprisals, to loot, burn, and destroy the countryside in order to terrorise the population. These are the hall-marks of the duelling system. Even when the assistance of the military has to be invoked to reinforce the constabularies, the courts of law still function unless the condition of the disturbed territories is such that it is wholly impossible for them to perform their duties. They may then be superseded by courts martial. But even under martial law, or a state of siege,² the

¹ " The Cabinet Ministers of the day stand indicted—that they, being members of a Government of a great and law-abiding community, permitted, that is to say, having the power to prevent took no effective steps to prevent, their agents and servants from engaging in a campaign of murder, arson, and terrorism in Ireland. The world verdict must be one of guilt."—O'Connor, *op. cit.*, II, p. 317.

² Martial Law may be defined as the suspension of ordinary law and the temporary government of a territory by military tribunals. In France a " Declaration of the State of Siege " operates to transfer the authority ordinarily vested in the civil power for the maintenance of law and order to the *autorité militaire*. Martial Law in this sense is, admittedly, unknown to the law of England, but not necessarily to the law of other portions of the Empire. The term Martial Law is sometimes used to designate the right of the Crown and its servants to repel force by force in the case of invasion, insurrection or violent resistance to the law.

accused is given a trial, and rough-and-ready justice is administered. Never in any circumstances should violence, exercised as a policing instrument, be converted into terms of robbery and murder. Such acts are the negation of civilisation in any policing system. They strip it of all moral authority and defeat the ends of justice.¹

It was for this reason that the Black and Tan experiment failed. Every Irishman with a spark of patriotism was transformed into a potential gunman. The prestige of the British Government was lowered, both at home and abroad. The British people, that great democracy, became ridiculous in the eyes of every nation in Europe.² The moral censure of every decent-minded man in America and the Dominions was brought down upon our heads. It was not that we used force to quell a rebellion, but the criminal methods we employed, that shocked our friends and delighted our enemies.

Why were the reprisals of the Black and Tans allowed? Why, later, was the British Government able to indulge in "authorised" atrocities? ³ Simply

¹ Mr. Arthur Henderson, M.P., declared on December 9th, 1920, that the British Ministers had "struck a blow, perhaps a mortal blow, at the sanctions of law and order. They had made the forces of the Crown, which existed only to maintain law and order, the instrument of a blind and ruthless vengeance. This was not 'resolute government' but primitive barbarism."

² "British rule is a by-word and a scoff in every country in Europe and across the Atlantic . . . For the good name of Britain, is it not high time that those crimes, committed in the name of law and order, should cease?"—Revd. D. C. MacGregor, Moderator of the Presbyterian Church of England, *The Times*, March 5th, 1921.

³ Official reprisals were put into force in January 1921, though only to a limited extent. These "authorised" reprisals must be distinguished from the "unauthorised" reprisals which had been indulged in between the advent of the Black and Tans in June 1920 and the end of the year. In regard to the latter the Government was responsible because it failed to check the reprisals and to

because the fundamental conception of the right or moral use of force was not ingrained in the consciousness of the British democracy. Had it understood this elementary principle it would never have tolerated the prostitution of the policing system. But a war-weary democracy failed to grasp the issues involved. Caught in the maelstrom of events, it allowed its leaders to convert its policing instrument into a duelling weapon. It was for this reason that the repository of trust and authority—the House of Commons—utterly failed to curb the animosity and ambition of a faction.

There was clearly no excuse for the cynical and cowardly policy which the Government pursued. The War was over and the British army and navy, with the exception of the contingents employed on policing duties abroad, were at its disposal. It was in a position to assert the authority of Parliament. It could have proclaimed martial law over the whole of Ireland.¹ The ports could have been blockaded. The Post Office could have been taken over by the military authorities. Motor-cars and railways could have been commandeered. Military tribunals could have been substituted for the ordinary courts where these could or did no longer function.

Policing measures strictly and impartially en-

keep its troops in order: in regard to the former it is directly responsible for the instigation of atrocities.

An instance of "authorised" reprisals is found in the events of January 5th, 1921. Two policemen had been killed and seven wounded in an ambush near Midleton. Houses in the town were blown up as an official reprisal.

¹ Viscount French's proclamation of martial law, issued December 10th, 1920, extended only to Cork, Tipperary, Kenny, and Limerick.

forced, without reprisals, burnings, lootings, and murders, would have brought the gunmen to their knees in a few months. Instead of inciting the hate and hostility of every Irishman, they would probably have rallied the mass of the people in support of an authority which tried to treat them with justice and impartiality, and protected them from the coercion and the terrorism of the Nationalist gunmen.

Moreover, had the Prime Minister and his colleagues sternly and unswervingly undertaken the pacification of the country and the suppression of the gunmen, as a policing measure, the authority of Parliament would have been vindicated, and the door opened for the return of the Irish Party to the House of Commons, culminating in the constitutional settlement of the Home Rule problem. But the pitch was queered when the nefarious enterprises of the Black and Tans were allowed to go unchecked and responsible ministers conceived the criminal idea of paying the rebels back in their own coin. By resorting to such measures the Government virtually declared war upon Southern Ireland, they proclaimed the contest to be, not one between a policing authority and a disturber of the peace, but a duel between the Irish people on the one hand and British democracy on the other, forgetting that the whole object of policing measures is to compel appearance before whatever tribunal has been charged with the settlement of the dispute. By this insane act of policy they deprived the Government of its moral authority. They had descended to the tactics of the rebels: they had sought to defeat anarchy by themselves resorting to anarchy. It was a duel between one "murder club" and another.

The defence advanced by Mr. Winston Churchill carries no conviction.¹ He rejoices in the fact that the Nationalist representatives resolved to boycott Westminster.² This implies that he applauds their decision to rely upon the pistol instead of free speech in the House of Commons. Had they arrived there, they might certainly, as Mr. Churchill suggests, have become a source of embarrassment to their fellow-members in the conduct of Parliamentary business. They might also have enlightened the British electorate about the doings of the Black and Tans. No doubt this would have been highly inconvenient to Mr. Churchill and his colleagues. In his narrative he then proceeds to throw the blame upon the experts. The soldiers at the War Office, he tells us, declared the rebellion could not be suppressed without the reinforcement of the army.

VII

The Results

THIS attempt to legalise anarchy, and call it a constitution, was bound to miscarry. Secret and informal parleys ripened into negotiations culminating in a Treaty.³ Rebellion had won the day. Democracy had been defeated by a faction. The leaders who prided themselves on having won

¹ *The World Crisis: The Aftermath*, pp. 287 et seq.

² "The two supreme services which Ireland has rendered Britain are her accession to the Allied cause at the outbreak of the Great War, and her withdrawal from the House of Commons at its close."—*Id.* pp. 282-283.

³ The "Anglo-Irish War" was brought to a close by a truce proclaimed on July 11th, 1921. Negotiations for a settlement were carried on in London, and the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed on December 6th. The Dail ratified the Treaty on January 7th, 1922, and the administration of the country was transferred to a Provisional Government by Act of the Imperial Parliament of March 30th.

the World War capitulated to a handful of gunmen—such was the result of their having absorbed the mentality of the gunman.¹

The effect was to undermine the British Constitution, because in a democratic country which had given Ireland its full measure of representation in the Imperial Parliament, the right of rebellion was conceded. The new regime, embodied in the Treaty, was not the offspring, as the Home Rule Act had been, of free and unfettered debate in a deliberative and legislative assembly. On the contrary, it was the loot of a successful hold-up. The consequences were disastrous for everyone. The factions were encouraged. The period of civil strife in Ireland was prolonged.² Everywhere a mentality was produced which hugged the illusion that everything could be accomplished by force. Respect for the law and Parliamentary institutions was undermined and a premium was placed upon rebellion. The Irish Treaty was the forerunner of the General Strike.

In Ireland itself the clock of civilisation was put back. People were imbued with the idea that

¹ "The decision was announced in Parliament that 'authorised reprisals' such as would have ruled in a war zone, and these only, should be adopted This resolve came with great relief to the Irish secret societies. To do them justice, they were almost the only people in the whole world who were not shocked by the activities of the Black and Tans. They thought it fair that their own measure should be meted out to them."—Churchill, *The World Crisis: The Aftermath*, pp. 288–289.

² The signing of the Treaty was followed by a division of the Sinn Feiners into hostile factions, the Republican and the Treaty supporters. In March 1922 the "Irregulars"—the Republican section of the Irish Republican Army—seized many public buildings in Dublin. The Government commenced operations against them in June, and the fighting thus commenced continued until April 1923. The early months of 1922 had also seen disturbances on the Ulster frontier, and within the Free State itself "the revolver was helping the propertyless man all over the country to become a propertied man."—O'Connor, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 351.

force, instead of being the exclusive monopoly of the Government, was the legitimate tool of the factions. A decade of law and order under Mr. Cosgrave has not eradicated this obsession. It still persists, and unless it is exorcised Ireland will continue indefinitely to be the prey of anarchy and civil strife.¹

The consequences to the British Government were no less disastrous. The Nationalists in India were not slow to take to heart the lesson of Ireland, and to emulate the tactics of the gunmen. If these proceedings could be justified in Ireland, how much more in a country whose people send no representatives to the British Parliament to voice their opinions, air their grievances, and demand a measure of self-government. But, as we have seen, in the democratic community of which Ireland was a part no right of rebellion existed, because the exercise of voting power rendered it morally unjustifiable.

VIII

*Their
Significance*

THE case of Ireland is referred to at length because it illustrates the thesis of this book. Moreover, it shows how easy it is for a political party to degenerate into a faction. Clearly, a party develops into a faction when it has made up its mind to resort to violence for the attainment of its political ends. When the Conservative Party encouraged the arming of the Orange faction, it not only dealt a mortal blow to parliamentary institu-

¹ "One finds, after the wars and possibly because of them, no civic spirit, no patriotism, and a general moral and spiritual degradation. . . . As a nation we have no real patriotism, we are eaten up with class selfishness and materialism."—P. S. O'Hegarty, *The Victory of Sinn Féin*, p. 177.

tions, but it also sounded the death knell of Unionism, because no union founded exclusively on force could possibly survive. Moreover, if the democratic machinery could be brought to a standstill by an armed faction in Ulster, then the right of rebellion would be restored to the people of the South. Therefore, the Conservative Party killed the spirit of Unionism when they undermined the influence and authority of the Irish Parliamentary Party amongst its own supporters. Further, they were sowing the seeds of separation not only from Great Britain, but also from the British Empire, a policy which John Redmond and his associates had never pursued. Subsequent events have proved that the betrayal of democracy has ended in a most unfortunate retribution. Let this be a warning whenever a political party is tempted to ally itself with a faction bent upon violence.

The Conservative Party has a great tradition, and on many occasions it has put the interests of the country before those of the party. By placing its reliance upon the people, supporting the democratic system, and insisting upon the right use of force in international no less than in domestic affairs, it may retrieve the errors of the past and render signal service to the nation and the Empire.

The Sinn Fein faction is in no better plight than its adversaries. For after covering itself with ignominy by its callous and brutal actions, plunging Ireland into a welter of anarchy, misery, and terror, it obtained little more, or possibly even less, than John Redmond and his colleagues had gallantly won a few years before on the floor of the House of Commons.¹ Had the gunmen been suppressed, and

¹ Sir James O'Connor, describing the position on Easter Monday, 1916, says that "a Home Rule Bill was on the statute book which

had the Nationalist party returned to Westminster, there can be no doubt that Parliament would have honoured the pledges of 1914, and granted Home Rule to Southern Ireland, just as it did to South Africa a few years after the conclusion of the Boer War.¹ That it was compelled to capitulate was due not to the employment of force, but to the abuse of its policing powers.

IX

*The
Lessons*

WHY, then, all this appalling hate, misery, and bloodshed, which could have been avoided if the basic principles of democracy had been firmly adhered to?

Surely there are lessons to be learnt from this tragic experience.

First, there is the vital necessity that a democracy—men and women—should understand the principles upon which it is founded, and that these should be rooted in the national consciousness. As we have seen, one of these principles is that in a democracy there can be no right of rebellion, and

was the germ of a settlement as ample as that which emerged from the Revolution.”—*History of Ireland*, Vol. I, p. 2.

“After 1916 there should not have been a shot fired in Ireland, nor a gun bought. They were totally unnecessary. Without firing a shot we could have forced from England anything that we have forced from her by the gun policy, and more. We would at the same time have maintained our solidarity, escaped partition, and avoided the irreparable moral disaster which has overtaken us. But for the lack of a firm hand on the civil side of the movement no effort to control the gun was made, and it brought us to disaster.”—O’Hegarty, *The Victory of Sinn Féin*, pp. 166–167.

¹ The Boer War was terminated by the Peace of Vereeniging in May 1902. Responsible government was instituted in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State in 1907: in 1909 the enemy provinces were joined with the Cape Province and Natal in the Union of South Africa.

that the exercise of force is limited to the police function. So long as the people are able to exercise their legislative powers freely and without restraint through their representative institutions, no faction—Nationalist, Communist, Fascist, or any other—possesses the right to resort to violence. It may well be asked why this principle among others is not taught in our schools and universities as part of the training of youth for its civic responsibilities?

Secondly, any political party which crosses the dividing line between free speech and violence by acts of provocation or intimidation, such as creating disturbances or arming itself, whether it be with rifles and machine guns or with lead piping and rubber truncheons,¹ should be denounced as an enemy of the State and should be proceeded against with all the rigour of the law.

Thirdly, even under the most acute provocation, the arm of the law—the constabularies and military forces—must act as the impartial executors of justice. This they cannot do unless there exists a comprehensive code of policing regulations drawn up in advance before the emergency arises. This code should regulate the application of force, prescribing the methods to be employed and the procedure to be followed before and after martial law has been proclaimed, and co-ordinating the duties

¹ On October 24th, 1922, a few days before the march on Rome, 40,000 Fascists paraded in military formation before Mussolini at Naples. It was asserted that one-tenth only of the total number of Fascists were present.

After the elections of September 1930 Hitler declared that the National Socialist Party was law-abiding and would never seek to obtain control by violent means. "This declaration," writes the *Annual Register* of 1931, "was not easy to reconcile with the existence of a strong nucleus of National Socialist troops, organised after the pattern of the Italian Fascist militia."

of the magistracy on the one hand and the policing services on the other.¹

Fourthly, in order that these principles and rules may become operative, and to prevent their abuse, it is essential that the representatives of the nation should exercise constant vigilance. It is their duty to guard against any violation of the regulations of the code on the part of the executive, magisterial, policing, and military authorities in the discharge of their duties, either on their own initiative or at the instance of the governmental departments.

Parliament will, therefore, insist that the policing measures are adequate, that they are executed in accordance with the law, and that the executive shall not be allowed to use its policing instrument as a means of inflicting indiscriminate and wholesale punishment or retaliation.

In a country where democracy has been in existence for centuries there should be no need to emphasise these elementary conceptions. Unhappily, however, the case of Ireland shows how in the heat of the moment, when passions are rising, they may be thrown overboard with the most disastrous

¹ Military and policing regulations, of course, exist. In the view of the law, however, these forces stand in the same position as private individuals: violation of the regulations, therefore, though it may subject the offender to official censure, is not *per se* a violation of law, while conversely the law may be violated even though the regulations are adhered to. Such regulations should, in so far as may be possible, make provision for all contingencies, leaving no question of principle to arbitrary decision of executive officers. Periodic revision of the codes is desirable, modifications thereby being made in the light of actual experience.

It is further essential that there should be no uncertainty in the law relating to unlawful assemblies, etc. The Commission which inquired into the disturbances in Ireland on July 26th, 1914, found that a body of volunteers was not an 'unlawful assembly,' a finding with which Lord Justice O'Connor is totally unable to agree.—*History of Ireland*, Vol. II, p. 203.

consequences. What is therefore needed is a sound, healthy, and intelligent public opinion, which will be reflected in "better Parliaments, elected by better electors."

This can only be achieved by education—the inculcation of those moral principles upon which democracy is founded. This duty devolves upon every institution, religious, cultural, and educational, concerned with the moral progress of the nation and of the individuals of which it is composed.¹ An informed public opinion should be capable of recognising the false prophets—the wolves in sheep's clothing, who thrive upon the passions, prejudices, and misfortunes of their fellow-men by exploiting a mob psychology.

X

IN many countries we have witnessed the usurpa-
tion of force by the factions, resulting in the Other
Examples
overthrow of democratic institutions. Whether or not these revolutions could have been prevented if democracy had been better led and better organised, it is clear that its leaders were guilty of betraying the whole nation when they allowed the factions to arm themselves. It is at this stage that intimidation begins and the outlines of the terror become discernible, whilst the spectre of civil war looms in the distance.

It is true that just as in the case of the aggressor in the international arena the faction always has the

¹ "The greatest evils which devastate our civilisation, and at times nearly destroy it . . . are due to the failure to apply to our social relationships knowledge which is of practically universal possession, often self-evident in the facts of daily life and experience, and to derive from that already available knowledge the relevant social truth."—Sir Norman Angell, *The Unseen Assassins*, p. 13.

advantage of the offensive. Its rôle is to attack. If it succeeds in organising, drilling, and arming its supporters, it will employ its forces ruthlessly, because it has placed itself above the law. If anyone doubts this, let him study the methods of Mussolini and Hitler. These methods are, however, denied to a democratic government, whose sole preoccupations are to provide protection and to enforce the law. Its rôle is purely defensive. But this handicap is more than counterbalanced by other advantages, namely, the possession at the outset of the means of dealing with incipient rebellion. In Italy and Germany these powers were allowed to lapse and the dangers ignored. The democratic leaders waited upon events instead of taking prompt action. They depleted their moral armoury by adopting a policy of "masterly inactivity," which amounted to cowardice and a betrayal of their responsibilities to the nation. When the crisis came they ignominiously vanished from the scene.

Dr. Breitscheid, one of the leaders of the German Democrats, meditating in his retirement at Prague, says, "The mistake of Anti-Fascists is not to be sought in the renunciation of resistance at the outbreak of the national revolution, but in the fact that they did not interrupt the dangerous preparations in time, and confined themselves to an attempt to maintain, by forming parliamentary majorities, a democratic regime that was becoming more and more dubious."¹

The moral of this is that the machinations of the factions which are determined to resort to coercion and violence must be nipped in the bud. Their speeches upon the platform can be met by argument, equally their manipulation of armed force should be

¹ *The New Statesman*, June 24th, 1933.

countered by police action which is undertaken by the Government—the political party in office—not in its own interests but on behalf of the whole community.

XI

IS the citadel of democracy—Great Britain—*Future of British Democracy* immune from these insidious attacks? In these days of kaleidoscopic change he would be a bold man who prophesied that such a contingency was “unthinkable.” The danger lurks at our doors, as the events in Ireland during the last twenty years have proved.

We have our Fascists, our Hitlers and Hugenburgs—ambitious, forceful, determined—bereft of every scruple, immune from all principle, ready to exploit every grievance and hardship, caring for naught except domination and power for the protection of their wealth and the destruction of democracy. We also have our Communists—our Lenins and Trotskys—filled with an intense fanaticism for the dictatorship of the proletariat, the plundering of the capitalist, and the overthrow of the parliamentary system. Like the Nationalists of Ireland, both these movements have abandoned the concept of representative government for the attainment of their aims. All deny the sovereignty of the people, and in the last resort they rely upon brute force for the achievement of their ends.¹ In principle there is no difference

¹ “In order to bring into being the Communist system of society the proletariat must have all power in their hands . . . They must become the ruling class in the State . . . The task of the dominant working class, therefore, consists in the merciless suppression of the bourgeoisie opposition . . . The rule of the proletariat will have to be a dictatorship . . . In such a situation there can be no talk of ‘freedom’ for everybody. The dictatorship of the proletariat is incompatible with the freedom of the bourgeoisie. The dictatorship is in fact necessary to deprive the bourgeoisie of their freedom,

in their methods, which, as in the case of Ireland, can only end in misery and bloodshed.

But we are told by the optimists that the people of Great Britain will have none of these things because we are too politically minded, that our traditions will save us and we shall muddle through somehow. But are we quite so sure of all this? It is true we may not be compelled to shout in stentorian tones, "Heil, Oswald!"¹ or "Heil, Stafford!"² nevertheless we may find ourselves bound and gagged, deprived of our rights and liberties as electors in a free country, unless our parliamentary leaders and representatives bestir themselves and are prepared at all costs to vindicate and uphold the democratic system. If vigorous action is required upon the platform, in the House of Commons or elsewhere, let it be taken before it is too late and the nation finds itself in the grip of anarchy.

The peoples of Europe are seething in turmoil; the factions fight for mastery. Dictatorships are springing up like mushrooms. It may be that soon Great Britain will find herself once more almost the sole representative and exponent of the democratic system in Europe. Her people will doubtless be told that they cannot afford to stand alone, that loyalty to democratic principles is out of date, and that, like another ancient fetish—Free Trade—it must for ever be abandoned. But whilst the new hot-gospellers proclaim their shallow philosophies

to chain them hand and foot in order to make it impossible for them to fight the revolutionary proletariat . . . The dictatorship of the proletariat is an axe in the hands of the workers."—N. Bucharin and E. Preobraschensky, *The A.B.C. of Communism*, pp. 90–92.

¹ Preferable to "Mosley," which has a Semitic not a Nordic flavour!

² Better than "Cripps" because it is good old Anglo-Saxon!

and display their tawdry wares let the British people never forget that democracy is founded upon an appeal to reason, not to force—that representative government is still the greatest contribution of the Anglo-Saxon race to the political development of mankind, and that it has given their country immunity from revolution and bloodshed for over two hundred years. Let them also realise that the only hope of effecting peaceful change and ordered progress lies in championing and upholding democratic principles, because these principles alone can solve the problem of the moral use of force, not only in the affairs of a nation but also in the governance of the world. Remembering these things, let them take courage, animated anew with the determination that “Government of the People, by the People, for the People, shall not perish from the earth.”

CHAPTER VIII

FORCE AND YOUTH

"And because Right is Right, to follow Right
Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence."—TENNYSON.

YOUTH always pays the price of war. But has it ever faced up to the problem of the right use of force? Before making up its mind what course it intends to follow when the next international duel is staged it must first of all understand the issues involved. Its decision, whatever it may be, must rest upon some moral basis. Otherwise it will be regarded merely as the offspring of an immature and untrained mind.

Youth cannot afford to dismiss this subject lightly. At the moment it is paying the price of the last war. In this generation it has been obliged not only to forfeit life itself upon the battlefield: it has also been deprived of the normal expectancy of enjoying its activities and pursuits. The avenues of opportunity have been blocked. Those millions of shells which a few years ago were bursting over Flanders not only decimated the ranks of youthful warriors, but blasted the careers of brothers and sons who to-day are searching in vain for work. During the War Youth was the cannon fodder, now it is the chaff of the economic machine. There are millions of unemployed in every country eating their hearts out for want of a job.

If there were no young people in the world there would be no war. Millions laid down their lives: millions were maimed for life; millions lost their

jobs ; millions on the threshold of manhood found there were no jobs. With a legacy of hate, saddled with colossal debts, burdened by armaments, bewildered by slogans and catchwords, sucked into the whirlpool of conflicting policies and national rivalries, Youth found itself dumped into a world gone mad, a world driven to the verge of destruction by its frenzied acts of violence and exuberances of passion. Generous, intrepid, fearless Youth ! It has always paid the price of war and always will do so.

I said to my son : " You have been born at the wrong moment. You are confronted by problems which have defeated my generation, whose mistakes have now recoiled cruelly upon you. Our folly, apathy, and indifference have brought misfortune upon you and your friends. We have made a mess of things. Instead of thinking of the future, we have been immersed in the present, and, aided by the scientists, we have passed on to you new weapons with which you can wipe out civilisation,¹ a result which we came within an ace of accomplishing ourselves. We have also presented you with the means of creating colossal wealth, means which in our hands have only produced poverty, misery, and unemployment. To-day the choice of an honourable and useful career is severely restricted. Now what do you propose to do about it ? Will you learn from our unhappy experience and futile mistakes ? Will you succeed where we have failed ? Will you be content to put the blame upon us and let things slide, or will you put your shoulders to the wheel, seeking first to understand the problem and then applying yourselves with enthusiasm and determination to its solution ? "

My son replies : " What is the use of crying over spilt milk or bothering about it at all ? Everything

¹ Cf. *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, chap. viii.

will come right some time, and this funny old world will go on just the same. Your crowd are not the only ones who have made mistakes. It's no use cursing you. We shall just make the best of things as they are. You take things too seriously. What is the good of preaching at us? You can't expect us to sprout wings all at once. There has always been war and there always will be. The right use of force doesn't worry us much. If some misguided foreigner attacks us, of course we shall fight just as you did, but I don't see any reason for making a song about it. We shall muddle through somehow, just as you fellows did."

This, of course, is the natural response. It boils down to this, "Let us blunder along and have our fling. Don't deprive us of our chance of displaying our heroism, courage, and audacity. We have no desire to become angels, nor have we any use for policemen. They were only invented to be ragged. The world will become a dull place if everyone has to be policed. Duelling may be immoral and expensive, but at least it provides some excitement and gives a man the chance of showing what he is made of and of sacrificing himself for his country. In comparison, the system of voting, tribunals, policing, and all the other peace paraphernalia is tame, and, indeed, humiliating. Anyone with an ounce of pluck will denounce it as effeminate and cowardly. War is a sport, the most virile and manly game in existence, appealing to all that is best and most heroic in human nature. Suppress trial by battle, and you will reduce the race to the level of pygmies or eunuchs."

But that is precisely what the World War has done for us. Since the Armistice the pygmies and the eunuchs have had the time of their lives. They

have dominated and still dominate the destinies of Europe and, indeed, of other parts of the world. They have risen to power over the corpses of the virile and manly who were killed in the War. The C.3's of every nation have been able to assert themselves.¹ They have pandered to the passions, hates, and emotions of their fellow-countrymen. They have betrayed the heroism and sacrifices of the dead. Now they seek to enmesh Youth in the coils of their furtive policies and vague ambitions.²

Youth, impulsive as ever, miscalculates. He rushes to extremes. That is due to ignorance. He is too proud to fight at all or he will join in the everlasting scramble for mastery. He is either an abolitionist or a duellist. He does not realise that war, the duel, has been robbed of its romance. It is no longer a gentlemanly game, and with every year that passes its glamour and glory are departing. No longer is it the thrilling experience described by Lindsay Gordon :

"To the cheer and the clarion, the war music blended with war
cry, the furious dash at the foe,
The terrible shock, the recoil, and the splendid bare sword, flashing
blue, rising red from the blow."

¹ A striking instance is found in Göring, the Premier of Prussia and Speaker of the Reichstag. A London psychologist and psychiatrist, writing in the *Daily Herald* of May 24th, 1933, states that he is "a paranoic of the most dangerous type, with the savage ferocity directed against everybody, with the instability, the passionate impulsiveness, and the sadistic violent hate of the paranoic." "It is known," he continues, "that as far back as 1925 he was detained—after trouble with the Swedish police—at an asylum in Stockholm as a dangerously violent lunatic and drug-addict. . . . There is no doubt that if he were deprived of his morphine for one single week, he would be reduced to a pitiable state of slobbering demented insanity."

² "The minority, the ruling class at present, has the schools and press, usually the Church as well, under its thumb. This enables it to organise and sway the emotions of the masses, and make its tool of them."—Albert Einstein, in *Why War?*, II, p. 17.

Now it has become a dismal affair :

“ When the smoke of thy hot conflagrations
O’ershadows the earth as with wings,
Where nations have fought against nations
And kings have encountered with kings,
When cometh the end of all things——”

For this transformation, we have to thank the scientists and mob psychology. The former have completely mechanised war and, in so doing, have placed the civilian populations completely at the mercy of the combatant forces. It is no longer the clash of armies which will decide the issue. It will be the wholesale starvation, asphyxiation, and destruction of the lives and properties of the warring peoples. The rules of the game have now become impossible. The passions of the mob—for in war every nation is a potential mob—demand one thing only. That is victory. Short cuts to victory, however brutal, destructive or cruel, will not only be tolerated, but applauded. They will be insisted upon, and the Prime Minister or dictator who refuses to take them will be hounded out of office. Each measure of retaliation leads to some novel form of frightfulness which the introduction of some new weapon renders possible.

Therefore, Youth miscalculates. He will be ordered to commit these hideous and ghastly crimes, to poison women and children, to annihilate whole cities, to wage a campaign of incendiarism and murder on such a scale as the world has never yet witnessed. Winston Churchill writes :¹ “ Next time the competition may be to kill women and children, and the civil population generally, and victory will give herself in sorry nuptials to the spectacled hero who organises it on the largest scale.”

¹ *The World Crisis : The Aftermath*, p. 451.

It will be hitting below the belt with a vengeance, but once he is committed to the duelling system Youth must go through with it. He cannot escape. Therefore, he must demand a substitute, and the only substitute is a policing system which possesses such moral authority and material power behind it as will suffice to enforce obedience to the rules governing the application of force.

The so-called laws of war, which are supposed to regulate the conduct of the duel, have always been violated with impunity. They are pure deception and make-believe. The reason is obvious. There is no super-national and impartial authority to compel obedience to these rules.

Police regulations, on the other hand, are essentially different in character. They are designed to restrict the use of force to its minimum, not its maximum limits. Their object will be not to annihilate the aggressor but to compel his appearance before the international tribunal. But these rules also will be futile unless the policing authority is equipped with the power of enforcing the code governing its procedure and is able to deter non-participating nations who may challenge the international authority from violating the so-called laws of war.

It follows that Youth should support a system which will be able to confine violence within the limits imposed by decency and necessity. Under the duelling system this can never be accomplished.

And if in the twentieth century young men and women are so devoid of the instinct of chivalry as to allow themselves to become the tools of a system based upon wholesale butchery and asphyxiation, then they have sunk to the level of the caveman and the she-gorilla. This is incredible, despite appear-

ances to the contrary. It is because they do not understand the implications of the present system that they tolerate its existence. When they realise its inevitable consequences, its disastrous entanglements, and the stain it imposes upon their honour, they will insist upon its abolition. Realising that evil cannot be restrained merely by disarming or signing treaties, they will rally in support of the policing system, which, though shorn of the glory and attractiveness of militarism, nevertheless will provide an outlet for their loyalty and enthusiasm.

If this does not suffice, if Youth still hankers for the duel and wants to indulge in a blood-letting operation, let him do so without inflicting injury upon other people whose combative instincts are not so highly developed. Why doesn't the ultra-pugnacious fraternity request the international authority to supply them with a duelling territory? If Youth is bored with life and wants to indulge his martial instincts, let him repair with his friends to some African wilderness. Here he may join a national contingent or group of duellists who will wage war upon some other group under the supervision of an international staff especially enlisted to supervise these voluntary and amateur operations. Within the confines of this arena, the youthful warrior, pitted against his sporting adversaries and conforming to the rules of the game, may fight to his heart's content. If he survives, he will probably return home a saner and wiser man.

In the modern world, however, Youth will probably find other and less lethal activities in which to employ his leisure and indulge his combative propensities. There remain a few remote parts of the globe where he may go in search of adventure. "Perils by land and perils by water" may still be

encountered. In the service of science and exploration there are arduous tasks to be undertaken. He may match his physical and mental powers against Nature, seeking to wrest from her the secrets which have so far eluded the search of man. The mastery of the air has provided Youth with a new element in which he may move and have his being. Though, perchance, he may break his neck, he can accomplish this feat without injuring other people. Speed performances and other innumerable thrills still lie in store for adventurous Youth.

There is also the realm of international sport, organised on a competitive basis, with some international umpire to enforce the rules of sportsmanship. This domain has not yet been fully explored. In fact, only the fringe has been touched. Here is ample scope for enterprising Youth seeking fresh fields to conquer.

Less exciting perhaps, but nevertheless full of adventure and romance, are the social and economic battles which must be waged against poverty, disease, ignorance, and all those evils which have always afflicted mankind and delayed his progress. The attack upon these social cankers involves a greater display of heroism and moral courage than even a war, especially one between levies of conscripts.

But if the overflow of energy and exuberance of Youth is to be directed into these and other channels, thus contributing to the advancement of humanity, war—the duel—must be suppressed. The employment of force must be limited to the police function. Until the claims of national security have been met and provided for young men will not be free to devote their time and talents as they choose. Not until their national responsibilities under the present system

have been translated into "the enforcement by common action of international obligations" can they be certain that they are not betraying the interests of their country and playing the traitor to their own kith and kin. Even Youth must recognise that, in the long run, the supreme interest of his own country as well as of every other is justice. He will demand justice, no more and no less. If he is imbued with the instincts of chivalry and fair play, he will understand that the duelling system does not mete out justice. It is often the perquisite of the bully. He knows that a just balance can only be obtained by appealing to reason, and that even then in an imperfect world the scales are sometimes tampered with. Moreover, reason can only function effectively and become authoritative through the instrumentality of courts, tribunals, assemblies, etc., when these institutions are backed by force.

Therefore, if he wants justice, Youth must be prepared to support and, if necessary, to fight for a system which is founded upon these institutions. This does not necessarily mean that on every occasion he should endorse their verdicts or awards. He cannot himself perform the functions of judge and jury. He is not expected to do so even in his own national community, but he nevertheless supports the judicial and policing systems because he recognises that the alternative would be chaos and anarchy. If one of his relations is arrested, he does not attempt to rescue him from the clutches of the law. Then why should Youth impulsively rush in to defend his country if it has been requested by an impartial tribunal to appeal at the bar of international justice? "My country, right or wrong" has no meaning in this system. If Youth supports right, he will fight for right as it is interpreted, not by his own poli-

ticians, but by a body of impartially-minded men who have sifted all the evidence and have pronounced their verdict on the merits of the dispute.

In the past Youth has always succumbed to its emotions, inherited and nurtured in his national community. His predecessors did not take the trouble to set up any institution or to evolve any system which would enquire into the rights and wrongs of every dispute and demonstrate clearly and unmistakably what was the just thing to do. Youth has been cheated. He has been compelled to make his decision in the dark. He has always been enlisted on the side of policy—the policy of his own particular country. Now he is invited to enlist on the side of justice. In doing so, he will have the assurance that when he fights he is fighting for the cause of right as right is interpreted, not by jingoes, nationalists, pacifists, communists or any other faction, but by a body of just, upright, and impartial men.

When the crisis came in 1914 young people in every country were surprised and befogged. They became the victims of stories and rumours, theories and prejudices, fears and hates, dished up by newspapers and politicians to whet their appetites for adventure and slaughter. Much of this propaganda was deliberately based upon lies and falsehoods or was a wilful perversion of facts. Since the Armistice the truth has come to light. It has been proved that the atrocity propaganda of all the duellists was often pure fiction. But everywhere Youth rushed impetuously into the War at the bidding of the politicians. There was no impartial tribunal to adjudicate upon the issues and to dissipate the lies. There was no police force to call a halt, to restrain the rising passions so as to prevent a breach of the

peace. The Hague Tribunal was cynically ignored. It was not called upon to sift the evidence and pronounce a verdict.

The result was that Youth paid the price, is still paying it, and will continue to pay it unto the third and fourth generations. Why should the sins of the fathers be visited thus upon their children? It has now been proved that no nation had deliberately planned that war should be declared in August 1914. The sins of the fathers were apathy and indifference. They had all acquiesced in a system which was bound, sooner or later, to end in war. It came like a thief in the night, and almost before anyone realised what was happening, nations were clutching at each other's throats. It was not a question either of courage or cowardice. It was the inevitable result of the system.

Youth has never been afraid to fight. In renouncing the duelling system there is no slur upon his honour. But in deciding these issues it is the crass stupidity and folly of the whole thing that should deter him from coming to any rash decision. This decision should be reached not on the spur of the moment when his passions have been aroused, but in an atmosphere of calm when his reasoning faculties are able to assert themselves. The consequences are so vast and overwhelming that a young man must make certain in advance that his sacrifices will be heaped upon the altar of right. There is no other moral basis which can justify him in resorting to physical violence and in indulging his chivalrous and generous propensities. Racial pride, national prejudice, the desire for territorial aggrandisement, power and mastery, are the common heritage of all nations. Right, however, is the monopoly of a judicially-minded, strictly impartial, and scrupulously

honourable body of men who will be appointed as magistrates to adjudicate upon the quarrels of nations. To such a body the rising generation must look for its inspiration and guidance. Thus, and thus alone, can it hope to vindicate the cause of justice and to hold aloft the banner of righteousness.

In this generation Youth is divided into two groups—the duellists and the abolitionists. The latter have forsworn war. They propose to banish this hoary institution from their lives. Force is to be abolished: disarmament is to be the cure for all international diseases. When the weapons have been destroyed the wolf will lie down with the lamb.

Such is the theory. But why put all the emphasis on the weapons? Obviously the thing that counts is not the weapons themselves but the purpose for which they are used. Are they to be employed for duelling or policing? That is the real distinction, not whether they are offensive or defensive instruments of warfare. A penknife in the hands of an infuriated or criminally-minded boy may become a peculiarly offensive weapon! Similarly with nations. Disarmament provides no guarantee that the bully will be restrained from tyrannising over the weaker members of the international community. Therefore, abolition does not solve the problem. In fact, it may make confusion worse confounded.

Carried to its logical conclusion, abolition means the disbandment of the police and constabularies in every country. Such a proposal could only be based upon the assumption that men and women will always act justly and fairly towards their neighbours; in other words, that the millennium has arrived.

It is clear, then, that we cannot abolish force. Our forefathers used it to defend their individual lives

and property. Then it became the custom that the members of the community should join the "hue and cry" in the pursuit of the criminal. Gradually, however, the execution of policing duties was put into commission. The sheriff and his *posse* were appointed. They were followed by the organisation of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 and of provincial police forces a few years later. Nevertheless, the obligation of every individual to assist the policeman remained and is still part and parcel of the law of the land.¹

It is clear that the same principle should be applied in the sphere of international relationships. Force would then be put into commission. It would be centralised under the control of an international authority entrusted with the primary responsibility of maintaining law and order. Nevertheless every nation and the individual persons composing it would still be under the moral obligation to assist the authority in the execution of its duty.

Therefore Youth cannot stand aside and say, "This is no concern of ours." Undergraduates at Oxford and elsewhere may pass resolutions pledging themselves to refrain from fighting for King and country. These resolutions are an echo of Nurse Cavell's declaration that "patriotism is not enough." They do not, however, suggest a constructive policy. They offer only a negative solution which is a contradiction of everything that Youth really stands for. They are impracticable, because we know that when the international duel has been arranged everyone except a few conscientious objectors will rush to the defence of his country. It is a commonplace that every war is waged on the plea of self-defence. At

¹ Cf. the Sheriffs Act, 1887, s. 8: "Every person in a county shall be ready and appalled at the command of the sheriff and at the cry of the county to arrest a felon."

this moment Japan is marching into China and carving out puppet States—"to defend her own interests"—despite the fact that she has been branded as an aggressor by an impartial tribunal. The fact is that when the crisis comes, everyone is on the defensive. When the pack rushes into the fray resolutions, good and bad, go by the board. Primitive instincts assert themselves, and the young men who in a spirit of exhilaration voted for non-participation will probably be the first to invade the office of the recruiting sergeant. Close upon their heels will appear a bevy of maidens armed with white feathers urging their brothers and sweethearts to fight and die for King and country and, incidentally, for them.

The doctrine of non-participation is stupid and futile because it leads nowhere. It signifies a bankruptcy of mind and ideas. It is divorced from realities. It is like Jonah's gourd which grew in a night and perished. It belongs to a soulless world devoid of feeling and chivalry. For if a man under the existing system refuses in all circumstances to fight for his country, it is extremely unlikely that he will be willing under the new dispensation to fight on the side of right and to exert himself on behalf of justice. If, in the absence of a tribunal to adjudicate upon the merits of a dispute, he hesitates to succour the weak and to protect his own kith and kin, is it probable that he will honour his moral obligation to assist the international policeman in the execution of his duty?

Therefore, in preaching the doctrine of non-participation Youth again miscalculates. He has forgotten that this was one of the articles of the Socialist creed before the War, to which millions of men in Europe were directly or indirectly committed. Non-participation had been the battle-cry of pacifists in

successive international conferences. But it only needed the call to arms in August 1914 to prick this bubble. Jean Jaurés, one of its chief protagonists, was assassinated despite the fact that a few days previously he had recanted and had urged his fellow-countrymen to join the Colours.

Non-participation failed then, and it will always fail, because its results are purely negative.

Clearly there must be a substitute for the duel, something which produces positive results and for which, as Mr. H. G. Wells insists, "men will presently be very ready to fight, and as the thing may go, either to kill or die."¹ This substitute is the idea of justice, which, as we have seen, cannot become effective until reason and force have joined hands in a partnership of which the outward and visible manifestations are a tribunal and an international police force.

Therefore, Youth must make its choice between red, brown, and black shirts or the policeman's uniform. A shirt has become the emblem of mastery, imperialism, and reaction. The alternatives are justice, liberty, and progress. The young generation must choose before the crisis is upon them, and their first duty is to apply their minds to the problem of the right use of force in the governance of the world.

¹ *The Salvaging of Civilisation*, p. 41.

CHAPTER IX

FORCE AND THE CHURCHES

"He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good ; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God ?"—MICAH.

I

IS the Church of Christ a moribund institution ? *Loss of Authority of the Church*
Few will deny that during the last twenty years it has lost ground throughout the world. In Great Britain it no longer exercises a decisive influence upon the conduct of private or public affairs. It does not speak as in pre-War days with the voice of authority and admonition. It is in danger of becoming as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal ? In Germany the political leaders, regarding it as an appendage of the Aryan race, have attempted to transform it into an embroidery of the Nordic Legend. In Russia religion has been ostracised and banned. It has been replaced by an economic creed centred in the fleshpots of this world, and intolerant of any belief in the mysteries of the next.¹ There is no sign of any religious revival amongst the Latin nations. On the contrary, the Church is merely tolerated. With few exceptions it makes little attempt to interpret the principles of Christianity in the light of the twentieth century, or to apply

¹ "Communism's false ends and false motives, with the confining of ideals to this life's span—ignoring such things as reverence for human personality—can only work out a greater evil than it tried to remove."—P. T. R. Kirk, "The Social and Economic Confusion," in *Christianity and the Crisis*, p. 111.

them to the practical issues of to-day. In America we search in vain for any spiritual awakening, mustering the followers of Christ in the van of a crusade which would assert the moral leadership of the republic amongst the nations of the world.

II

*The War
the Cause*

THEREFORE, we ask again, has the spiritual influence of this divine institution ceased to operate in the lives of men and nations? The truth is that the Church has never recovered from the shock of the World War, which rent it in twain from top to bottom. For four years its members were engaged in a fratricidal slaughter, thus undermining the structure of the religion they professed and destroying the moral influence of the organisations they supported. Perhaps of all human institutions the Christian Church has suffered most at the hand of war. It has not yet recovered from this grievous hurt, nor has it regained its lost prestige in the hearts of men. It is impossible to stage a duel between Christian nations, and to destroy by one means or another forty millions of people,¹ without calling in question the efficacy and utility of a Church whose mission is to bring peace and goodwill amongst men.

To this cause more than to any other must be assigned the loss of authority of the Christian Church. It is true that in these days of science and education the frills and trappings of dogma and ceremonial make little appeal to the ordinary man. Destructive criti-

¹ Professor Hersch, in his article "Demographic Effects of War on the Population during and after a War," in *What would be the Character of a New War?*, assesses the deaths caused directly and indirectly by the World War as 41,435,000. The total comprises 13,055,000 military deaths and 28,379,000 civilian.

cism has done its worst. Yet the moral and spiritual values remain, and the root cause of the decline is to be traced not in any weakness or fallacy in the teachings of the Founder, but to the apathy and mental sloth of His followers. This is demonstrated by their inability and apparent unwillingness to apply the principles of His teaching to the problems of the modern world, especially in the realm of international relationships.

III

IT will be generally agreed that it is the duty of *The Church's Duty* the Church to take the lead in the task of solving the problem of the prevention of war. By so doing, it would regain the position which it forfeited by its failure to take a firm stand in the course of the World War. The Christian communities would then be able to hasten the day when the peace of righteousness shall become a reality instead of a fiction.

Another point which the sections of the Christian Church must consider is that if they throw their weight into the scales on the side of international reform, they would assist in solving the moral problems, not only of nations, but also of their own members. If the War proved anything, it showed that international problems have a direct bearing upon the lives of individuals in every community. When a violent convulsion takes place in the international sphere, as was the case during the War, its repercussions are disastrous to the moral standards of individuals. But by inculcating in the minds of the latter the principles of world citizenship, they would be better equipped for the discharge, not only of their international obligations abroad, but of their civic responsibilities at home.

IV

*Standards
of
Morality*

NO one can deny that the standard of morality in the relationship of nations is on a much lower plane than the standard governing the relationships of individuals. The experience of two thousand years proves that it is supremely difficult to infuse the spirit of Christ into the conduct of individuals and groups even within the confines of the national State. It is manifestly far more difficult to apply His teaching to the affairs of nations. But because this experiment has so seldom been attempted is no reason why it should be regarded as impossible. In the national communities the Church has exercised its influence for centuries. The cumulative effect has resulted in the slow growth of a moral culture, which was reflected in the conduct of individuals, and collectively in the moulding of public opinion. Indirectly, this culture has found its expression to a greater or lesser degree in the national and civic organisation of the community. Moreover, it was absurd to suppose that religion could flourish or develop its potential force in a condition of unrestrained violence and anarchy. Gradually, the reign of law was established, and this enabled the Church to carry on its mission in an atmosphere of relative peace and tranquillity. With the advent of religious toleration the Church was able to exert a still greater influence upon the life of the community, despite its internal controversies and disputes over points of doctrine and other matters. Having established a peace as between itself and the State on the basis of freedom of conscience, it was safeguarded from assaults of violence and found shelter behind the strong arm of the law. Thus when its services had been enlisted on the side of

justice, the element of force, which had hitherto been employed as the instrument of religious persecution—often at the instigation of one section of the Church against the others—became the guarantee of its freedom and peaceful development.

All sections and denominations of the Christian Church have acquiesced in these arrangements. They realised that a return to anarchy in which each section of the Church, and every member of the community, became a law unto himself would be as prejudicial to the spiritual development of the Church as it would to the moral progress of individual citizens.

It follows that within the national State the Church does not demand that all force shall be abolished. On the contrary, it is concerned to maintain it as the sanction of the law, the custodian of justice, and the guardian of the peace. Why, then, should it oppose the use of force for precisely the same purposes in the sphere of international relationships? Why does the Church, while insisting in the higher plane of morality—the relationships of individuals—upon assigning to force its policing function, remain content that in the lower plane it should continue to be the instrument of trial by battle between nations?

V

SURELY in the twentieth century it is possible to distinguish between the policing and duelling systems.¹ Dr. Howard Masterman, the late Bishop of Plymouth, wrote: “It is difficult to

*Force and
the
Policing
Function*

¹ “If we regard each other first as potential enemies, we shall soon be real enemies; if we regard each other as colleagues the risk of hostility will dwindle away.”—The Archbishop of York, in *Christianity and the Crisis*, p. 602.

contemplate without repugnance the idea of a League, whose *raison d'être* is the preservation of world peace, bombing the cities and destroying the commerce of one of its members: yet can any community preserve order without a police force ready, if need be, to meet violence with violence?"¹ It is true that during the War cities and the civilian population were attacked by aircraft and bombed. That is just what an international police force is intended to prevent. Under the existing system of duelling it will never be prevented. But operating under an international code of policing regulations the rôle of an international police force will be purely defensive. It will be precluded from offensive operations. It will never be able to strike the first blow in dealing with a recalcitrant or defaulting nation. It will be in the background in order to render possible and effective diplomatic, financial, and economic pressure—the boycott and the blockade. In the case of an aggressor, its operations will be directed to repelling his armed forces and paralysing his military activities.

It is true that in the twentieth century these activities embrace every section of the population. In one sphere or another everyone is mobilised in this enterprise. It is described by a French writer as "*La guerre totale.*" Therefore it is impossible in practice to distinguish between civilian and military objectives. The dividing line became blurred in the last war. In future it will altogether cease to exist. Consequently, in order to paralyse the military activities of the aggressor, an international police force may be compelled to bomb objectives which will unfortunately result in casual-

¹ "The Confusion in International Relations," in *Christianity and the Crisis*, p. 146.

ties amongst the civilian population, not as a measure of offence or punishment, but to compel the aggressor nation to desist from its aggressive action and to retire behind its own frontiers.

After all, a policeman's duty is to protect and defend, not to attack ; to maintain order by employing the minimum, not the maximum, amount of force ; to compel the aggressor to appear before the Tribunal, not to inflict punishment upon him. The duellist tries to get in a knock-out blow in the first round, whilst the policeman is concerned not to destroy his opponent, but to arrest him. The duellist is determined to impose his will upon his opponent—the policeman to compel his appearance before an impartial judge. It is therefore wrong to suggest that the primary function of an international police force would be to bomb the civilian population. Anyone who asserts this does not comprehend the vital distinction between the policing and duelling systems.

VI

WE must make up our minds which system is the right one, otherwise the Christian world will again be faced with the same dilemma as in 1914. The last war was a duel. The objective was mastery, not justice. But in the stupendous crisis of August 1914 the voice of Christendom was silent. Crash ! The military time-table had begun to operate, and in a few days the Christian nations were clutching at each other's throats. The Churches found themselves in a quandary. Either they must support their national governments, or preach the doctrine of passive resistance, which, if successful, could result only in the defeat of their own country and the cause for which it stood.

*The Right
Use of
Force*

The Churches as organisations were therefore found wanting. They threw the *onus* of making a decision upon their individual members. Every Christian found himself in a dilemma. He felt compelled either to join the ranks of the duellists or to become a conscientious objector.

The vast majority elected to take the first course, not because they had any use for war—they hated it—but because they believed that they were enlisting on the side of right. Christian men in other countries, however, were equally convinced that they were fighting in a just cause. All the combatants were manœuvred into this quandary by their national politicians. The tragedy was that no impartial body existed to tell them who was right and who was wrong. Why? Because, while every country had been feverishly preparing for war, no adequate preparations had been made for the organisation of peace. Citizenship in Dante's kingdom, whose monarch was justice, was undreamt of. There was no judge and no policeman. There was no impartial authority empowered to act without delay, and to pronounce its verdict upon the rights and wrongs of the disputes which had so suddenly arisen. There was no police force to deter the nation bent upon aggression and to serve as the rallying point for all those sincere and courageous men who were determined that justice should prevail.

Thus international justice, in 1914, found little place in the hearts of men because the Church had ignored it. Can we, therefore, blame unduly the politicians who in the crisis ignored the existence of the Hague Tribunal; ¹ any more than those who in the Sino-

¹ The Serbian Government's reply, of July 25th, 1914, to the Austrian ultimatum contained the statement that Serbia was prepared to refer the question to the Hague Tribunal. On July 29th

Japanese dispute of 1931 failed to apply the provisions of Article XVI of the Covenant? Were their failures not due to the universal disregard of the claims of justice?

There were, on the other hand, a considerable number of conscientious objectors who ignored the political issues of the struggle. They pleaded for neutrality because they objected to the employment of force as an instrument of policy. They were prepared to see their country overrun by the invader, and to accept the consequences. To prove their mettle, and to assert the superiority of moral force in the midst of violence they might have requested the authorities to send them unarmed to the trenches, and to allow them to advance against the enemy with no weapon other than a walking-stick. Had such a demonstration been permitted—which is inconceivable—it would have been impressive, but in the heat and passion of the moment, it is unlikely that it would have been effective, any more than the voyage of Mr. Ford's Peace Ship to Europe in 1915.¹

the Tsar telegraphed to the Kaiser: "It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Conference." "This merely met with an exclamation point from the Kaiser, and a line from Bethmann, 'The idea of the Hague Conference will be naturally excluded in this case.' The fact is that from the beginning of the crisis, Pashitch's offer to submit it to an arbitral tribunal . . . was never taken seriously by any of the leading statesmen of Europe."—S. B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, Vol. II, p. 429.

¹ In the autumn of 1915 Mr. Henry Ford became convinced that it might be possible to end the War if a sufficient gesture were made. He chartered a ship, intending to call at the Scandinavian capitals and to establish committees therein which would send delegates to a congress at The Hague. This congress was to formulate abstract principles of peace and submit them to the belligerents. But in the course of the voyage to Europe Mr. Ford realised that the mission was futile, and returned to America. The Scandinavian capitals were visited by the "Peace Ship," but little interest was aroused.

The quarrel of the conscientious objector, however, was really not with the employment of force *per se*, but with the international system, which could only end in a duel. When he made his protest it was too late. The conscientious objector is still confronted with the same system of competitive armaments. What steps is he taking now to change the system, before violence has once more been let loose? Prevention is better than cure, and once the disease has gripped the patient it will run its course. Surely the remedy is to substitute the policing for the duelling system in order to secure justice, not mastery, to compel appearance before an international tribunal, not to inflict punishment.

Here is a way of escape, both for those who fought, and were disillusioned, and those who refused to fight, but left the problem unsolved. An international tribunal and police force—unless these institutions are established before the next war comes, every Christian will find himself in the same dilemma as he did in 1914. Every Church will once more be compelled to choose between supporting the national interests or a defeatist policy; in either case repudiating the basic virtues of Christianity, self-sacrifice, justice, righteousness, and peace. It is clear that in preaching the doctrine of non-resistance after or even before the outbreak of war, the Church may be actively assisting an aggressor, by preventing the enlistment of recruits and sapping the morale of the nation which is singled out for attack. It is equally immoral that its leaders, and members, should urge the prosecution of a duel, and participate in a slaughter which is the very negation of all Christian teaching. Obviously, however, a decision cannot be avoided, an attitude of neutrality is im-

possible.¹ Therefore, we are once more driven to the conclusion that, as in every civilised community, the establishment of a tribunal and a police force is the only means of escaping from this impasse.

VII

THERE are many people who reply, "Why not abolish every form of coercion? If the world is rid of armaments, war will automatically cease." This view, however, is not substantiated by experience, or by the teachings of history. If we want war to cease, it is first of all necessary to change the character and purpose of force. Instead of being used exclusively, as it is now, as a duelling instrument, it must be consecrated to the service of justice. It is obvious that it can never be abolished in all its forms until the millennium arrives. The immediate problem is how to ensure that its use shall be limited to policing purposes.

VIII

IS there any reason why the Church should oppose this development in international relations, or why, on the contrary, it should not actively support it? Does the teaching of the Founder lead us to suppose that He condemned the use of physical force, when it is exercised not in substitution for but in support of justice? It is true

¹ "And the first necessity for a Christian is to escape from the nationalist standpoint and take up that of Christendom or of the commonwealth of civilised nations. For even though circumstances may arise in which a Christian should fight, yet the occurrence of such circumstances is proof that somewhere at least there has been treason to the Kingdom of God."—The Archbishop of York, in *Christianity and the Crisis*, p. 601.

that Our Lord is described as the Prince of Peace. But is peace incompatible with justice? Is not justice the foundation of a righteous peace? If the peace of righteousness cannot be assured without an appeal to justice, and if justice cannot be made effective without a sanction—there are always the bad men—then “the Prince of Peace” becomes synonymous with “the Prince of Justice.” Why? Because the sanctions of force employed in the interests of justice are not punitive. They are essentially redemptive in character. They seek to save the individual and the nation from the results of their weakness and misdeeds, to restore them to sanity and to urge them to return to those standards of moral conduct, expressed in the law, which they may have temporarily abandoned. It follows that the right use of force in the governance of the world implies the application of the redemptive principle in the international sphere.

The Founder of Christianity lived during a period when the exercise of force, controlled and organised by Rome, was to a considerable degree limited to the police function. The Roman Empire had introduced the reign of law throughout its vast territories, and its garrisons not only maintained order but stood as a guarantee for the execution of justice. It was this power and authority which enabled Jesus Christ to preach His gospel for three years without molestation. Had it not been in existence He would probably have been murdered by the Jews in the early days of His ministry.

If we search the New Testament, on no occasion do we find that He denounced the policing system. “Render to Cæsar the things which are Cæsar’s—and to God the things which are God’s,” was His retort to the Pharisees. Nor does He pour abuse

upon the military profession.¹ Speaking of a centurion, He said, "I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel." There was no suggestion that the centurion should abandon his profession because it was an immoral one. We can only surmise that as, during this period, it was in many respects a policing profession, our Lord regarded it in much the same light as we regard the policing systems of to-day.

There is, in fact, nothing to show that Christ was opposed to the employment of physical force in all circumstances. It is equally clear that He emphasised, and insisted upon, the settlement of disputes by an appeal to reason, equity, and good conscience. He extolled the virtues of forgiveness, mercy, passive resistance, and personal restraint, even under extreme provocation. But He Himself did not shrink, when the occasion demanded, from resorting to force, as His treatment of the money-lenders in the Temple clearly shows.

The truth is our Lord forbade the duel and submitted Himself to the process of law when He said to one of His disciples "Put up again thy sword into its place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword." Moreover it was not force *per se* that killed Him, but its prostitution. Instead of being the sanction for the verdict of Pilate the judge, it became the tool of Pilate the politician. The law vindicated His innocence, but the politicians crucified Him. At this moment force is the tool of the national politicians. It should be employed exclusively at the behest of the international judge.

¹ Cf. J. W. Graham, *International Relationships in the light of Christianity*, p. 96. "Soldiers were told by the Baptist to be content with their wages, not told to disband. That they were also told to do violence to no man and not to take bribes shows that they were really keepers of order: in practice they were policemen."

Of course there will always be risks that it may be prostituted for base ends. Therefore we must jealously guard against, and endeavour to minimise, these risks. This, however, does not invalidate the fundamental principle of the right use of force.

Therefore, it is a travesty to suggest that the Christian religion bangs, bolts, and locks the door against the right use of force in the relationships of men and nations. Why then should the Christian Church ignore this crucial question, leaving it to become the shuttle-cock of the politicians, militarists, and cranks? Why should it not declare itself as the protagonist of the right or moral use of force in international relationships as in the sphere of domestic affairs?

But we are often reminded that "all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword." Precisely! The man or nation who takes or unsheathes the sword—that is to say, the aggressor and attacker—shall perish by the same weapon. But clearly someone has to wield it. It is pertinent to ask—Who? Surely the policeman, the men or nations who are prepared to sacrifice, if need be, their lives for the supremacy of right as it is interpreted by reason and the moral sense through the medium of peaceful discussion undertaken by an impartial authority—in short the Tribunal System. This may not be the orthodox, but it is at least a reasonable interpretation of Our Lord's declaration in the Garden.

IX

*Moral
Disarma-
ment*

IN these days we hear a good deal about moral disarmament. What does it signify? Not merely that a nation is prepared to destroy its weapons. The absence of weapons does not prevent

a nation or a faction from resorting to violence. A few rusty old cannons and obsolete rifles will suffice, as one of the bloodiest wars in history—the struggle between North and South in America—clearly shows. Moral disarmament cannot stop short at the elimination of weapons. It means much more. It implies that a nation recognises the rights of other nations as well as its own—that it is willing to hand over its big stick to the custody of a neutral authority—that it is prepared to relinquish the so-called right of being the judge in its own cause—and that in any dispute it will submit to the adjudication of a third party, whose services have been enlisted in advance. This new attitude of mind involves amongst other things the sacrifice of what the pundits describe as national sovereignty,¹ which in simple language means the right to complete liberty of action—to do just as you please—to tear up treaties which have become irksome—to injure your neighbours if you think it will bring you any advantage, and in short, to do other unkind and unchristian things.

Moral disarmament therefore covers a wide field, but its practical expression is relatively simple. It can only be found in the tribunal and policing systems—the settlement of all disputes by pacific means and the right use of force. Consequently, if the Church is sincere when it supports the idea of moral disarmament, it will advocate the establishment of these institutions.

X

NO one suggests that physical force alone can accomplish anything, or that it is to be regarded as a substitute for moral force. The will to peace and the determination to secure justice

Conclusion

¹ See, as to sovereignty, *post*, pp. 194 *et seq.*, and *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, chap. v.

must be expressed in a combination of both if we are to construct the bulwarks of peace on a solid foundation. "Force and Right are the governors of the world," says Joubert, "Force until Right is ready." Surely it is the duty of the Church to reverse this order and to make Force the servant of Right until the moral development of mankind renders its services entirely superfluous.

Therefore the Church cannot shirk this problem. It cannot ride off on a vague sentimentalism—repugnance to coercion¹—denunciation of force in all its forms—the abandonment of justice for a policy of peace at any price—an exaggerated insistence upon love as opposed to restraint, forgetting that Our Lord invoked both in the service of right. Under existing conditions the armament firms and the duelling system thrive upon fear. But to endanger the security of the good by placing them at the mercy of the bad will not create goodwill. On the contrary, it stirs up hatred and fear, thus postponing the era when perfect love shall cast out fear. "How may a change of the world's heart be induced? Fear must be removed, and all illusions and fictions designed to disguise facts must be exposed. 'The Truth shall make you free.'"²

The opportunity that faces the Christian Church is great beyond words. It is nothing less than to recover the world's moral allegiance and to lead the nations in the way of peace. The Church universal has still a great mission to fulfil. All over the world it is confronted by problems which call for the

¹ "The Christian knows, as all men know, that the behaviour of men can be modified not only by the radical method of spiritual conversion but also by the use of sanctions designed to promote some ideal end."—The Archbishop of York, in *Christianity and the Crisis*, p. 605.

² P. T. R. Kirk, in *Christianity and the Crisis*, p. 128.

heroism and devotion of its members no less than their loyalty to the teaching of its Founder. In the background, overshadowing them all, looms the massive and sinister figure of force. Hitherto, in the international arena and at the dictation of man, he has employed his strength to destroy life in the pursuit of selfish ends. If mankind so directs, force can be transformed. He can be induced to use his might for the protection of civilisation and making straight the paths of human progress. Will the Christian Church inspire mankind with such a lofty zeal and earnest devotion to the cause of right that it will demand and bring about this transformation? God grant that it may do so before a new Armageddon plunges the world into outer darkness, where there shall be weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth.

CHAPTER X

THE MARCH

"The human race can most freely and easily approach its proper work in the quiet or tranquillity of peace. Wherefore it is manifest that universal peace is the best of all those things which are ordained for our blessedness."—DANTE.

"Justice is the means of peace; it prevents strife and at last ends it; for they, being under government, are constrained to bound their desires and resentment with the satisfaction the law gives. Thus peace is maintained by justice which is a fruit of government."—WILLIAM PENN.

IN the preceding chapters we have endeavoured to allocate to force its rightful place in the democratic, non-democratic, imperial, and international spheres. We have seen that from the moral standpoint and in the existing state of the world nowhere except in a democratic community can its exercise be limited to the police function. We have also sought to define the conditions under which force could operate exclusively as a policing agency in those other domains of human society where reason is still subservient to passion and right is compelled to bow to the dictates of might.¹

If these conditions are fulfilled, we may dimly discern the tortuous path of progress threading its way past innumerable pitfalls and precipices to the ultimate destiny of the race—the citadel of perfection. On the other hand, if they remain unfulfilled, and force in international relationships is not con-

¹ For a concrete plan for the limitation of force in international affairs to the police function, in accordance with the conditions defined in chap. VI, *ante*, see *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, chaps. X–XIII.

fined to the policing rôle, the path will assuredly lead to the pit of destruction.

But whoever travels along this road must equip himself with instruments which will tell him where he is heading for. What are these instruments? The traveller cannot rely exclusively upon his instincts, because they are often destructive. Nor can he be certain that his creative faculties will not sometimes lead him astray unless they are controlled by a moral consciousness which is able to discriminate between right and wrong. His mastery over nature and his scientific discoveries may contribute to his own undoing unless they are consecrated to the attainment of the higher purpose. He must therefore not allow his achievements in the domain of materialism to outrun his moral development. If he does, they will certainly delay his progress and may even plunge him into the darkness of the pit. Consequently, if he wants to discover the path leading to perfection, these instruments will not suffice. He must also have recourse to his powers of reasoning and, applying them to the vital issues, hammer out a working philosophy which will guide him upon his adventurous career. This process of consolidation can only be achieved if the experience and knowledge of the travellers have been reduced to concrete principles which will aid them in their further advance.

From the heights of 1934 we may scan the vast panorama stretching back to the dawn of history. It has taken thousands of years to cross this huge territory, and a new generation of wayfarers can espy the twists and turns, the upward and downward trends of the path. Spread before them is the chart on which is recorded the progress and delays, the advances and retreats, the achievements and disasters

which have characterised the march of humanity. From these facts and experiences, recorded in history, they may draw certain conclusions. These they will test in the crucible of their moral consciousness and, as a result, certain truths will emerge. Thus each period of consolidation will contribute its quota to those basic ideas which, consciously or unconsciously, help to guide the footsteps of erring humanity.

Such, for instance, is the conception of the right use of force. Can this principle be applied to the relationships of nations? Can this simple truth, which everyone is able to understand, be expressed in terms of a practical scheme? As we have seen, it already operates in the structure of every democratic community. But, even in the national State, it cannot be transformed into a guiding principle until it has been consciously recognised as a fundamental article of the constitution. The conception of the right use of force must dwell in the minds of the people. It must penetrate their inner consciousness. It must be included as a part of their working philosophy, so that if it is ever challenged they will rise as one man to support it. They will then be prepared to apply it, not only in their own community, but also in the domain of international relationships. It follows that when its application has become universal, the reign of law will be firmly established. The peace of righteousness will become a reality. Force, having become the servant of reason, will actively assist in bringing about the gradual regeneration of the world, culminating eventually in perfection, when its services will no longer be required.

The present is a time for consolidation, a preparation for the next stage of the journey. After the

greatest war in history the moment is opportune for reconstruction. The chance may not recur, and humanity may be irretrievably engulfed in the pit which the scientists are digging for it.

The supreme question is, what is really our attitude to war? Do we regard it as an indispensable institution, something which has always been and always will be in the world? Despite its horrors and unpleasant consequences, does it, in the long run, help us to reach the ultimate goal? ¹ Is it a good thing occasionally to call a halt in the march of progress, organise our ranks, stage a duel, and fall upon one another in a fit of frenzy? After the blood-letting operation is over, shall we all be fitter to resume the march? If forty or fifty millions are annihilated

¹ This is, for instance, the Fascist point of view. "Fascism, the more it considers and observes the future and the development of humanity, quite apart from political considerations of the moment, believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace. It thus repudiates the doctrine of Pacifism—born of a renunciation of the struggle and an act of cowardice in the face of sacrifice. War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it. All other trials are substitutes, which never really put men into the position where they have to make the great decision—the alternative of life or death."—Signor Mussolini, "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism," in *Political Quarterly*, July–September 1933.

Compare Herr von Papen's speech of May 13th, 1933: "They must try to make the world understand why Germany on January 30th, 1933, had struck out the word 'Pacifism' from its vocabulary. But they must simultaneously prove that the struggle against pacifism was not synonymous with war-like intentions. Pacifist war-literature made out that he who fell on the field of honour died an unnatural death. It had no understanding for the old song, 'There is in the world no better death than to be slain by the foe.' . . . What the battlefield was for man, motherhood was for woman. The decline of manly heroism was accompanied by that of womanly heroism. . . . The maintenance of eternal life demanded the sacrifice of the individual. Mothers must exhaust themselves in order to give life to children. Fathers must exhaust themselves on the battlefield in order to secure the future for their sons."

by one means or another, will those who remain be better off? These are the sort of questions we must answer. If we are in earnest, we cannot shirk them. Obviously, if there is a colossal slaughter there will be fewer mouths to feed. One would also have imagined there would be more jobs to go round. But this doesn't seem to have happened. On the contrary, thirty millions of men are looking for jobs.

Another trouble is that whilst those in the van of the march are busily killing each other, those in the rear indulge in all sorts of pillaging. The camp followers may rifle the baggage and the commissariat. They may even make huge fortunes. They may demand higher wages and an eight- or even a six-hour day. So that when the fighting is over, and the time has come to resume the march, the marchers find themselves in a somewhat unenviable position. Instead of a six- or eight-hours' job, there may be no jobs at all. One of the duellists will have been disarmed. Both are tired and bleeding from their wounds. All the marchers are quarrelling and squabbling. The commissariat is at a low ebb and rationing has to be resorted to. Most of the baggage and stores have been destroyed. The victors cannot make good their losses from the resources of the vanquished. Everyone buttons up his pockets and tries to cultivate his own particular patch. For the moment the march has come to a complete standstill. All sense of direction and unity of purpose have been lost. Had the battle been prolonged or had the scientists been given time to perfect their new weapons, the whole show would have ended in a disorderly rout.¹ *Sauve qui peut* would have been

¹ " All that happened in the four years of the Great War was only a prelude to what was preparing for the fifth year. The

the watchword. Panic would have succeeded panic until nothing remained except a few remnants reduced to the uttermost depths of misery and poverty.

We have not yet, thank God, reached this culminating point in the onward march when, in one brief period, it may be a few weeks, months, or years, humanity is hurled back through the space of centuries to find itself once more inhabiting caves and jungles. The path will have been obliterated, the work of the pioneers will have been destroyed, and mankind will have committed hara-kiri on the grand scale.

We have been granted a respite. In the midst of forebodings, grumblings, clamourings, and quarrellings, we must tighten our belts and take our bearings anew. The march has been held up. Why? Because the marchers did not understand the necessity for discipline and restraint. They allowed the

campaign of the year 1919 would have witnessed an immense accession to the power of destruction. . . . The Germans would have been assaulted in the summer of 1919 with forces and by methods incomparably more prodigious than any yet employed. Thousands of aeroplanes would have shattered their cities. Scores of thousands of cannon would have blasted their front. . . . Poison gas of incredible malignity, against which only a secret mask (which the Germans could not obtain in time) was proof, would have stifled all resistance and paralysed all life on the hostile front subjected to attack. . . . The campaign of 1919 was never fought, but its ideas go marching along. In every army they are being explored, elaborated, refined, under the surface of peace, and should war come again to the world it is not with the weapons and agencies prepared for 1919 that it will be fought, but with developments and extensions of these which will be incomparably more formidable and fatal."—W. S. Churchill, *The World Crisis : The Aftermath*, pp. 453–454.

"In the Great War we saw only the beginning of the vast difference which science was making in human affairs. In the next great war, if that was ever allowed to occur, science would, like some angry, outraged deity, go far to destroy mankind itself."—General Smuts, October 8th, 1931.

factions within their ranks to get out of hand. The latter were spoiling for a fight because they were jealous of their neighbours, of their power, their wealth, their territories : jealous of everything.

In the old days the marchers jogged along separated by spaces and intervals from each other. Now they all tend to converge upon the narrow track. They are constantly jostling each other and treading on one another's toes. Consequently the opportunities for displays of bad temper are increasing rather than diminishing.

So we come to the conclusion that the onward march cannot be resumed with any hope of success until there is some sort of discipline within the ranks. This means that there must be a law for the marchers and that those who want to go forward to discover new territory must organise themselves to enforce the law. This involves the creation of an authority charged with this responsibility. It is clear that if the marchers can be convinced of the right use of force and if they will combine to limit it to the police function, they may with confidence set out once more upon their quest, gradually regaining the ground they have lost during the years of hot-headed strife and its aftermath of bickering.

Consolidation, therefore, means conversion to a definite working principle which can be applied and practised in every sphere of society, national and international. But even when this principle is recognised and practised, it can only be maintained at the price of eternal vigilance. Otherwise it will be betrayed or allowed to lapse. Unless it is ingrained in the consciousness of the peoples through their educational institutions it will fail to assert itself when the crisis arises. It will be betrayed by the factions, who are always ready to seize any

weapon which they imagine will assist their own pet cause.

There are factions who are a constant menace to the progress of the march because they propose to enlist the services of force for their own ends. In the old days it was the religious and dynastic factions who held up the march. Now they have been replaced by the imperialists, nationalists, fascists, and communists. The latter are imbued with the idea of mastery over others ; they are unwilling to tolerate creeds and systems which do not conform to their imperialist, nationalist, or economic aspirations. They are to be found in every nation. Ascendancy—the mailed fist ; egoism—“ourselves alone” ; economic equality—“the bloody revolution,” are their respective watchwords. To attain their objectives they rely not on reason but on force.¹ Whenever a favourable opportunity presents itself they are prepared to break up the march in order to assert their own particular “ism” or belief.

Obviously they are the enemies of the marchers, because they foment violence and armed strife within their ranks. Instead of joining in the general advance, they block the path. They have not yet discovered that even in the achievement of their own

¹ “ The Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress . . . could have made the working of the Means Test impossible within three months. Nation-wide demonstrations on an unparalleled scale could have been organised. Not 2,000 but 100,000 men could have been marched on London. . . . By such measures, by mounting agitation on this single paramount point, by an absolute refusal of all Labour councillors to administer it, and like means, the Means Test could have been, and could still be, smashed by the Labour movement. Incomparably greater concessions could have been wrung from the Government by these methods than by negotiation and pleadings. It is true that Governments always tell us that they will never yield to force. All history tells us, however, that they never yield to anything else.”—John Strachey, *The Menace of Fascism*, p. 228.

aims reason is the final arbiter, and that their attempt to hold up the march will eventually recoil upon their own heads, postponing and frustrating the ultimate fulfilment of their desires.¹ "He that takes the sword"—in this case, he who precipitates the duel—"shall perish with the sword."

At the moment, the rank and file of the marchers are dominated by the factions. Before they can hope to reach the promised land they must rid themselves of this intolerable yoke. This they cannot do until they have agreed to restrain the political parties and the sovereign nations from resorting to violence. This means that the former must never be allowed to arm, and that force should be controlled exclusively by the representatives of the people. It also means that individual nations must be deprived of their super-weapons which the scientists have designed during the last twenty-five years—aero-planes, submarines, poison-gas, tanks, big guns, etc. These should be handed over to an international authority, which will henceforth be responsible for the orderly and peaceful conduct of the march. This is now a comparatively easy task, because the super-weapons can confer upon the authority that superiority of force which will hold the aggressor in awe and compel him to appear at the bar of justice. Here his grievances will be settled by an appeal to reason instead of to force. Moreover, the

¹ It is interesting to note the admission of the Sinn Féin O'Hegarty: "The visitation which we have gone through was the result of our own breaches of the Moral Law. There are certain things which should not be done, even to obtain freedom. We did them, and they seemed to succeed, and we went on doing them. We have paid. And we must get away—we are getting away—from all that worship of physical force, application of force, contempt for life, for decency, for charity and tolerance, which have made of our country a moral and physical slaughter-house."—*The Victory of Sinn Féin*, p. 173. Cf. p. 125 (cited *ante*, p. 2).

international policing organisation, equipped with these super-weapons, will not require an army of millions to prevent the marchers from falling upon one another. A few hundred thousand technicians trained to operate the new machines will probably suffice.¹ Nor will such a centralised force possessing a monopoly of these weapons lessen the efficiency of the internal policing arrangements which sections of the marchers have instituted for maintaining order within their own ranks.²

Thus we are driven to the conclusion that such a plan is not impracticable from a technical standpoint. But it can only be accomplished when the rank and file have understood and acquiesced in the principle of the right use of force and have consecrated it to the service of justice. They must also be prepared actively to support their police force, if necessary by "making the great decision—the alternative of life or death." Thus they will repudiate Mussolini's description of pacifism as a doctrine "born of a renunciation of the struggle and an act of cowardice in the face of sacrifice." Then they will resume the onward march, and a new era unsurpassed in its material prosperity and unparalleled in its intellectual advancement will dawn upon the world.

¹ The utilisation by Great Britain of the Royal Air Force for the policing of large areas in the Middle East demonstrates the economy, in money and lives, resulting from the employment of modern weapons. "Iraq is the outstanding case. . . . The War Office estimated that it would cost annually £7,000,000 to £8,000,000. The Royal Air Force has been carrying out the task during the last few years at a cost of £1,500,000 annually."—Mr Geoffrey Mander, M.P., House of Commons, March 14th, 1933.

² Cf. *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, pp. 395 *et seq.*

CHAPTER XI

FORCE AND THE FUTURE

"When the blood of thy victims lies red on
That stricken field, fiercest and last,
In the sunset that gilds Armageddon
With battle-drift still overcast—
When the smoke of thy hot conflagrations
O'ershadows the earth as with wings,
Where nations have fought against nations,
And kings have encountered with kings,
When cometh the end of all things——"

LINDSAY GORDON.

I

*A Practical
Question*

THE conclusions reached in the foregoing chapters may appear to be theoretical and academic. They may be challenged on the ground that morality and statecraft are ill-assorted bedfellows. It may be said that in a world seething with passion and swayed by emotion these principles have no bearing upon practical politics. It may be argued that the exigencies of the moment, produced by the frailties and foibles of human nature, preclude statesmen and politicians from applying any principle, right or wrong, in the conduct of public affairs. To deal with urgent and pressing problems they must have recourse to makeshifts; they must rely upon expedients to tide over the ever-recurring crises in the national, no less than in the international, sphere. Therefore, what is the use of preaching a doctrine—the right use of force—which is so far removed from the practical issues confronting the nations of the world to-day?

Such criticism, however, rests upon a shallow foundation. It is a short-sighted view. In the long run there can be no real progress unless it is founded upon a moral principle, the conception of right as opposed to wrong.

It is equally clear that the human mind must be convinced of the truth embodied in the principle, and this conviction will not be expressed in terms of laws and institutions until there is general agreement. In the national community agreement is the result of education by voluntary organisations, which is reflected in the growth of public opinion. Whatever the particular form of government and however shallow or fickle public opinion may be at any given moment, there can be no doubt that in the end it will prevail.

It is also clear that agreement is not the same thing as unanimity ; otherwise the conduct of a nation's affairs would always be governed by the opinions of the most ignorant and reactionary of its members. The same rule applies in the international community. To register progress it is not essential that the acceptance of reforms should be either unanimous or simultaneous. General agreement will only arrive in instalments ; conversions will not be simultaneous ; and the rate of penetration will vary in different countries.

In the last resort, however, success or failure, advance or retreat, will depend upon the cogency of the moral appeal to the conscience of each community. We believe that the time is ripe for making this appeal because the vast majority of people in every civilised State are capable of understanding the issues involved. They can at least grasp the principle underlying the policing function, because it is one which operates in their daily lives. They

can, therefore, demand that its application should be extended into the international sphere.

It follows that the discussion and elucidation of this problem is not so academic as we might have supposed. Neither is it theoretical, because it touches the lives and interests of every individual, not only in the relationships of his own people with other peoples but also in the realm of domestic affairs. For if this principle is violated in the democratic community, and the factions are allowed to arm, it means a recrudescence of duelling between one murder club and another, which plunged the people of Ireland into a state of anarchy and terror only a few years ago. Moreover, a cursory examination of the internal conditions of many countries will convince us that this mentality—a throwback to the Middle Ages—is rampant in Europe to-day, inflicting misery and death upon thousands of innocent people. It dictates the creed of fascists and communists everywhere in their crude and brutal onslaughts upon the social and democratic systems. Unfortunately, the same mentality is also to be found in other quarters. Here is a sample taken from a recent debate in the House of Commons. "I am afraid I do not accept that definition—force in the right place—as being of any value, because the right place for me is exactly where I want to use it, and for him also and for everyone else, including Herr Hitler in Germany."¹

It is abundantly clear that if this doctrine is to become the stock-in-trade of political parties for the attainment of their own ends, and if the employment of force is no longer to be limited to the police function, there can be only one result—civil war—which

¹ J. Maxton, M.P., November 7th, 1933, *Commons' Debates*, 5th Series, Vol. 281, col. 130.

will injuriously affect every man, woman, and child from one end of the country to the other.

II

INTERNATIONALLY the consequences of this mentality will be still more widespread and disastrous. For if the League possesses no sanction to make the writ run, and if it has no means of deterring the aggressor, it will be unable to carry out the responsibilities which so many nations have committed to its keeping, and its failure will recoil upon the heads of millions of people in every part of the world. *International Consequences*

A few years ago Mr. Churchill, describing these responsibilities, wrote: "We are free to approach the central problems of race and territory, of the balance of power in Europe and of the foundations of a World State. These dominate the future, and there is no cottage or hut in which a white, brown, red, black, or yellow family is now dwelling which may not some day find itself directly and quite unpleasantly affected by them."¹ The disastrous experiences of the last war have already substantiated the truth of this statement on a gigantic scale. Hundreds of thousands of individuals were dug up by the roots. Husbands were torn from their wives and families, children snatched from their parents. Widespread devastation and havoc blasted the lives and careers of millions whose sole crime was that they had acquiesced in the system of international duelling. Why did they acquiesce? Because they had never understood the significance of the right use of force in its bearing upon their own lives and

¹ *The World Crisis : The Aftermath*, p. 160.

daily avocations. Until they learn this lesson, what happened during those tragic years will happen again on an unprecedented scale, and the misery and bloodshed will be multiplied a thousandfold. The prophetic warning of Kant, uttered a century and a half ago, will be fulfilled, and Europe will become "the great graveyard of the human race."

Therefore the problem of the right use of force is a practical matter which vitally concerns everyone ; rich or poor, peer or peasant, socialist or conservative, fascist or communist alike. No one can escape the consequences of another war.

III

*Character
of Next War*

FOR this development we are indebted to the scientists and inventors who have transformed the mechanism of industry and commerce into engines of destruction on a scale unprecedented in the annals of the world. During the last quarter of a century they have produced or developed four new weapons—submarines, tanks, poison gas, and aeroplanes. In addition, the range, size, and performance of artillery and naval craft have been immeasurably increased. Consequently, as adjuncts of the duelling system they can be used to blot out the peoples, and utterly destroy the civilisation of Europe.

These developments are mainly due to the application of science to industry. Inventions and processes primarily intended to increase the wealth of nations have been employed to produce engines of wholesale destruction upon an unprecedented scale.

"It was not until the dawn of the twentieth century of the Christian era that War really began

to enter into its kingdom as the potential destroyer of the human race.”¹

This is a new phenomenon involving problems which our ancestors were never called upon to face. In the past sheer physical exhaustion and the weapons available imposed a limit upon wholesale slaughter. The wiping out of an entire population with swords, pistols and even rifles was an arduous undertaking involving considerable risk and an immense expenditure. To-day, however, a nation with undisputed mastery of the air could annihilate with ease every living person in a hostile country with the minimum of exertion and loss to itself.

The trouble is that we still think of the next war in terms of the last, failing to realise that colossal armies and huge navies are now practically useless. Obviously this attitude of mind—a refusal to face the facts of a scientific age and the habit of deluding ourselves—is fatal. If we steadfastly refuse to read the handwriting on the wall, if we make no attempt to visualise the conditions under which the next war will be waged, if we are incapable of drawing common-sense deductions from facts which are known and proved, we shall deserve the fate in store for us.

The facts are clear. They point unmistakably to the following conclusions, which are substantiated by the knowledge and experience of distinguished statesmen and experts, drawn from different countries, whose opinions merit our highest confidence and respect.²

¹ The Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis: The Aftermath*, p. 452.

² For a striking demonstration of the points hereinafter made the reader is referred to the recently published book by Brig.-Gen. P. R. C. Groves, *Behind the Smoke Screen*, to which the author is most indebted.

**(I) THE NEXT WAR WILL BE WAGED
IN THE AIR.**

Marshal Foch.—"The military mind always imagines that the next war will be on the same lines as the last. That has never been the case and never will be. One of the great factors in the next war will obviously be aircraft. The potentialities of aircraft attack on a large scale are almost incalculable, but it is clear that such attack, owing to its crushing moral effect on a nation, may impress public opinion to the point of disarming the Government and thus become decisive."¹

Mr. Baldwin.—"In the next war you will find that any town which is within reach of an aerodrome can be bombed within the first five minutes of war from the air, to an extent which was inconceivable in the last war, and the question will be whose *moral* will be shattered quickest by that preliminary bombing. . . . Aerial warfare is still in its infancy, and its potentialities are incalculable and inconceivable."²

General von Metzsch.—"The outstanding feature of a future war will certainly be the aerial arm, because it permits of a maximum of effectiveness with a minimum force of men."³

¹ Cf. *The Times*, March 21st, 1922.

² House of Commons, November 10th, 1932.

³ *What would be the Character of a New War?*, p. 38. General von Metzsch was a member of the German General Staff before and during the War, and was subsequently head of one of the German military districts.

- (2) THE AMMUNITION OF THE FUTURE WILL BE POISON-GAS, HIGH EXPLOSIVE, AND INCENDIARY BOMBS, RESULTING IN WIDE-SPREAD INCENDIARISM, ASPHYXIATION, DISEASE, AND STARVATION.**

Viscount Grey.—" ' War ' is the same word as it was a century ago, but it is no longer the same thing. It used to imply a contest between armies ; it will henceforth, by common consent, mean the destruction by chemical agencies of the crowded centres of population ; it will mean physical, moral and economic ruin. It is necessary, therefore, that by common consent war should be avoided." ¹

Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson.—" No convention, guarantee or disarmament safeguard will prevent an unscrupulous enemy from employing poison-gas, especially if that enemy has discovered some new powerful agent, or possesses, as Germany does in her well-organised and strong chemical industry, a ready means for producing such chemicals in bulk at practically a moment's notice." ²

Marshal Foch.—" By the use of bombs, which are becoming increasingly efficient and of greater capacity, not only have armies become more vulnerable, but the centres of population situated in the rear, and whole regions inhabited by civilians, will be threatened. Chemical warfare has thus acquired the power to produce more terrible effects over much greater areas." ³

Professor André Mayer.—" Three means of attack may be employed against civil populations : attack by the chemical arm, attack by explosive and incendiary engines, and bacteriological attack." ⁴

¹ *Twenty-Five Years*, Vol. II, p. 276.

² Preface to *The Riddle of the Rhine*, by V. Lefebure.

³ Cf. Groves, *Behind the Smoke Screen*, p. 188.

⁴ *What would be the Character of a New War ?*, p. 228. Professor Mayer, a distinguished French scientist, was during the War head of the physiological laboratory of the French Chemical Service.

- (3) NERVE CENTRES — CITIES, GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS, FACTORIES, RAILWAYS, PORTS, SHIPPING, ETC., WILL BE BOMBED.**

General von Altrock.—"In wars of the future the initial hostile attack will be directed against the great nerve and communication centres of the enemy's territory, against its large cities, factory centres, munition areas, water, gas, and light supplies; in fact, against every life artery of the country. Discharge of poison-gases will become the rule, since great progress has been made in the production of poison-gases. Such attacks will be carried out to great depths in rear of the actual fighting troops. Entire regions inhabited by peaceful populations will be continually threatened with extinction. The war will frequently have the appearance of a destruction *en masse* of the entire civil population rather than a combat of armed men."¹

General Groves.—"What we have to reckon with is an entirely new strategic weapon. The real aim in war, the ultimate object, is to destroy the will to war of the enemy people. To this end pressure has in the past been applied to the enemy people indirectly, by defeating their navies and armies. But the new strategic weapon now renders it possible to attack the people themselves. It enables a direct method to be substituted for an indirect method."²

¹ Cf. Groves, *op. cit.*, p. 190, and *What would be the Character of a New War?*, p. 360.

² *Behind the Smoke Screen*, pp. 143-144. Cf. *The Times*, March 21st, 1922.

- (4) THERE WILL BE NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN CIVILIANS AND THE FIGHTING FORCES. IT WILL BE “LA GUERRE TOTALE.”**

Mr. Winston Churchill.—"Next time the competition may be to kill women and children and the civil population generally, and victory will give herself in sorry nuptials to the spectacled hero who organises it on the largest scale. . . .

"It is established that henceforward whole populations will take part in war, all doing their utmost, all subjected to the fury of the enemy. It is established that nations who believe their life is at stake will not be restrained from using any means to secure their existence. It is probable, nay certain, that among the means which will next time be at their disposal will be agencies and processes of destruction wholesale, unlimited, and perhaps, once launched, uncontrollable."¹

Mons. C. Rougeron.—"Wars of the future will be '*guerres totales*.' The mobilisation of the whole nation 'without distinction of age or sex' has, in principle, been accepted by the French Chamber practically unanimously. . . . Such a conception of war cannot but influence the principles governing the conduct of operations. Hitherto the destruction of the adversary's organised forces has been rightly considered as the only means to impose one's will upon him. . . . This traditional procedure resulted in the accepted principle that the belligerent should respect the lives and goods of non-combatants. . . . But how can this principle apply to the '*guerre totale*'? If *all* the forces of a country are organised for the struggle, the destruction of 'the organised forces' has no limit. . . . Thus the '*guerre totale*' involves and justifies general destruction."²

¹ *The World Crisis : The Aftermath*, pp. 451-454.

² *L'Illustration*, September 12th, 1931.

(5) THAT SO FAR AS PROTECTION IS CONCERNED, NAVIES WILL BE AS OBSOLETE AS BOWS AND ARROWS.

Admiral Lord Fisher.—"Air fighting dominates future war both by land and sea. It is not my business to discuss the land, but by sea the only way to avoid the air is to get under the water. . . . That's why I keep on emphasising that the whole Navy has to be scrapped. For nearly a whole year after the Armistice we are spending 140 millions sterling on a scrapped navy."¹

Admiral von Scheer.—"Only recently experiments in America have made it clear that a battleship may be sunk by aeroplanes. Even though the factor of defence did not enter into these experiments, it cannot be denied that the prospects are favourable to the aeroplane—since an attacking fleet cannot remain in motion permanently. It requires rest for the engines, time for taking on board munitions, fuel and oil supplies ; it must dock for repairs, lie at anchor—and it is then that the opportunity for air attack presents itself. The danger involved in being struck by a two-thousand-pound bomb from the sky also exists in the mines and torpedoes which threaten the battleship. It is thus exposed to danger beneath the water and from the air, and it has no absolute security against these. Swift cruisers—the eyes of the fleet—are threatened in a still greater degree, since in view of their high speed they must be content with weaker armour."²

¹ *The Times*, September 12th, 1919.

² Cf. Groves, *Behind the Smoke Screen*, pp. 210-211. Admiral von Scheer was in command of the German Fleet at Jutland.

**(6) THAT AGAINST ATTACK FROM THE AIR
THERE IS NO DEFENCE EXCEPT REPRISALS.**

Mr. Baldwin.—"I think it is well for the man in the street to realise that there is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through. . . . The only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves."¹

Mons. Laurent Eynac.—"The best defence remains the attack, and there is no surer protection than to have at your call to reply to the enemy's blows a solidly organised air force for fighting and bombing work by day and by night."²

General Groves.—"The only effective method of protection against aircraft attack is the aerial counter-offensive against the enemy's territory, and the only effective deterrent to aerial aggression is the threat of reprisals in kind."³

Lord Lloyd.—"It is in the counter-attack, the swift and strong counter-attack, that you get the main safeguard for a great civil population huddled in towns in this country. . . . Counter-attack will give the swift destruction of the enemies' military air installations—the aerodromes from which air raids are being operated, the hangars and the aircraft in them, their arsenals and all their ancillary establishments for maintenance, repair, and equipment of the Air Force."⁴

¹ House of Commons, November 10th, 1932.

² Cf. Groves, *Behind the Smoke Screen*, p. 188. M. Eynac has held office as Air Minister in successive French administrations.

³ *Behind the Smoke Screen*, pp. 168–169. Cf. *The Times*, March 21st and April 3rd, 1922.

⁴ House of Lords, November 29th, 1933.

These are a few of the considered pronouncements of men of affairs—statesmen, generals, and admirals—delivered not in the heat of the moment but after mature reflection. They are not the vapourings of scaremongers or pacifists. They are the handwriting on the wall warning us of the inevitable consequences of the duelling system, which is the very negation of the right use of force. They point unmistakably to its suppression and its replacement by a policing system. They also demonstrate that the issue is pre-eminently a practical question which brooks no delay.

IV

*The
Speculation*

THIS is the crux of the whole matter. Will man utterly destroy himself with the new weapons he has forged, or will he employ them for his security and advancement? Viscount Grey asks this question thus: "To-day civilised man is confronted by immensely changed conditions. They are due in the main to his own discoveries in the region of science. In the last hundred years he has eaten more fruit of the Tree of Knowledge than any previous generation of which there is record. He has acquired unprecedented power over the processes of nature. He can move by air, land or water with hitherto unheard-of speed. He has facilities for incessant communication that heretofore have been unknown. Whether he will control the use of all these things so as to make them serve and not injure his physical and mental capacity and welfare is a speculation that goes beyond political enquiry."¹

The following is the "speculation" of his old

¹ Viscount Grey, *Twenty-Five Years*, Vol. II, p. 276.

colleague, Mr. Winston Churchill, in an imaginary account of a conversation between President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, and M. Clemenceau on the eve of the Peace Conference :

“ Then they went back to the League of Nations plan. No doubt once all the greatest nations were included, their moral force alone was an immense security for peace and justice. An almost universal trade and financial boycott, and total exclusion from the seas, were additional severe deterrents upon an aggressor. Credit, food, munitions were strong defences for the attacked. But surely the august authority of the League must not shrink in the last resort from the use of force !

“ It is not known which of the three chiefs first conceived the master-plan by which the peace of the world is now so well defended that national armaments are falling into increasing neglect. But history records the fact that on the second day of conversation it was decided that the new instrument of world-order should be armed with the new weapons of science. Nations great or small might, if they wished, for their own reassurance have battleships and cruisers, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, and spend their money as they chose on these ; but war from the air and war by chemical means were reserved to League and to international authority alone.

“ At the moment when science had produced weapons destructive of the safety and even the life of whole cities and populations, weapons whose action was restricted by no frontiers and could be warded off neither by fleets nor armies, a new instrument of human government would be created to wield them. Conversely, just as this new instrument was coming into being, the new weapons which it required were

ready to its hand. But with that practical spirit which shone in these three experienced statesmen, they proclaimed at once the principle and its gradual application. Every state signatory of the Covenant would in the first instance dedicate to the League so many squadrons of aeroplanes. From these a new force would be formed. 'We are reviving, in fact,' said Clemenceau, 'the old Orders of chivalry like the Knights Templars and the Knights of Malta to guard civilisation against barbarism.' Here he made a remark of somewhat irreverent character which has escaped the chronicler. 'There is certainly no lack,' said the President, 'of knights whose renown is deathless to found the Order. French, British, American, German, Italian aces have performed exploits for which there is no counterpart in human annals. Let these be the new nobility.' 'At any rate,' said Lloyd George, 'they are better than the profiteers who are sitting on my doorstep every day.'

"So it was agreed that in principle the power of the air should be reserved to the League of Nations for the purpose of maintaining world peace against aggression. No absolute veto was placed in the first instance upon national air forces, but the whole emphasis of the policy of the Great Powers would be laid upon building up the International Air Force, with the intention that as general confidence grew only commercial aviation should be developed nationally, and the military aspect should be reserved to international authority alone."¹

We have quoted this passage at length because it displays Mr. Churchill in the rôle of the prophet. An experienced administrator, a distinguished politician, a fascinating historian, an amateur strategist, and a prolific painter, he occasionally wanders off

¹ *The World Crisis : The Aftermath*, pp. 26-27.

the beaten track and allows his imagination to soar into the realms of the future :

“ And tones that reach the ear mysteriously
When thou art wrapped in thy divinest dream.”

But Mr. Churchill imposes a strict censorship upon the inner workings of his mind. Literary freedom is one thing, political exposition quite another. Visions are visions, and politics are politics. The Tory Party has no use for visions, therefore speeches and actions in the House of Commons and elsewhere bear no resemblance to the divine dreams of the study. Jekyll is a philosopher and moralist, Hyde a politician and jingo, “ and never the twain shall meet.” Alas, that gifts so transcendent should fail “ to reach the level of events.”¹ Mr. Churchill has held high office in successive administrations since the Armistice, but we search in vain for one jot or one tittle of evidence to show that he has made the slightest attempt to advance the principle and the plan for which he pleads so eloquently in his dream.

As we have seen, at least two institutions are essential for the fulfilment of Mr. Churchill's prophecy, a tribunal in equity to dispense justice—the only foundation of peace—and a police force to maintain order. These constitute the bedrock of every civilised community, and in the twentieth century they cannot be dispensed with in the community of nations. The alternative is to retrace our footsteps to the jungle and the cave.

¹ “ After all, life is a brief span, and all that matters is not to fall below the level of events upon the greatest occasions.”—*The World Crisis : The Aftermath*, p. 23.

V.

*Necessity
for
European
Solidarity*

“**T**HEN let them which be in Judæa flee into the mountains.” To-day this warning can be literally applied to those nations which inhabit Europe. Since the arrival of the aeroplane their proximity to each other has become the supreme danger. For the first time the means of swift, certain, and widespread extermination are at hand. Mutual annihilation stares them in the face. Consequently, in the existing stage of aeronautical development distance is the decisive factor in the relationship of States. Strategic frontiers are no more, and the range of the bomber must in the end determine the policy of every foreign office. It is true that at the moment America, Japan, and Russia cannot obliterate Europe, but a war between the nations of Western Europe is bound to result in wholesale massacre and destruction. Again we are reminded of the Biblical warning: “Woe unto them that are with child and to them that give suck in those days.”

Therefore, the immediate problem is to consolidate these nations into a confederation within the structure of the League. If they will agree to hand over their super-weapons, especially the air weapon, to the League as a policing instrument, the pressing danger will have been averted. But it is imperative that Europe should put its own house in order first without waiting for America and the non-European countries, leaving the door open for their admission when they evince a desire to co-operate in establishing the reign of law. This, after all, is common sense. Moreover, it has become a sheer necessity because it is the only way of safeguarding our national existence. Self-preservation,

one of the strongest instincts in human nature, demands it. Morality implores it, because by no other means is it possible to dispense justice, revise treaties, and provide for the pacific settlement of all disputes.

It is idle to suggest that this orientation must wait until every nation is prepared to collaborate in setting up the new machinery. As Abraham Lincoln might have said, "You can include some of the nations all the time; you can include all the nations some of the time, but you cannot include all the nations all the time." To insist that no plan is feasible until all the nations agree simultaneously to pool their weapons and submit their disputes to the arbitrament of a tribunal is nothing less than sheer hypocrisy or sabotage. The essential thing is to make a start and to form the nucleus of the new organisation, even though at the outset its membership is restricted to the existing members of the League in Europe.

VI

IF the British people volunteered their co-operation now, it would save the situation, but if we wait until the crisis is upon us, as we did in 1914, it will be too late. By failing to declare ourselves in advance as the protagonists of the right use of force, we shall have thrown to the winds our potential powers of preventing a new war. Already we have allowed priceless opportunities to slip by: the drafting of the Covenant, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the 1924 Protocol, and the French proposals for a European Air Police submitted to the Disarmament Conference. On each of these occasions we have in effect, though perhaps unconsciously, launched a torpedo at the League. Now that it is

*Attitude of
Great
Britain*

within measurable distance of complete shipwreck we may well deplore the results of our folly.

No one can deny that the blame for the existing anarchy in Europe lies mainly at the door of the British people,¹ because they have obstinately refused to develop the potentialities of the League. They have been hoodwinked by their rulers into believing that they are immune from the perils hanging over the heads of Continental nations, forgetting that their own country is the most vulnerable of all.² They have been lulled to sleep with the soothing syrup of disarmament and the false gospel of the "no force, no restraint at any price" pacifists. They have been deluded by the Press and the military and naval hierarchies into minimising the dangers of aerial warfare and magnifying the defensive value of the senior services. The result is that we are spending ninety-seven millions a year on the latter and eighteen millions on our air force. Professor Madariaga, a keen observer, writes³: "England as a whole still believes in the supremacy of the British Navy as the panacea for all her international ills. That it has been a panacea for about three centuries no one could deny. That it played its last scene in this magnificent rôle during the Great War no one can deny. But that it was the last scene is apparent to every one outside England and to those

¹ "It is painfully evident that Great Britain, which might have had the leadership of the League, as the saying goes, for the asking, has left it vacant and taken, in practically every case, a line at variance with the best interests of the world."—S. de Madariaga, *Disarmament*, p. 257.

² "Long-range guns that could command the Channel, mines in the sea, aircraft, submarines, the recent inventions of science, have impaired our island security, for we must ever be dependent on imported food supplies."—Viscount Grey, "Freedom of the Seas," in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1930, p. 330.

³ *Disarmament*, p. 29.

clear-sighted Englishmen who do not allow the glow of the past to interfere with the light of the present." To emulate the ostrich in this fashion at the dictation of militarists and armament firms can only result in a rude awakening. When it comes there will be no time to improvise our defences, which we are told will in any case be useless to stave off the first blow.

VII

*T*HERE is only one defence against a poten- Pooled
Security
tial aggressor, that is to implant in his mind the certainty of an overwhelming reprisal by a superior force, under the control of an international executive and backed by the moral support of an impartial authority—the League. There is no other way of combining moral and physical force so as to produce the maximum deterrent effect upon the would-be disturber of the peace.

But ever since the signing of the Covenant successive British governments have consistently fought against the idea of pooled security. Our rulers have lost no opportunity of whittling away our obligations under Articles VIII, X, and XVI. We have turned the League into a debating society instead of developing it into an authority.

Are we so infernally proud that we are unwilling to avail ourselves of an international sanction against aggression? Are we so fat and flourishing that we can afford to dispense with the services of an international police force? Are we so certain that our strong right arm alone will suffice to deliver us in the day of trouble? ¹ A few short years ago we did

¹ "In the world as it is now constituted the only real safety lies in a strong right arm and in the power to use its strength in the proper place and at the right time."—Captain Ian Fraser, M.P., November 29th, 1933, *Commons' Debates*, 5th Series, Vol. 283, col. 1,004.

not despise the assistance of other arms, however strong or puny they might be. Have we so soon forgotten the lessons of the War? In those critical days we left no stone unturned to call to our aid the resources of any nation, great and small alike.

VIII

*Treaty
Revision*

THEN there is the urgent problem of treaty revision. During the past fifteen years we have never ceased to lecture France and other countries upon the iniquities of the Treaty of Versailles. We forget that we helped to draft this Treaty and that in a great measure we are responsible for its provisions. We also forget that we signed it. If it now requires revision and amendment, what single step have we taken to adapt or develop the machinery of the League in order to equip it for this formidable task? Our contribution to this problem has been nil. On the contrary, we have impeded the course of justice because we have jettisoned every proposal directed towards this end.¹

France was not the only country which is supposed to have benefited by the peace settlement. We marched off with considerable booty in the shape of overseas territories. And whilst we curse the intransigence of other nations, it is just as well to remember that on no single occasion have we volunteered to reconsider the allocation of mandates in Africa or elsewhere in order that Germany might participate as a member of the League in this new

¹ Even the belated adhesion to the General Act of September 26th, 1928, forthcoming only on May 21st, 1931, is such as to be almost entirely valueless. "A *via media* between its acceptance and rejection might be found in acceding to the Act with reservations which would make the accession almost meaningless. This is the course that the British Government has now adopted."—J. L. Brierly, in *British Year Book of International Law*, 1931, p. 132.

system. When we are reminded that Germany has no outlets for expansion we merely shrug our shoulders. Can we wonder that Continental nations regard us as hypocrites tarred with evasion and feathered with self-deception?

IX

WE jeer at France because she is obsessed with the idea of security, forgetting that she has been thrice invaded within a century. We cynically tear up the treaty guaranteeing her Eastern frontier. Because the United States dishonours its pledge, we feel bound to emulate their example. We urge France to disarm. When she asks if she can rely unconditionally upon our aid in the event of aggression, we reply, "Perhaps yes, perhaps no." Even under the Locarno Pact we reserve our final decision until the event takes place.¹ In the words of Sir John Simon, "It is not the Anglo-Saxon habit to make defined engagements for undefined circumstances."² This is the kind of uncertainty which makes war certain. For it is obvious that the circumstances cannot be defined until the League has been equipped with the appropriate powers and machinery. That is just what Sir John Simon and his colleagues are unwilling to do. More than a year elapsed after the first shot had been fired in Manchuria before the Lytton Commission made its

*Anglo-Saxon
Mentality*

¹ "At no time within my experience has this country been ready or willing to bind itself specifically to particular actions in circumstances which it is wholly unable to foresee. . . . We shall in the last resort always reserve to ourselves the right to judge whether the *casus foederis*, the circumstances foreseen in the engagement, has actually occurred."—Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain, M.P., February 6th, 1934, *Commons' Debates*, 5th Series, Vol. 285, col. 1,037.

² February 6th, 1934: *Id.*, col. 993.

report. Is dilatoriness and delay another peculiar characteristic of Anglo-Saxon mentality? It is true that at the moment our commitments under Article XVI are nebulous and ill-defined, but if an international air police is established we shall know precisely what our commitments are to be. As it is, everything is left to chance, a circumstance which no doubt Sir John Simon applauds as further evidence of those ingrained habits which are the pride of the Anglo-Saxon race.

"Every country for itself and God for us all. And the devil take the hindmost" is still the slogan of the Foreign Office, just as it was a century ago. But we know perfectly well that if Paris or Berlin is suddenly reduced to ruins, we shall be compelled in sheer self-defence to intervene again in Europe as we did twenty years ago. On that occasion our intervention came too late to prevent war, and if, pursuing the advice of Sir John Simon, we cling to the grand old Anglo-Saxon habit of sitting on the fence till the last moment, history may repeat itself within the lifetime of the present generation.

Therefore, why do we hesitate to join the European members of the League in putting the system of collective security on the map? Why do we delay taking the lead in establishing the reign of law in Europe? Is it sheer cowardice,¹ moral inertia, or mere prejudice, or all three combined?

¹ Cowardice was, apparently, the cause of the British Government's decision in February 1933 to place an embargo upon the export of arms to Japan and China (as to which see p. 197). "I lay down this proposition from which we shall not budge. It is impracticable for a single country like ourselves acting alone to differentiate between one combatant and another. . . . I am myself enough of a pacifist to take this view, that, however we handle the matter, I do not intend my own country to get into trouble about it."—Sir John Simon, February 27th, 1933, *Commons' Debates*, 5th Series, Vol. 275, cols. 57-58.

It is impossible to scuttle out of Europe. We are proud of our scattered Empire, but it is a mirage when we are considering the dangers of insecurity, war, starvation, and asphyxiation. London, the heart of the Empire, might be reduced to a heap of ashes before one of our Dominions with the best will in the world could raise a little finger to avert the catastrophe.

X

FRANCE, our nearest neighbour, possesses the *The French Proposal* strongest military air force in the world.

Yet when she proposes to hand over her bombers to the control of the League we give her the cold shoulder. Had we accepted her offer, we should at least have eliminated one—and if we include ourselves, two—potential aggressors from the list. What evil spirit possessed us that we, the sixth air power¹ in the world, should disdainfully reject a proposal which the majority of the twenty-three smaller powers in Europe would probably have accepted?

Here was an opportunity of nipping in the bud a new race in air armaments, which we should be compelled to enter under a severe handicap and with a considerable leeway to make up. Here was a chance of preventing the rearmament of Germany by giving her equality of status in the composition of the new air police. Here was a prospect of reducing our defence expenditure by adopting the co-operative principle and enlisting the support of the small nations to redress the balance should one of the Great Powers in Europe prefer to remain in isolation.

It is not generally realised that twenty-three European nations, described as the small powers,

¹ See *post*, p. 190.

contribute under the barême formula ¹ 306 units towards the maintenance of the League. The contributions of the Great Powers, France, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain, amount to 323 units. Consequently, the total annual sum paid by the small powers into the coffers of the League is approximately equal to the total contributions of the four Great Powers.

Therefore, if the cost of the European air police is apportioned on the basis of the barême, i.e. ability to pay, half its maintenance will be borne by the smaller nations. And what becomes of the assertion so frequently made in ill-informed quarters that Great Britain is a philanthropist—that she carries almost single-handed the budget of the League on her broad shoulders—that she is being mulcted and bled for the benefit of foreigners, and that in return she derives little or no advantage for herself? If these advantages are not greater, the blame rests upon the British people, not upon the League.

XI

*A League
Fully
Armed*

THIS is what Mr. Garvin said in an article written several years ago²: "Ladies and Gentlemen of twenty-one and over, constituting after centuries of political development our final regime of universal suffrage! You are sometimes warned to beware of the amount you subscribe in these tight times to the League of Nations; that is to the world effort for perpetual

¹ I.e. the scale by which the cost of maintenance of the League is apportioned between the states-members. The scale now in operation was adopted by the Fourth Committee of the 1925 Assembly.—*Minutes*, p. 243.

² "Arms, Money, and Muddle," in *The Observer*, March 3rd, 1929.

peace. You do, in fact, contribute half a crown a minute to the League of Nations. But you spend £200 a minute on armaments. Nevertheless, as regards power in the air above you all, whence poison and flame will sweep on you if peace is broken, you are a subordinate nation, and to a degree that no generation of your ancestors would have endured. Is this good enough? If not, then save your millions or modernise your defence."

How can we modernise our defence? "Parity with the strongest air force in Europe" is the answer of the Air League. But how will this suffice to protect our highly industrialised, densely populated, and vulnerable island? Why not demand a two- or three-power standard? This would be costly no doubt—postponing indefinitely any relief from taxation—and highly impracticable because under the competitive system standards are seldom attained and never maintained.

The obvious alternative is to co-operate with our neighbours in allocating to force its rightful place—the policing function—and thus to construct a healthy and modernised Europe.

The truth is that if the European members of the League agreed to establish an air police, they would be able to save vast sums in their military budgets and, what is far more important, the peace of Europe would be preserved.

At the outset several nations, including possibly Germany and Italy, might refuse to collaborate in this undertaking. The door should be left open, and in course of time these nations would realise the futility of challenging what Rousseau described as "a League fully armed." Guided by saner counsels, they would voluntarily demand inclusion and would be admitted on a status of equality with the rest,

equality not in competitive armaments, as Germany now suggests, but equality in the sight of the law. They would comprehend that the only chance of effecting revision, of protecting minorities, and of securing justice was through the medium of an impartial tribunal empowered to adjudicate upon all these matters.¹

XII

*The Key to
Disarma-
ment*

THIS is the only road to peace because it leads to the citadel of justice. On the other hand, the policy of disarmament advocated so unconvincingly by the British Government leads us nowhere because it ends in a cul-de-sac. It is a purely negative proposition which, as Lord Balfour remarked, "just puts up a paper screen painted to delude the people of goodwill all over the world into thinking that something is really being done to prevent war, while in reality behind the paper screen the forces of militarism are sharpening their knives all the time." Clearly the first step is to remove the knives—they cannot be destroyed or abolished—from the control of the militarists and hand them over to the international policeman. Disarmament would then be achieved because "centralised force tends to eliminate all force, including itself."

This, however, is the only method. It is the method which has been successfully employed in the evolution of every civilised community. The king, supported by the majority of his subjects, was able to disarm the baron when the baron realised that aggression was no longer profitable or practicable. The advent of the sheriff and the constable disarmed the individual because it created a sense of security.

¹ Cf. Sir John Seeley, cited p. 85 *ante*.

Thereafter the carrying of arms and the erection of private defences became superfluous. When security, based upon justice, had been established through the application of the principle of the right use of force, the necessity for carrying weapons ceased to exist.

Similarly with nations. An international air police would become the guarantee of justice administered through the medium of the tribunal. And just as the monopoly of artillery and gunpowder—the royal train—enabled Henry VII to disarm and hold in awe the feudal lords, so the creation of an international air police would paralyse the military and naval activities of every nation in Europe. For under these conditions it is certain that a huge conscript army could never be mobilised. It is even doubtful whether a small professional army would be able to assume the offensive, but if as a highly mechanised force equipped with thousands of tanks it succeeded in crossing the frontier, its communications would be constantly menaced from the air and it would find itself cut off and marooned in hostile territory.

The potency of the air arm in severing the line of communications, isolating armies and navies from their sources of supply, is a relatively new factor which was just emerging in its embryonic stage at the conclusion of the Armistice. Had the campaign been prolonged into 1919 its effectiveness would have been proved conclusively.¹ In future it will operate on the side of the policeman, whose rôle is restricted to defence and protection. This is the age of mechanical weapons, but it may well be that the superiority of the aeroplane and the bomb will be decisive, rendering naval and ground weapons

¹ Cf. Groves, *Behind the Smoke Screen*, pp. 215, 219–220.

obsolete for offensive purposes. Therefore, the establishment of an international air police is the real key to disarmament.

XIII

*The Edge of
Risk*

MEANWHILE, the British Government, with commendable though misplaced zeal, has been fumbling in its pockets endeavouring to discover a formula or schedule which will disarm everyone without rearming Germany and, at the same time, will retain the supremacy of the British Navy. We are told that in pursuit of this will-o'-the-wisp the Government has already disarmed to the edge of risk. Having dropped during the last fifteen years from the first to the sixth place¹ as an air power, it would appear that we are already well over the edge and are sliding at an accelerated rate towards the abyss! Then what do we propose to do—to rearm or to join the law-abiding nations of Europe in pooling our air resources?

Three centuries ago Thomas Hobbes in effect pointed out that unilateral disarmament could only end in handing over the sheep to the wolves. But competitive armaments, however much they may be restricted, are equally futile because they perpetuate the system of wolf versus wolf. Therefore, we are compelled in conjunction with our neighbours to adopt the third system, which requisitions the

¹ "In terms of first-line strength the Royal Air Force stands to-day only fifth on the list of Air Powers, although at the end of the late War we could with justice claim to take, not fifth, but first, place."—The Under-Secretary for Air, March 14th, 1933. "But this statement leaves the Soviet Air Force out of account, and there is good reason to believe, if that be included, that our position is sixth."—Groves, *Behind the Smoke Screen*, p. 12. Cf. *Lords' Debates*, 5th Series, Vol. 90, cols. 166, 183.

services of the policeman to keep the wolf from the door.

XIV

WHAT are the arguments put forward against this system? *The Bogies. Super-state*

Firstly, our rulers denounce it as the creation of a super-state.¹ This particular boggy is trotted out on every conceivable occasion. In the view of the pundits, to clinch the argument it is only necessary to pronounce the words "super-state" and "sovereignty." After this there is nothing more to be said, and the pundit goes on his way rejoicing, knowing that he has left you in a complete fog. Had he tried to dispel the darkness and talk common sense, he would no longer have been a pundit, and he would have failed to impress you. Professor Schiller puts it thus: "The interest of the professor is to become more unassailable and so more authoritative. He achieves this by becoming more technical. For the more technical he gets, the fewer can comprehend him."

We have a right to know exactly what these learned people mean when they talk so glibly about the dangers of a super-state. What is a super-state? Is it something intrinsically bad, as apparently they would have us believe? Is it some poisonous growth which we should shun like the devil, or is it only an incantation to chase the devil

¹ "The endowment of the League with physical force . . . would be to change its whole basis from that of its original character as an influence of moral suasion to that of military domination which we would all deplore. . . . Let us examine for a moment just a few very elementary difficulties which this idea of a super-state brings into existence."—The Marquess of Londonderry, House of Lords, December 7th, 1933: *Lords' Debates*, 5th Series, Vol. 90, col. 374.

away? Do the pundits suggest that a super-state involves the elevation of one of the many States of the world to a position superior to all the rest? Do they imply that this State would be allowed to impose its authority upon everyone else? If this is what is meant, then Rome was a super-state. In fact, every great empire which imposes its rule upon other States comes under this description. In its relation to India, Great Britain is, therefore, a super-state.

But the pundits will tell you they mean something else. In their minds, the super-state is not an authority imposed upon States by an external power. It is an organism created by the national States themselves of their own free will. Naturally, one asks, "Do you mean a federation?" The pundit, driven into a corner, replies, "Yes." Of course, every schoolboy knows what a federation is. Most people are aware that there is nothing particularly harmful or wicked about it. Even the Americans, who scream in alarm whenever they encounter the super-state, pride themselves upon being the great exponents of federalism.

A federation is, after all, simply a group of States who band themselves together for certain specific purposes. They do so with their eyes open, and because they believe it suits their own interests. They may enter the federation or not, as they choose. If they are sufficiently enlightened, they will recognise the advantages of co-operation in certain directions. On the other hand, if they are blinded by national prejudice and a false patriotism, they will probably remain as isolated units. They may be compelled, however, by necessity to devise some organisation for regulating their relationships.

No doubt they will be impelled by various motives.

They may say, " If we live in complete isolation, we shall probably squabble ; then we shall end up by fighting each other. Fighting has become an extremely costly and dangerous business. In one war we may destroy more wealth than we accumulate in half a century. We may even annihilate each other *en masse* and completely blot out what is left of our civilisation. Perhaps civilisation isn't really worth bothering about. But we should be callous and inhuman if we took no steps to prevent the starvation, asphyxiation, and ruination of our descendants." Or those who are not concerned about the future may say that war is a futile business because neither side, victor nor vanquished, can hope to derive any advantage out of it except the momentary gratification of their lust for power. Consequently, it may be considered to be a saner policy to co-operate with their neighbours than to fight them.

There is also the economic motive. Men may believe that a federation will bring increased prosperity and wealth ; that if a number of States pool their armaments, it will result in economy and a reduction of taxation. Or it may be that the existence of certain States is menaced by a powerful neighbour. In the federal bond they recognise a means of mutual protection. By concentrating their military resources under a single command, as the Allies did in the war, they will not only rid themselves of the danger of annihilating each other, but will also increase their power of resistance against aggression from outside.

It would therefore appear to the ordinary person that these are all sound reasons why the proposition—call it a super-state, a confederation, a federation, a commonwealth, or what you will—should at least be considered. It is not disposed of by merely

chanting "super-state." Moreover, racial and linguistic differences do not appear to be insuperable obstacles. Canada, Switzerland, and Russia have overcome even these difficulties.

XV

Sovereignty

SECONDLY, there is our old friend Sovereignty. In these discussions she inevitably makes her appearance like a "Jack-in-the-box." No one can tell you who she really is, what she does, or what useful purpose she serves. She is described as being self-sufficient, self-supporting, self-reliant, and extremely self-conscious. She is independent, usually aggressive, often irritable and pugnacious. She brooks no interference; she is a law unto herself. She is the sole arbiter of her own rights. In short, she is ego with a big "E." At least, so she is described. But when we scrutinise her more closely, she is not quite so omnipotent and awe-inspiring as the pundits would have us believe. She moves about in terror of her neighbours, who, of course, are all sovereigns like herself. Occasionally she fights them, and if she is defeated she is forced to sign an unpleasant treaty. So she is no longer as free and independent as she was. She may have to give up territory and pay indemnities. But, although she is compelled by her neighbours to do these things and many others, she still retains her sovereignty—such is the theory—because she might have refused to sign the treaty at all. It is not explained what would become of her if she refused.

Then there are other treaties which she signs willingly without any coercion. It is obvious that all treaties, contracts, and pacts curtail the absolute freedom and liberty of the State which signs them. If sovereignty means the right to do just as you

please on every occasion, then any treaty which restricts this right or imposes an obligation is a limitation of sovereignty. The Covenant of the League deprives a nation of the so-called right to go to war except under certain conditions. It lays down obligations which are more or less definite. It enjoins a procedure, and the observance of rules and regulations. In fact, a state-member of the League cannot do just as it likes, unless it breaks its word and repudiates its solemn engagements. When it does this, as Japan did two years ago, it resumes its complete sovereignty; that is to say, it may commit all the crimes in the calendar.

On the other hand, it may be argued that States which voluntarily make treaties and pacts, enter into covenants or join a federation, have made no surrender of their sovereignty, because they have done so of their own free will. According to this theory, they still retain their sovereignty intact. This was the argument employed by the Southern States of America when they announced their intention of seceding from the Union. The majority of the American people, however, led by Lincoln, plumped for retaining their super-state.

National sovereignty has already flirted with Federalism even in Europe. The controversy now rages round the question as to how far the young lady may go without compromising her virtue. When she visits Geneva or The Hague, she may join a mixed society; she may pay a subscription; she may indulge in speeches; she may engage a secretary without a stain upon her character. She may even allow herself to be summoned before a court for certain misdemeanours. But, should she elect to employ the services of a policeman, she is compromised for ever!

This, apparently, is the view of the British Government and until recently of three-quarters of the Press in this country. It is probably endorsed by a majority of the professors who produce these theories, in the seclusion of their studies. What it means is that if in a fit of sanity a nation suggests to its neighbours the desirability of a police force to prevent international crime—its own included—it is denounced as an impostor who is only fit for Utopia.

There may be millions of simple folk who have never been introduced to sovereignty. They all, however, have some faint conception of justice and fair play. They all understand the necessity for a court and a policeman. Most of them would endorse the dictum of William Penn that neither party should be "judges in their own cause, nor punishers of their own wrongs." They all devoutly long for the suppression of war, which has brought so many calamities upon their heads. How long will they tolerate politicians, pressmen, and professors who seek to delude them with catchwords and slogans? How long will they endure being the victims of sovereignty and the super-state?

XVI

*Mistrust
and
Evasion*

THIRDLY, we cannot trust the foreigner. This is a favourite argument. Are we quite so sure that the foreigner trusts us, and is there any particular reason why he should? As an illustration, let us consider for a moment what happened at Geneva when the Lytton Report was presented to the Assembly. On Friday, February 24th, 1933, our Foreign Secretary, in conjunction with the representatives of forty-one other nations, voted for the adoption of this report and thus, on behalf of Great Britain,

condemned Japan's acts of aggression in Manchuria. A further resolution was adopted constituting a Committee of Twenty-one to advise upon what further steps should be taken to render operative the unanimous vote of the Assembly. It was also agreed that no member of the League should take independent action, and that whatever coercive measures were considered practicable should be undertaken collectively.¹ Captain Eden, the British Under-Secretary, remained in Geneva to serve on this committee. Sir John Simon returned to London. On the following Monday he announced to a bewildered House of Commons that the British Government had determined to place an embargo upon the export of munitions to Japan and China. On the previous Friday he had declared by his vote in the Assembly that Japan was the aggressor—China the victim of aggression. Almost within forty-eight hours he proposed to mete out the same treatment to the criminal and the victim. At one stroke he stultified his vote, undermined the collective responsibility of the League, repudiated the pledge given on Friday that no independent action should be taken, and left Captain Eden completely stranded in the Committee of Twenty-one.

This is a fair sample of the tortuous path of diplomacy even when it is carried on in conference or on the floor of the House of Commons. There

¹ The resolution constituting the Advisory Committee declares its purpose to be, *inter alia*, "to aid the members of the League in concerting their action and their attitude among themselves and with the non-member States." The Report upon the situation in the Far East, which the Assembly had already adopted, had declared that it was the intention of states-members "to abstain from taking any isolated action in Manchuria," as well as "from any act which might prejudice or delay the carrying out of the recommendations of the said Report."

was no effective protest. The Press was silent and the House of Commons mute.¹ Is it surprising that foreigners should mistrust us, or that Sir John Simon's antics should be regarded at Geneva as another proof of our perfidy and double dealing?

All through the long-drawn-out Sino-Japanese dispute it was clear that our sole preoccupation was to emasculate Article XVI and to extract even the milk teeth of the infant League. Our representatives were busily occupied engaging the potential policeman in animated and polite conversation, raising objections and prolonging the discussion whilst the burglar rifled the premises.²

It is beside the point to argue that other nations are guilty of similar conduct. That is perfectly true, but people who live in glass-houses cannot afford to throw stones. Let us be candid and admit that we are no better and, let us hope, no worse than the others.

¹ The British Government's action was, however, strongly criticised by the Right Hon. L. C. M. S. Amery: "The right honourable gentleman proceeded to say that we are going to act individually after all, and to act, not in accordance with the policy which is presumably being put forward internationally but on an entirely different and indeed contradictory policy. . . . It seems to me to be entirely inconsistent action and to be justified not on the merits of the case but, quite frankly, on the ground of what my right honourable friend called prudence, but as I would say, cowardice. If we do consider Japan to be wrong in this matter . . . then if we take any single-handed action, it should, in so far as lies in our power, be directed against Japan."

² In a farewell after-dinner speech in July 1932, Colonel Homma, Military Attaché at the Japanese Embassy in London, declared that "sorry as he was to leave England, he was glad to leave it with the assurance that the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was stronger than ever, and that when the most critical moment in the life of Japan came, with the presentation of the Lytton Report to the League in October, Japan could count on the full support of England, who alone understood how entirely in her own defence Japanese action had been taken."

In the existing world-anarchy it is stupid to expect mutual trust and confidence. If this was possible, and if we were all angels, clearly there would be no need either for a court or a policeman. It is just because we cannot trust each other to carry out our promises and engagements that these institutions are necessary. It is because we evade our obligations under a "Solemn League and Covenant" to which we affixed our signatures at the conclusion of the greatest war in history that a tribunal and police force are essential. The most we can hope for at this stage is a spirit of toleration, which must find its expression in terms of justice and restraint. There is no other way of developing this spirit into one of mutual respect and esteem, from which ultimately may spring feelings of true comradeship and friendship.

XVII

FOURTHLY, we are told that the organisation necessary to implement the right use of force in international relationships is impracticable, that the aspirations and jealousies of nationalism preclude the establishment of either a tribunal or an international police force, and that even if nations were agreed in principle, the difficulties in establishing the new machinery would be insurmountable. *Impracticability*

But are these obstacles, stupendous though they may appear, really as formidable as some people would have us suppose? In the main they are political, not technical. The French General Staff believe that an international air force is a practical proposition. Military experts tell us that watertight plans can be worked out and that a scientific study of the problems involved would solve many of the difficulties with which we are confronted.

The experience of the last war demonstrates conclusively the feasibility of building up an organisation of sanctions under a unified command.¹ Therefore, from the technical standpoint, even the pitfalls of nationalism can be circumvented, as the existence of military organisations such as the French Foreign Legion and the Shanghai Police Force amply proves.

XVIII

*The Peoples
must Decide*

CONSEQUENTLY, there is enough evidence to show that if the peoples of Europe are determined to eliminate the ancient practice of trial by battle and to substitute a policing system in its stead, the means are at hand. Where there is a will there is always a way. Therefore, let the rank and file in every country bestir themselves before it is too late. Let the democracy of Great Britain deliberately choose between the policing and the duelling systems. Let our mandate to the House of Commons be clear and unmistakable.

Political pressure must be applied from below.² Here is an example illustrating this thesis, taken from the early days of the eighteenth century, which may well be applied to the conditions of to-day: "But the Tories were slow in realising the evolution of opinion which was already so marked. They were still hunting William III and planning retrenchment. They were still dreaming of detachment from Europe when the nation awoke beneath them. On May 8th, 1701, the freeholders of Kent presented a petition

¹ Cf. *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, pp. 366, 543.

² "All depends on public opinion. If we—the people of this country and of other countries—desire that the glories of peace should take the place of the glories of war, that great and beneficent change will assuredly come to pass."—Viscount Cecil, *The Way of Peace*, p. 102.

to the Commons begging the House to grant supplies to enable the King to help his allies 'before it is too late.' The militant pacifists were for punishing the freeholders for their presumption. They actually imprisoned their leaders, but the ground crumbled beneath their feet. The insular structure in which they sought to dwell crashed about their ears."¹

What is the next crash to be? A shower of bombs upon London? As matters now stand, and if political programmes mean anything, this disaster can only be averted by a Socialist majority in the House of Commons, because this party alone has declared for the solidarity of the League and the establishment of an international police force.² In a matter of such vital importance it would, however, be saner, wiser, and more patriotic if all parties pursued a national policy with a single paramount aim—the establishment, in conjunction with our neighbours, of the reign of law in Europe. "The insular structure" can be protected in no other way.

But it is obvious that without a mandate our political representatives will continue to pursue the policy of drift. Upon their own initiative they will do nothing. They will rightly say that they cannot legislate in advance of public opinion. Our rulers at

¹ Winston S. Churchill, *Marlborough*, Vol. I, p. 531-532.

² At the Conference of the Labour Party at Hastings in October 1933, the following resolution was adopted on the motion of the Rt. Hon. J. R. Clynes, P.C., "This Conference favours the total disarmament of all nations throughout the world and the creation of an International Police Force, and calls upon the British Government . . . to submit proposals for a large and immediate reduction in the expenditure of all nations on armed forces: for the general abolition of all weapons forbidden to Germany by the Treaty of Versailles: for the abolition of military aircraft and for the international control of civil aviation: for the suppression of all private manufacture and trade in arms: and for strict international inspection and control of the execution of a Disarmament Treaty."

the top—Parliament, the Cabinet and the departments—will pay no heed until public opinion compels them to act. Why? Because to increase the power and authority of the League will necessarily diminish their own.¹ This applies to the political leaders of all nations, especially in those countries governed by dictators, who are less sensitive to the trend of public opinion than the ministries of a democratic State. To a Chancellor, Prime Minister, or Foreign Secretary the prospect of having to appear before a tribunal and being compelled to accept its awards may not be an alluring one. No War Minister, First Lord, or Secretary for Air will become wildly enthusiastic at the suggestion of handing over their big sticks to an international authority. Faced with the prospect of being deprived of certain unlimited powers—e.g. the right to declare war—which they and their parliaments—if they have any—now wield on behalf of their respective countries, they may cling to them all the more tenaciously, even though the result will be the destruction of themselves and everyone else. We can hardly blame them, for, after all, this feeling is only natural and will be shared by many of their subordinates. They may fear that their status and prestige will be diminished and that they may even be amalgamated into a single ministry of defence, which would undoubt-

¹ "Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandise themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government."—Alexander Hamilton, in *The Federalist*, No. 1.

edly pave the way for international co-operation and at the same time effect great economies in our expenditure.

These are some of the real difficulties which stand in the way, and it is clear that nothing will be done unless the people, who will be compelled to bear the brunt of this obsolete system, insist upon its abolition. Unless the electors, who pay the piper but seldom call the tune, demand a policing system in its place, we shall imperceptibly drift into the final debacle.

XIX

IT is also clear that in this matter the democracy of Great Britain is the final arbiter. It is within its power to construct a bridge upon the twin pillars of a tribunal and police force, linking the aspirations of Germany for treaty revision on the one hand and the demands of France for pooled security on the other. There is no other way of peacefully composing the differences and disputes of the revisionist and anti-revisionist groups in Europe. If we refuse to take the lead in constructing this bridge, our blood will be upon our own heads, and we shall go down to posterity as a nation of cowards and shirkers who, whilst pursuing selfishly their own aims and ignoring the plight of their neighbours, perished miserably with them in the culminating disaster.

*Responsi-
bility of
Great
Britain*

As we have seen, the policy hitherto pursued by our country has only helped to disintegrate the League. It has compromised its unity and solidarity. Instead of becoming what its founders, President Wilson,¹ Bourgeois, Cecil, Smuts, and

¹ " Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the

others, intended it to be—an instrument for the prevention of war—it has degenerated into an annual conference. It has become what General Smuts said it should at all costs avoid becoming—merely “a talking shop.” Its prestige and moral authority have been weakened by successive blows—withdrawals, evasions, and contempt of court—until it has now almost sunk to the level of the Hague Tribunal before the War.

Could any other result be expected when its reactionary members, led by Great Britain, have refused to endow it with those elementary institutions—a tribunal and a police force—without which no government in any country could function for a single week? This hypocritical and evasive policy pursued by successive British Governments has now proved itself to be a complete failure. “By their fruits ye shall know them.” It has brought the League, described by some of our statesmen as the corner-stone of British foreign policy, to the brink of disaster. Therefore, it stands condemned by its results. It has brought not peace but a sword. No one can deny that ever since the rejection of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Protocol of 1924 the moral authority of the League has steadily declined. Now it is rapidly falling to pieces, and no British Government has taken any drastic action to stop the rot. On the contrary, one after the other, they have abetted the sabotage.

What is the explanation? After all, we pride

permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organised major force of mankind.”—Address to U.S. Senate, January 22nd, 1917, *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. CXI, pp. 875–876.

ourselves upon being a practical people. Then why this kink in our mentality? Why do we expect the League as it is at present equipped and constituted to perform the impossible? Surely this is "trying it too high."¹ Therefore, let us cease trying to delude ourselves. Let us look the facts squarely in the face, and, recognising the right use of force in international relationships, take time by the forelock and organise in advance.

Adaptation is the secret of existence. It is therefore the highest patriotism. We are not a nation of cowards, nor are we devoid of common sense. Therefore, when we see the clouds gathering and the storm approaching we should be foolish if, in a fit of sheer obstinacy, we refused to take the only step corresponding to our interests, consonant with our professions, and consistent with our morality. Let us therefore adapt our defensive policy to meet the imperative requirements which the march of science has imposed upon us. Instead of timidly and furtively withdrawing from our commitments and responsibilities, let us boldly take a hand in shaping the destinies of Europe as the surest guarantee of our own liberty and prosperity. Let us not, weak-kneed and irresolute, pause in this fateful hour; let us remember that in the past our ancestors have been the pioneers of political institutions and the architects of the reign of law in distant territories. In the twentieth century we, their descendants, are faced with harder tasks, but let us not shirk them,

¹ "This proposal—an International Police Force—would try the League too high, and I, who am a consistent adherent of League policy . . . would strongly deprecate the advocacy of this proposal, for I believe, so far from helping, it would do the League of Nations injury at the present stage."—The Right Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel, November 13th, 1933, *Commons' Debates*, 5th Series, Vol. 281, col. 612.

believing that the innate common sense, practical wisdom, and political sagacity of the Anglo-Saxon-Celtic race can still make its contribution towards the solution of those problems which in these days perplex Europe and the world.

XX

*The League
of Nations
Union*

THE attitude of successive administrations is all the more difficult to understand because for a considerable period the League enjoyed a growing popularity in this country. Ever since its inception it has been supported by a voluntary society, the League of Nations Union, whose membership over the whole period has embraced nearly a million persons. This body, constituted under Royal Charter and supported by representatives of all the political parties, has carried on an intensive peace propaganda. Its annual budget exceeds £30,000 a year, and it has established its branches all over the country. Its main objective is to popularise the League and to enlist the wholehearted support of British democracy on the side of this infant institution. One would, therefore, have imagined that its chief pre-occupation would have been the development of the functions of the League and the strengthening of its organisation. This, however, has not been the official policy of the Union, or at any rate it has not been crystallised or expressed in terms of definite objectives. Broadly speaking, the Union has supported the League policy of the different governments and has, therefore, indirectly helped to land the League in its present deplorable plight. Consequently, it cannot be absolved from blame, because it has been content to play the part of fairy godmother to the governments of the day. Instead

of leading the van and breaking fresh ground, it has clung to the apron-strings of the Foreign Office or the skirts of the peace-at-any-price pacifists.

But surely the rôle of a voluntary society fighting the battle of the League is neither to become a miniature government department on the one hand nor a Quaker institution on the other. Its principles are those enshrined in the Covenant, and amongst these are to be found the pacific revision of treaties¹ and the employment of force in pursuance of the police function.²

It follows that individuals who join the Union accept both these principles. If they repudiate them it means that they have joined this organisation under a misapprehension and that they are sailing under false colours. On the other hand, the acceptance of these principles involves endowing the League with the machinery of revision, either by putting the legislative function into commission—the tribunal system—or developing the Assembly into a World Parliament. It also involves the creation of an international police force.

Our complaint against the Union is that it has concentrated on the symptoms and neglected the disease, and that it has chased the ever-receding shadow of disarmament instead of making effective the common pledge of "the enforcement by common action of international obligations."

Occasionally, of course, there have been spasmodic revolts against governmental policy, but there has never been a concerted attack upon the bogies of sovereignty and the super-state, which appear to have obsessed the politicians of all parties. The Union has failed to give a clear lead, mainly because it has lacked initiative, courage, and conviction.

¹ Article XIX.

² Article XVI.

With few exceptions it has never been able to agree upon any reforms other than those that had been espoused by the government of the day. On occasions, as in the case of the 1924 Protocol, it has abandoned a policy which it had already adopted, apparently because it was no longer the official policy of the party in office. Emulating the example of its predecessor in the nineteenth century—the Peace Society—it has constantly and consistently ignored the problem of the right use of force. It has also singularly failed to tackle the question of treaty revision—an arbitral tribunal empowered to settle all disputes finds no place in its programme.

Surely it is time that this highly influential and representative body got down to business. Having been associated with a policy which has produced such disappointing results, how does the Union propose to restore the prestige and authority of the League? Not merely by denouncing war—people are sick and tired of peace rhetoric; not by preaching the sanctity of the League as a heaven-born institution—forgetting that it has to do with men, not angels; not by fostering the idea that disarmament *per se* is going to give peace to Europe—a conception already proved to be a delusion. These methods and policies are unworthy of a great organisation which proclaims itself to be the champion of the League, because fundamentally they are false and represent a purely negative attitude which is incompatible with the spirit of the Covenant and the genius of our people.

If the Union and similar organisations are to succeed in their mission, they must be boldly constructive in their outlook. They must be fired with zeal and enthusiasm for definite and positive objectives. Like missionary enterprises, they must not be afraid

of putting principle before expediency. Instead of being continually on the defensive, endorsing failure, excusing the follies so often perpetrated by our representatives at Geneva, let them vigorously assume the offensive, remembering that it is always the surest and most direct road to victory—in this case the establishment of the reign of law.

To retrieve the situation it is necessary to rehabilitate the League. Circumscribed in its membership, the balance must be redressed by consolidating those who remain into an international authority, which, by organising and pooling the resources of its members, will present a united front to the aggressor from whatever quarter he may appear, and which, by erecting the necessary machinery, will provide for the peaceful settlement of all their disputes. Surely that is the lesson of experience during the last twenty years. Shall we take it to heart and highly resolve to instil this lesson in the minds of our fellow-countrymen? The Union has performed a great service in keeping the League prominently before the people of this country and in informing its members of the multitudinous activities at Geneva. It has created a League atmosphere and loyalty, which are indispensable as a starting-point for a further advance.

Force and the future—that is the problem, which brooks no delay. And now that the League and the whole system of collective security is threatened with extinction, let the Union, freeing itself from the shackles of political parties, mobilise its supporters, sound the advance, and boldly proclaim the right use of force in the governance of the world. By so doing it will appeal to the highest and noblest patriotism, it will champion the cause of justice, and it will earn the undying gratitude of generations yet unborn.

influenced occasionally by morality and reason, became restive, the aid of patriotism was invoked. In these circumstances there could ultimately be only one result, namely, a resort to war.

Thus the combative instinct inherent in the nature of man, inherited from his ancestors, the cave-dwellers, was encouraged in his international surroundings whilst it was restrained in his national environment.

Here is a contradiction which it is difficult to explain.¹ To attribute the blame to human nature is no answer, for violence was and sometimes still is a characteristic of the relationships between individuals, nor unfortunately has it been entirely eliminated between contending groups in the internal affairs of States. In the international realm, however, it has been the rule rather than the exception. The factor of human nature applies equally to all three relationships, and therefore it cannot be cited as the root cause of this apparent contradiction in the national mentality towards the employment of force. The result has been to stabilise, if not to increase, the combative instinct in the international sphere. Consequently, the national mentality in its attitude towards war has undergone little change. Until 1919 war was generally regarded as an inevitable institution, a necessary though perhaps unpleasant part of the social intercourse of the universe.

¹ "If the social order were really, as is pretended, the work not of passion but of reason, should we have been so slow to see that, in the shaping of it, either too much or too little has been done for our happiness, that each one of us, being in the civil state as regards our fellow-citizens, but in the state of nature as regards the rest of the world, we have taken all kinds of precautions against private wars only to kindle national wars a thousand times more terrible, and that, in joining a particular group of men, we have really declared ourselves the enemies of the whole race."—J. J. Rousseau, *A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe*, trans. Vaughan, p. 38.

law, imposed by the consensus of opinion of the community in which he lives. At a subsequent stage in his development, the community has seen fit to impose a further restraint upon his passions by the imposition of penalties and the creation of the means of enforcing them.¹ Thus in civilised communities the combative instinct has been either suppressed or directed into new channels, manifesting itself, for example, in electoral campaigns and political discussions no less than in the proceedings of the courts of law.

Nevertheless, there are occasions when the passions of the moment submerge these safeguards like a river overflowing its banks, or the safeguards themselves have been strained to breaking-point through patent abuse and acts of tyranny. The flood of violence is then let loose, and for a season the combative instinct is allowed free play.

In the international sphere this instinct seldom slumbers. It is goaded to assert itself by all manner of agencies, some of which operate in the open whilst others work in the dark. The Press, for instance, is a constant irritant, loudly proclaiming the backslidings of every country other than its own,² whilst the armament firms prefer to stimulate the combatant spirit by devious and subterranean methods.

Until the advent of the World War, instead of being curbed and diverted from the path of violence, this national propensity was fomented by every conceivable means. If it showed signs of slackening its pace, it was flogged unmercifully. If public opinion,

¹ See *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, chap. IV, p. 157.

² "Almost everywhere (the Press) tends to embitter racial animosities and make more difficult the preservation of international peace."—Viscount Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, Vol. II, p. 493.

influenced occasionally by morality and reason, became restive, the aid of patriotism was invoked. In these circumstances there could ultimately be only one result, namely, a resort to war.

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In spite of the lessons of the World War, many people, probably the majority, still appear to hold the same view.¹ It is clear that so long as this fatalistic doctrine is uppermost in their minds war, in the sense of a duel between nations, will still be regarded as the ultimate, if not the normal, arbiter in the settlement of international disputes.

How can this mentality be changed? Ingrained in the national fibres by centuries of conflict and violence, how can it be exorcised from the international system? To see is to believe where no amount of argument will prevail. When nations have actually witnessed the transference of superior force to an international authority, they will at last be convinced that the era of peace and justice is at hand. The national mind will henceforth slowly begin to realise that war is a crime which should and can be punished. No longer will this institution be regarded as a duel staged to satisfy the combative instincts of the belligerents.

II

MANY theories and causes may be cited *Causes of War Mentality* which in the past have helped to produce the war atmosphere and mentality. Amongst these are the following.

First, war was regarded as an instrument of policy, which could be employed to attain some political object as, for example, supremacy over a neighbouring State, the acquisition of new territory or the control of economic resources. The condition

¹ "The affective memory of the nations is so short and the sentimental and mystic impulses which hurl them against one another so powerful that our hopes of peace for the future are very uncertain. . . . The wind of madness which has blown upon the world is not yet stilled."—Gustave Le Bon, *The World in Revolt*, p. 134.

of readiness for war was considered to be the hallmark of prestige and authority.

Secondly, war was regarded as inevitable. It was the only means of settling disputes in which the honour or vital interests of the nation were supposed to be involved.¹

Thirdly, war was regarded as a duel or trial of strength between nations or groups of nations. As such, it contained an element of adventure, nobler and more inspiring but akin to other forms of manly exercise and sport. How many adventurous spirits in every country before the World War longed for this thrilling experience?

Fourthly, war was regarded as the sole means of self-defence. The armaments race was costly, but there was no alternative. Cadet corps, volunteers, territorials, the system of conscription, were all based on this fundamental conception.

Fifthly, war was regarded as a cult or an end in itself. In countries like Germany and Japan the military machine dominated the political parties and intruded itself into every department of national activity. Industrial, financial, educational, literary, and even religious institutions were smitten by this fever. In almost all countries the armed forces took precedence in the esteem of the peoples over all other institutions.² Military and naval rank overshadowed

¹ Thus arbitration treaties in the past have commonly excluded disputes involving national honour or vital interests.

² "Citizens are called upon to make immense sacrifices for their own country, on the ground that cosmopolitanism is an idle dream, and that service under arms, universal or vicarious, is the only way by which our hearths and homes can be protected. The army and navy of each country are, therefore, credited with a peculiar sanctity, as representing not merely the prestige, glory and honour of the Fatherland, but the very possibility of its existence. Without these national guards—so the theory runs—we cannot live. The first business of the State is to maintain them, to increase them with

the peaceful professions. In the eyes of the populace, ecclesiastics and scholars of every variety faded into obscurity on occasions when military and naval uniforms enlivened the scene. Every conceivable pomp and circumstance was present to instil martial ardour into the minds of the masses. Reviews, war-like spectacles, manœuvres, gorgeous though prehistoric uniforms, military bands, and all the other frills and trappings of war were and still are in constant request to popularise the art of human slaughter.

Sixthly, war was regarded by groups of people in every country as a profitable business. These groups—the armament firms and financial concerns engaged in exploiting semi-civilised communities—though relatively small in numbers, were extremely influential. They controlled newspapers and lost no opportunity of bringing pressure to bear upon ministers and cabinets. They sold their products to all nations indiscriminately.¹ They exercised a constant and sinister influence upon the public mind.

Seventhly, war was regarded as the last refuge of the discredited monarch or politician. When internal unrest approached the danger point, how simple to divert the righteous wrath of the people from their rulers into the channel of hostilities against their

every increase of force in a neighbouring nation, and, on the ground of the personal and national sacrifices they embody, to surround them with every mark of public honour, and even with religious sanctions.”—G. H. Perris, *The War Traders*, p. 4.

¹ “ If they are patriots, it is a new and singularly impartial kind—British on Monday, Russian on Tuesday, Canadian on Wednesday, Italian on Thursday, and so on, as orders may be got from China to Peru. . . . These are not the kind of men to wait upon the fortunes of political parties; they make their own politics, they make their fortunes by moulding international relations to their will.”—Perris, *The War Traders*, p. 17.

neighbours.¹ What surer way of regaining popularity than by appealing to the martial instincts of one's fellow-countrymen? What fairer prospect of eternal fame, and incidentally of winning an election, than by standing on the prostrate form of a vanquished foe?²

Eighthly, war was regarded as the adjunct of patriotism. "My country, right or wrong" tersely embodies this creed. This particular twist in the national mentality is often associated with some form of religious sanction. For instance, one is reminded of the popular songs, "This was the charter of the land, and guardian angels sang this strain—Rule, Britannia," and "God who made us mighty, make us mightier yet."

III

*Education
in War*

NINTHLY, war has been regarded as the institution which has made the greatest contribution to the progress of the world. Hence the importance which historians have accorded to war in their records of national events. Generally speaking, every history book is a chronicle of human activities in which violence plays a prominent part. The impression left on the mind of the reader is that history represents merely a succession of wars. A schoolboy, on being told that the League of Nations was intended to abolish war, remarked, "Then we shall have no more history lessons to learn."

¹ Thus the Russian Minister, Plehve, hoped in 1904 to divert public attention from the internal situation by the war with Japan.

² The dominance of the Japanese militarists was thus secured by the Chinese War. "The psychology of war, which deadens all morality, had awakened the chauvinism of the people. As a result, their insistence for democracy succumbed to an insistence for blood. The conquest of war over liberalism was complete. The military party has ruled practically supreme in Japan down to the present day."—Buell, *The Washington Conference*, p. 366.

The glorification of militarism in history, literature, and music, the space devoted to the exploits of generals and admirals, the background of national pride in these achievements, foster in the youthful mind an entirely wrong impression of the attributes of war. The combative instinct is encouraged. At an early age toy soldiers and battleships, always a leading attraction, assist in the process of forming a bias in favour of war.

A father who wishes to bring up his son as a safe sportsman will chastise him for pointing an unloaded gun at anyone, even in play. To inculcate a subconscious habit of safety, this practice is absolutely forbidden. The same father, however, remains unperturbed if his boy, in the course of play or during his school career, points the national gun at all and sundry.¹

Subsequent steps in his educational career tend to create in the boy's mind a false standard of values. In comparison with other activities, the military profession holds the leading and most distinguished place. The suggestion that membership of a police force offered a still more honourable and useful career would probably be received with coolness; certainly not with enthusiasm. When force becomes subservient to the law, it appears to lose much of its glamour and attraction.

Thus it will be seen that education in its widest sense—the impressions received during childhood and adolescence, which eventually constitute the

¹ The Japanese battleship *Mutsu*, one of the largest and most powerful battleships afloat, was built out of subscriptions by school-children and the general public. The sentimental value attached to it by the Japanese public caused the Japanese delegation at the Washington Conference to insist on its retention, even though its retention involved a cost of some £16,000,000 to the British taxpayer.—Cf. Buell, *The Washington Conference*, pp. 159–161.

national mentality—has contributed towards the continuance of war.

IV

*The
Antidote*

THESE are some of the ideas and motives which have assisted, amongst others, in moulding the attitude of every nation towards war. From age to age, century to century, and generation to generation they have varied in degree and intensity. In certain nations, as in individuals, the warlike instinct is much more highly developed than in others. It flourishes for a period and then declines, having drained its victims of their life-blood and prosperity.¹ The mentality, however, still persists. The scene may be shifted, but the intellectual horizon remains the same. Germany forced the pace yesterday, she demands equality to-day: Russia and Japan take up the running to-morrow. Where will it end? Can no antidote be found? Arbitration alone will not provide the

¹ "Armies demand men above the average in physical efficiency. It is plain that the most energetic and intelligent among these make the best soldiers. It is recognised that those who fight best suffer the most in action, while the demands of battle and camp cut off men in the prime of life from normal parenthood. This leaves the weaker elements of one kind or another to be the fathers of the coming generations. By the law of heredity, like the seed is the harvest, and the future of the race repeats the qualities of those war does not use."—D. Starr Jordan, *War and the Breed*, p. 2. "The average height of the men of France began notably to decrease with the coming of age, in 1813 and on, of the young men born in the years of the Revolutionary Wars. . . . it continued to decrease in the following years with the coming of age of youths born during the wars of the Empire."—V. L. Kellogg, *Military Selection and Race Deterioration*, p. 190. "The influence of the Napoleonic Wars was felt by the nation, and revealed by its recruiting statistics, for a far longer time in its aspect of producing a racial deterioration as to vigour."—*Id.*, p. 191.

remedy¹: disarmament is already at a discount. Where, then, can we discover a cure sufficiently drastic which will transform the evil genius of force in such a way that the change may be reflected in the mentality and physique of the nations?

It may be true that to accomplish this task nothing short of a revolution in international conceptions is necessary. As we have seen, reformers are faced with the traditions of the past, enshrined in the history of every nation. Mighty forces, appealing to the feelings and passions of men, are arrayed against any fundamental change. And yet, stripped of its trappings, the question is a simple one. What is the right use of force? Is it, as we have contended, epitomised in the police function? If the answer is Yes, then here is a basis for common agreement between the nations, which will at once modify and eventually completely change their moral and intellectual outlook towards war. Here is a principle which the ordinary person in every civilised community can understand. The courts of law and the police are factors which enter into his daily existence, even though he may hardly be conscious of the fact. He comprehends the purpose for which they have been established, and as a rule he approves of them. They are part and parcel of the system of law under which he lives, moves, and has his being. His experience, morality, and reason tell him that the same principle should be applied to the relationships of States. He will, therefore, be more likely to respond to this

¹ "Marching *pari passu* with this growing practice of appeal to arbitration is the sinister fact that nowhere are armies and navies diminishing in numbers and strength: rather are they increasing by leaps and bounds."—C. F. Goodrich in *The Nineteenth Century*, July 1911, p. 26.

argument than to any other. If he can be aroused from his apathy, and if his innate prejudices and conservatism can be overcome, it is conceivable that he may even support the project. Finally, after he is convinced that it offers the only alternative to the utter destruction of his national community, he will demand its adoption. Experience, morality, and reason may each play their part in arriving at this conclusion, but the trump card is necessity. "Necessity knows no law," but in the end the reign of law will provide the means of meeting the necessity? The impending doom which science has unconsciously prepared for mankind "when cometh the end of all things"¹ has thrust necessity into the foreground. It cannot be evaded. The choice must be made. The prophecy of Kant² will be fulfilled and, against his will, man will be compelled to subjugate international force to the dictates of reason and right. Necessity, stern and relentless, points out the road. To disregard her warning is to court disaster: to pay heed is to find salvation.

Never before have the peoples of the world been faced with this tremendous issue. New conditions demand a change of mentality. The faculty of adaptation is the secret of existence.³ Will the democracies of the world rise to the occasion? Hitherto their governments, dominated by the shibboleths of a bygone age, have refused to entertain the project of

¹ A. Lindsay Gordon, *Bellona*.

² "The mechanism of nature, working through the self-seeking propensities of man (which of course counteract one another in their external effects), may be used by reason as a means of making way for the realisation of her own purpose, the empire of right, and, as far as is in the power of the State, to promote and secure in this way internal as well as external peace. We may say, then, that it is the irresistible will of nature that right shall at last get the supremacy." —Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, trans. Smith, p. 155.

³ Cf. Le Bon, *The World in Revolt*, pp. 57 *et seq.*

setting up an international police, which involves "so drastic a pooling of sovereignty."¹ The ultimate choice, however, lies with the democratic electorates.

If the support of the peoples can be enlisted for a principle which they cannot fail to understand—the right use of force—the project is not so revolutionary as at first sight it would appear. The assets at the disposal of the concern are sufficiently great to avoid the bankruptcy of civilisation. If the shareholders can be convinced that a policy of reconstruction is essential, a strong board of directors will be found to carry it through.

Hence it follows that the great task is the education of the public. Let them be warned in time. Let the national reformers in every country concentrate their efforts in focussing public opinion on the vital significance of an international police. Only by this means will it be possible to create that new mentality which seeks to repress the combative instinct in international relationships no less than in the sphere of domestic affairs.

V

“**A**S the social group merges in the larger *Cohesion* group, the moral bonds which have held men together as members of the smaller group may lose much of their force, without being immediately succeeded by moral bonds of equal strength between citizens as members of the larger group. In other words, the process of drilling men into larger communities is one in which force is apt to play the prominent part.”²

¹ Interim Report of League of Nations Committee of the Foreign Office, March 20th, 1918. See *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, chap. III, p. 124.

² W. Jethro Brown, *The Austinian Theory of Law*, p. 278.

This dictum can also be applied to the new association of nations. A confederation seeking to establish the reign of law, but lacking any centralised force on which it can rely, is handicapped from the start. It is true that this force is not the fountain of the law. It does, however, represent its authority and its majesty in the eyes of all those nations which have joined themselves together in a solemn league and covenant to support the claims of justice.

Further, it signifies the visible point of cohesion which binds these communities together for the purpose of preventing war. There are, no doubt, other ties, such as intellectual co-operation and the treatment of health, labour, and economic problems, all of which help to produce a common interest. At present the outward and visible manifestation of this common interest is represented by a comparatively small civil service, the sections of the League of Nations Secretariat, which are permanently engaged in dealing with these subjects. Similarly, the creation of an international police force will express the determination of the nations to endow the international authority with the means of making itself effective. During its adolescent stage, when the bonds are necessarily weak and the common interests have not yet been able to assert themselves as in older and more firmly established communities, the authority cannot afford to be deprived of an organisation which not only holds the would-be aggressor in awe but also helps to produce a new mentality in the realm of international relationships.

VI

LET us suppose that the international police force has been established. What changes will its advent foreshadow in the psychology of nations? *The New Mentality*

In the first place, its appearance will denote the inauguration of the reign of law. Governments will realise for the first time that treaties, pacts, and conventions can no longer be ratified unless it is intended to observe their provisions. Failure to live up to international obligations will involve the imposition of penalties which can be enforced. Hypocritical arrangements, so common in the past, which one or possibly both of the parties never meant to carry out, will be studiously avoided.¹ Henceforward every international engagement will bear the seal of sincerity and good faith. The tricks of the diplomatic conjurer will be at a discount; the mentality of every Foreign Office will undergo a transformation.

Secondly, in the past national mentality has associated war with the idea of conquest. The victors were entitled to the spoils, whether these were expressed in terms of money, maidens, flocks or fields. The conqueror extracted his booty at the point of the sword. These ideas, though modified in

¹ Even the Treaty of Versailles, handed to the German Delegation after a conference lasting many months, was insufficiently considered by the Allies. "As regards the Treaty," writes Sir Henry Wilson on May 5th, 1919, two days before the day the Treaty was to be handed to the German Delegation, "no one has ever seen it in its completed form, for it does not exist. Both Bonar Law and Smuts, who have been struggling to get completed copies, told me they had been unable, and both told me the whole thing was in a hopeless mess. . . . We are going to hand out terms to the Boches without reading them ourselves. I don't think in all history this can be matched."—Major-Gen. Sir C. E. Callwell's *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson*, Vol. II, pp. 188–189, 190.

theory, still, however, persist. Even though they are cloaked in the garment of the mandate to give them an air of respectability, the popular mind still regards new acquisitions of territory as the product of the sword.¹

The creation of an international force will finally dispel this conception of war. Henceforth the day of annexations will be past. The international authority will not be concerned to acquire territory or any other material advantage. Its sole responsibility is to support the process of law and to compel the criminal to appear before the bar of justice.² When the international force has performed this task, the dispute or the act of aggression is referred to the international court or arbitration tribunal. The case is tried or adjudicated upon in accordance with the law of nations. The verdict is given and the costs

¹ It is to be feared that prominent politicians have been too prone to regard the German and Turkish territories as acquired by the mandatories by right of conquest. "I would like at once to challenge the claim made by my Right Honourable friend that the League of Nations has got to dispose of these mandates. I do not accept that. . . . Under the German Treaty the German colonies are handed over, not to the League of Nations, but to the Allied and Associated Powers. By the very terms of the Treaty it is for them to decide who are the mandatories. After all, the expense of emancipating these colonies fell upon the Allies. . . . I repudiate entirely the suggestion that it is for the League of Nations to determine who shall be the mandatories of those countries . . . that cost us hundreds of millions to emancipate."—Mr. Lloyd George, June 23rd, 1920, *Commons' Debates*, 5th Series, Vol. 130, col. 2256.

² "Although such applications of violence will retain certain external characteristics of war, yet in their nature they will be essentially different from it. In the first place they will only be rare exceptions, which will not, as present war, influence the entire normal life of the countries. Moreover, they will not, like present war, usurp the place of law, but be carried out in the service of law. This will take away the bitterness of the strife, and above all, it will save it from the dangerous aftermath which present wars bring with them. Neither hate nor desire for revenge will remain behind."—A. H. Fried, *Handbuch der Friedensbewegung*, 2nd edition, I, pp. 12–13, reprinted in *War Obviated by an International Police*, p. 187.

are assessed. But there is no question of dividing the spoils. Thus the new mentality will no longer be influenced by those primitive conceptions which have been bequeathed to us by the pillagers and pilferers of the past.

Thirdly, recourse to international courts and arbitration tribunals will crystallise into a habit. It will develop into the normal procedure, and will become the rule rather than the exception. Accustomed to the idea of law as opposed to rules, realising that contempt of court may be fraught with serious consequences, the most chauvinistic nation will pause before it decides to substitute the uniform of the aggressor for the garb of the litigant.

VII

FOURTHLY, as world opinion solidifies around this concrete manifestation of the will to peace and the enthronement of justice, nations will develop the habit of conforming to the code of international law, not because they fear the consequences of an illegal act, but because it has become the custom to do so.

*Growth of
Sub-
conscious
Mentality*

In civilised communities, the vast majority of law-abiding persons are animated by an instinctive respect for law, which has almost developed into a second nature. If anyone were to suggest that they should become law-breakers, they would feel aggrieved. To self-respecting citizens the loss of social prestige, the stigma attached to the criminal, the horror of appearing in the dock, are sufficiently awe-inspiring. In these cases, the threat of a penalty or a punishment may be superfluous. The development, however, of this subconscious mentality, exemplifying the attitude of the majority of in-

dividuals towards the legal machinery of the State, represents the accumulated experience of centuries. It is not the product of a single generation, but expresses the habits of thought and mental training inculcated by successive waves of civilisation.

On the other hand, there are the criminal classes in every country, a comparatively small percentage of the total population, whose activities can only be restrained by forcible means.

There remain two other categories of law-breakers, namely, those normally respectable persons who become the victims of a sudden temptation to overstep the bounds of the law, and those who are momentarily overcome by gusts of passion, depriving them of their self-control.

It is difficult to appraise the deterrent effect exercised by the element of coercion upon these various categories. It is probably greater than most people imagine. In the case of the hardened criminal its influence may be slight. It merely prevents the propagation of this species, and protects the rest of the community from its unwelcome attentions. To the weaker brethren whose powers of self-control and subconscious habits have been impaired, the existence of the arm of the law becomes a potent factor in determining their behaviour, whilst throughout the centuries it has contributed to create and maintain the habit of obedience amongst the self-respecting members of the community.

Though it may not be possible to measure the deterrent influence of the constabularies in a positive sense, we may well imagine the state of affairs in any country suddenly deprived of their services,¹ and

¹ During the police strike in Liverpool in August 1919 extensive looting took place and much damage was done to property.—*Annual Register*, 1919, pp. 99–100.

the consequent reaction upon the mentality of all classes of the community. The ranks of the criminal class would at once be augmented. Those individuals whose appetites and passions had hitherto been restrained by the fear of punishment would divert their footsteps from the straight and narrow path. In course of time, the pervading sense of lawlessness would invade the strongholds of the law-abiding fraternity. Their self-respect would be undermined and their normal mentality would be impaired.

As an illustration of this tendency, it is instructive to note the effect upon national mentality produced by the removal of incentives in the economic sphere. Eliminate the inducements to thrift, and the nation becomes seized with a fit of extravagance. Distribute doles and subsidies, and individuals lose their self-respect and independence, characteristics which the nation may have cherished for generations.¹ The demoralisation spreads. Men who would have scorned to accept charity at the hands of the State, whose ancestors prided themselves upon their sturdy independence, are now content to subsist upon the unearned distributions of the national exchequers. Industrial concerns which in the past had faced competition at home and abroad with confidence in their

¹ Disastrous effects followed the general adoption of the principle of the Speenhamland decision of 1795, when the Berkshire magistrates decided to distribute doles to the poor out of parish funds in order to augment their earnings and secure to every man a minimum living wage. "By securing an income to all the labourers, it offered a direct encouragement to carelessness on the part of the men, so that the farmers complained that they could not obtain efficient labour. . . . The demoralising effects became apparent to one observer at least before it had been in operation many months. 'From what will follow emulation and exertion will be totally destroyed, a man working extra hours not doing it for his own benefit but for that of the parish.'"—W. Cunningham, *English History and Commerce—Laissez Faire*, p. 720.

own ability to overcome every obstacle, now invoke the protection of the State and greedily absorb the subsidies which spendthrift governments place at their disposal.

What is the inevitable result? National character suffers, the qualities of initiative and self-help lose their attraction, luxury trades reap their harvest, the ranks of the unemployed are swelled. The mentality of all classes undergoes a complete, though possibly only a temporary, change.

Similarly, if all legal restraints were removed, the results would be displayed in a change of mentality, even on the part of self-respecting citizens. Experience during every period of anarchy, when the machinery of the law has been temporarily suspended, corroborates this view. At the conclusion of these upheavals it has been found necessary, sooner or later, to reintroduce the element of compulsion, and to re-establish systems of government whose legal institutions relied upon force for their sanctions.

Thus the influence exercised by force, organised in a concrete and visible form, upon the mentality of individuals in their relationship to the State and to each other, is one of the most important factors in the development and welfare of the community.

The character of a State is portrayed in its institutions and laws. Conversely, these institutions and laws are themselves mirrored in the mentality of the peoples. The same remark applies to the community of States. An international organisation devoid of sanctions, and possessing no visible means of enforcing its decisions, cannot exert a profound influence upon the mentality of its state-members. The latter are deprived of the means of forming gradually the subconscious habit of obedience to

the higher purpose. The weaker members are not encouraged to exercise their powers of self-control, whilst the criminally minded States are still free to connive at the robbery and murder of their neighbours. Not until an international police force has been established will the old mentality, which seeks to demonstrate its superiority by a resort to war, be replaced by a new conception of international justice and the universal recognition of international law.

VIII

FIFTHLY, the existence of an international police force, representing the determination of the nations to uphold the reign of law, will become a permanent reminder to every person of his individual responsibility to assist in this undertaking. Here is something visible and tangible, which has been constituted to protect him from the inroads of aggression. No longer can he entertain any doubts as to the rights or wrongs of the quarrel. If the international police are engaged in suppressing a crime or enforcing a decision of the international court, the individual will realise that if he is called upon he is under an obligation to assist them. To the existing duty of rendering assistance to his constabularies will be added the further responsibility of aiding the forces of the international authority. The scope of his allegiance and loyalty has thus been expanded. When the cry of "Stop, thief" reverberates in the streets of the international metropolis, he will understand its significance.

*Direct Influence of
I.P.F. on
Mentality*

Sixthly, the return of members of the international police at the expiration of their period of service to their homes will exercise, in course of time, a profound influence on the national outlook. If the in-

ternational police establishment develops into one of the finest technical training centres in the world,¹ its popularity will become assured. As the reservists are absorbed in civilian employment they will become missionaries in the cause of international co-operation. The combative instinct will thus have received its rudest shock, and war mentality will stand abashed in the presence of these modern Knights of Justice. Their influence will permeate into all ranks of society; they will represent the embodiment of an idea heralded throughout the ages, which at last has received its carnate manifestation.

To dispel any lingering doubt on this point, we have only to consider the remarkable influence upon international relationships which is exercised by the members of the Secretariat at Geneva. Although relatively a mere handful, they nevertheless, in indirect ways, exert a degree of influence out of all proportion to their numbers. Similarly, the views of Foreign Secretaries and national representatives often undergo a complete change for the better after a period of close association with the affairs of the League. Their sympathies are broadened, their outlook expands. On their return home, they may even become ardent apostles of the infant regime. At present the missionary forces engaged in promoting the new mentality are deplorably few in numbers. The inclusion of the international police reservists in their ranks will provide an accession of strength which, in the course of a few decades, will make its influence felt throughout the length and breadth of the world.

¹ See *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*, chap. XII, pp. 446, 448.

IX

SEVENTHLY, the new mentality towards war which the creation of an international police force would hasten into existence would not be confined to the international sphere alone. Its reactions will be felt in other quarters. The combative instinct in human nature eternally draws fresh inspiration and replenishment from the recurrence of war. Long after the treaties of peace have been signed, the baleful aftermath of the slaughter persists in the internal ferments which the recrudescence of this instinct has let loose. The conflict between nations has reduced the forces of morality and reason to a low ebb. The idea of justice in all departments of human relationship recedes into the background. Force and nationality have become the heroes of the moment. Generals, admirals, and munition manufacturers¹ receive thanks, honours, and emoluments at the hands of their grateful countrymen. Politicians and profiteers seek to invest their respective capital, amassed during the struggle, to the best advantage. In the exultation of the moment the futility of war is forgotten and its lessons are only partially learnt.

*Reaction of
the New
Mentality
on Internal
Affairs*

After the War this mentality proceeded to have its fling in other directions. It invaded the political arenas of various States, and intruded itself into their domestic affairs. In Russia, for example, it manifested itself on a large and disastrous scale, just at

¹ Sir Basil Zaharoff, of Vickers Ltd., was the recipient at the Armistice of the D.C.L. degree of the University of Oxford, the Grand Cross of the Orders of the Bath and the British Empire, and the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour for "special services in the cause of the Allies."—R. Lewinsohn, *Sir Basil Zaharoff*, pp. 133-135.

"At this time generals were everywhere being made doctors *honoris causa*."—*Id.*, p. 135.

the moment when the faint outlines of a democratic government were discernible. The Duma, whose constitutional powers had for a time been increasing, was extinguished by a new tyranny more insidious and more devastating than the one from which it had emerged.¹ The war mentality, a blind belief in the supremacy of force over morality and reason, had entered into the vitals of this nation. The day may come when it will be exorcised ; not, let us hope, by the means which enable a handful of adventurers to exercise mastery over their fellow-countrymen, but by a gradual evolution of the present regime into a constitutional democracy based upon the eternal principles of equality in the eyes of the law, the liberty of the subject, and the right of exercising a free and unfettered franchise by all the members of the community.

Another illustration of this blind belief in the supremacy of force is to be found in the post-war history of Great Britain. A General Strike was organised to subvert the constitution and to overthrow a popularly elected government, whose authority rested upon the votes of a free people. So obsessed were the leaders of this reactionary movement with the idea of force that they were prepared to challenge the decisions of a legislative assembly whose conclusions were reached after full and unfettered discussion. This event displayed a curious exhibition of the war psychology on the grand scale. What morality and reason, expressed by the decisions of the deliberative and sovereign organ of the constitution, refused to grant must be extracted by force. The creed of the new apostles, a product of the war

¹ The Duma was established by an act of August 19th, 1905, and ceased to exist on the formation of the Provisional Government in March 1917.

mentality, appears to be that if you cannot get what you want by negotiation, you are entitled to impose your will by forcible means, even though this course involves the infliction of suffering upon people who are in no wise parties to the dispute. To employ the services of a third party, competent to express an impartial verdict, is regarded as a sign of weakness. To suggest compulsory arbitration, when the awards of the arbitrator would be enforced, is looked upon as folly. The result has been that in many countries a succession of strikes, lock-outs, and economic upheavals have taken place in which war mentality has been allowed free play. The speeches of the protagonists leave no doubt on this point. They abound with warlike metaphors. The exhortations of the most ardent international pacifists become redolent of the jargon of the trenches.

The cult of the lock-out or strike weapon, involving the abandonment of arbitration, has already been fraught with the most appalling results. Like a boomerang, it has recoiled upon the heads of those unfortunate people on both sides who had become the dupes of catch-words and slogans manufactured to arouse their combative instincts. The economic conditions of the situation are ignored. Upon the stern logic of facts is superimposed an equally relentless determination to compel settlements regardless of every other consideration. Thus industry, struggling to regain its foothold after the convulsion of the war, is mercilessly thrust back into the whirlpool by those short-sighted people who derive their sustenance from its continued existence and prosperity.

The same attitude of mind is displayed by educational and professional combinations. It has permeated the national mentality. Bitter experience

alone will eventually prove that reason is the final arbiter in all these proceedings, and that settlements dictated by force offer only a temporary and illusory solution of the problem.

X

Conclusion

THUS it will be seen that the psychological effects produced in international affairs tend to reappear in the industrial warfare between labour and capital and in other departments of economic and social relationships. Convulsions in one quarter find their reactions in the other. The eternal struggle between reason and passion, between right and might, manifesting itself in the mentality of the nations, will not be assuaged until force has become the servant of justice in every department of human affairs. The moral and intellectual outlook of nations, like that of individuals, changes from generation to generation. The slogans of youth become the heresies of old age. Religions wax and wane ; civilisation advances and recedes. The dividing line between right and wrong may shift its position from time to time : nevertheless, the law of progress still remains. In all departments of human thought it will reassert itself. Checked and retarded it may be by the reactions of a war mentality, but eventually it must recover the lost ground.

Few people will deny that the standards of private and public morality were lowered by the experiences of the World War.¹ All religions have suffered. Their messages of peace and goodwill had fallen on deaf ears. The claims of the State and nationality proved too strong. They overruled the dictates of the Master. In the social sphere waves of crime and bloodshed have swept and are still sweeping

¹ See p. 17.

over the countries of Europe. Scores of men accustomed to the art of killing do not hesitate to resort to violence. In all classes of the community an unrestricted licence has manifested itself among men and women which would not have been tolerated in pre-War days. This reactionary phase in the evolution of mentality is directly attributable to the War.

If, however, we believe that the Universe has been ordained with a moral purpose, this phase can only be regarded as temporary. "Yet if man of all the Creator plann'd, His noblest work is reckoned," he must retrace his footsteps, shaking the dust of Armageddon from his feet. By long and successive stages his mentality will gradually become attuned to a higher purpose, until at length he attains the perfection of those who inhabit the Kingdom of God. It follows that one of the first lessons he has to learn is the right or moral use of force amongst the nations of this planet. When man has applied himself successfully to this task, he may then proceed swiftly along the mysterious road. Divesting himself of his appalling burden, he may look forward with renewed hope to the day when justice shall reign supreme, and peace shall encircle the earth.

The tumult and the shouting dies ;
The Captains and the Kings depart :
Still stands Thine ancient sacrifice,
An humble and a contrite heart.
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget—lest we forget !

Far called, our navies melt away ;
On dune and headland sinks the fire :
Lo, all our pomp of yesterday
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre !
Judge of the Nations, spare us yet,
Lest we forget—lest we forget !

RUDYARD KIPLING.

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